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ABSTRACT 
This research investigates political risk in the context of service offshoring and 
the corresponding impact on risk management decisions. The first stage of the 
study uses the Repertory Grid Technique (RGT), to explore key post-contract 
political risks experiences within offshore outsourcing activities. Twelve key 
political risks affecting offshore outsourcing decisions are identified, and the 
moderating effect of offshoring activity types (BPO, ITO or KPO) on political risk 
exposure and impact perceptions is highlighted. The research also explores the 
conditioning effect of industry specific exposure to political risk and enhances the 
explanatory ability of the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) constructs, offering 
a re-operationalization of the political risk component of external uncertainty.  
The second stage of the research introduces a series of hypotheses between 
offshoring flows and political risk profiles, and applies multiple regression to 
analyse political risk affecting offshore activities in low cost countries across 
contract-based offshoring engagements and FDI. The findings highlight that 
political risk is a genuine business concern for offshore contract-based 
outsourcing modalities, and identify concerns with Intellectual Property 
protection, Quality of Bureaucracy and Corruption as key considerations affecting 
location decisions in low-cost countries. The research further suggests a positive 
relationship between strong country level institutional and regulatory systems and 
high knowledge content in offshoring engagements.  
From a practical perspective, the research highlights the need for managerial 
tools to determine diversified firm and industry specific political risk impact on 
global service outsourcing engagements. The key practical contribution is the 
development of differentiated political risk typologies that can capture the 
nuances of external risks in offshoring, allowing for more accurate risk 
assessment of offshoring decisions. 
Keywords: Political Risk; Offshore Outsourcing; Low-cost country sourcing, 
Service Offshoring; Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); Transaction Cost Theory, 
Repertory Grid Analysis, Multiple Regression Analysis. 
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Personal Statement 
My interest in offshoring, in its various forms, stems from years of working in 
emerging economies and observing how the phenomenon has engaged the 
world in an interlinked network of economic interdependence. The expanding 
global sourcing activities are having a transformational effect on the global 
economy, working as a platform for socio-economic realignment and growth. 
Whereas critics have highlighted offshoring as a potential cause of job-loses in 
the US and Europe, and at times even a source of income inequality in host 
countries, the overall value-building dynamic of offshoring is materializing at a 
global level. In fact, offshoring is now acknowledged as a powerful engine for 
socio-economic change through job creation in host countries and can be seen 
as an indirect mechanism for global wealth redistribution. With the emergence 
and acceptance of concepts like social impact sourcing, as part of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, offshore outsourcing has the potential to 
further create dignified job opportunities, support gender equality through equal 
pay and reverse urbanization as enhanced IT infrastructure allows for job creation 
outside major cities. Furthermore, offshoring has similarly become an indirect 
social equalizer in developed countries by facilitating accessibility to affordable 
goods/services to all levels of society and thereby enhancing the material quality 
of life for millions.   
For host countries offshore outsourcing is an opportunity to connect local 
businesses with the global economy, developing local job market opportunities 
and facilitating knowledge transfers, with the potential to assist developing 
countries onto a development path fuelled by private sector expansion and 
capacity enhancement. This dynamic is most obvious in now maturing emerging 
economies, such as China and India, being previous markets for simple 
manufacturing, then Information Technology Outsourcing or simple Business 
Process Outsourcing (BPO) and now engaging in Knowledge Process 
Outsourcing (KPO), based on an advanced level of supplier-client relationship 
and integration.  
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The following research on political risk in global offshoring strategies promotes 
the expansion of business opportunities into new frontier low-cost countries by 
developing methodologies that aim at identifying, and potentially managing rather 
than avoiding risk. Through proactive risk management international service 
buyers will be able to engage with increased confidence in more complex, but 
profitable offshoring opportunities. Finally, the research informs policy 
development for national governments and multinational organizations like the 
United Nations and World Bank, on private sector support and actions promoting 
the hosting of offshoring activities with the intentions of furthering national 
development objectives. 
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1 Linking Commentary 
The purpose of this Linking Commentary is to synthesize and integrate the 
scoping study and three consecutive research projects that have been completed 
as partial fulfilment of the Doctorate in Business Administration (DBA) at Cranfield 
School of Management. These projects build on each other and constitute the 
milestones required by the DBA process. 
The linking commentary firstly introduces the background and business problem 
to be addressed by the research. Next, it presents the theoretical entry point and 
associated research questions guiding the overall study. An overview of the 
research process and interlinked projects is provided, followed by a discussion 
on the applied research methods. Finally a summary of the key findings is 
presented, before elaborating on the research’s contributions to knowledge and 
practice. The commentary closes with a discussion of limitations and 
opportunities for further research. 
The overall aim of this thesis is to explore the type and impact of political risk 
exposure in offshoring strategies. Specifically, the objective is to extend the 
analysis of political risk to include the offshore outsourcing service industry, and 
to compare the impact of political risk exposure across an extended spectrum of 
offshore entry modes. The research is guided by the following research 
question(s): 
1. What are the key political risk factors impacting on offshoring strategies? 
2. How do these political risk factors differ in importance depending on entry 
mode structure? 
1.1 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
 Chapter 1: Linking commentary - Provides a synthesis of the three 
research projects and consolidated findings. 
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 Chapter 2: Project one (Systematic literature review) – Provides a 
systematic review of the literature and existing knowledge on political risk 
impacting offshore sourcing strategies.  
 Chapter 3: Project two – Empirically explores and maps how offshore 
outsourcing practitioners construct and perceive political risk in offshore 
engagements. 
 Chapter 4: Project three – Empirically explores the relationship between 
the identified political risk constructs and offshore sourcing flows from 
2006-2015. 
Appendices: There are a number of appendices related to each of the individual 
projects of the thesis. Appendices for each project are presented in separate 
sections A, B and C (A=Project One, B=Project Two and C=Project Three). 
Note that this thesis integrates stand-alone documents submitted as milestone 
requirements for the DBA. The documents have been developed during the time 
period 2010 - 2015, and reflect a progression of the research process 
accordingly.  
1.2 Business Problem  
Globalization has propelled a revolution in offshoring strategies as companies, 
driven by cost pressures, extend their service chains across the globe through 
increased levels of offshore sourcing activities (Meixell, Gargeya 2005). The 
offshoring to low-cost countries, with ever more complex business environments, 
has expanded traditional risk consideration to include the political environment of 
host destinations, and underlined the need to combine offshoring strategies with 
proactive risk management (Giunipero 2004). As stated “the risk [for offshoring 
and global supply chains] is broader than ever and a risk and uncertainty lens is 
the newest and perhaps one of the most important capabilities and contributions 
that can be made to a firm’s competitiveness and viability” (Barry, 2006, p.697). 
As companies offshore increasing volumes of business processes through 
complex networks of subsidiaries and outsourcing suppliers, proactive and 
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efficient risk management is therefore emerging as a key priority for companies 
relying on low-cost country offshoring as part of their global sourcing strategies.  
1.2.1 Managing external risk in offshore engagements 
Offshoring as a business concept is driven by the objective of finding more cost 
effective business process solutions through identifying and exploiting cost 
arbitrage between regions, including low cost skilled labor, raw materials and 
other economic input factors (Ramarapu, Parzinger and Lado, 1997). The key 
driver in offshoring has therefore traditionally focused on cost reductions by 
relocating subsidiary facilities or outsourcing production or back office service 
components to suppliers located in countries with lower production factor costs. 
Common examples of globally-sourced products or services include labor-
intensive manufacturing, call centers staffed with English speaking workers and 
IT application maintenance work. As the concept has evolved, offshoring is no 
longer driven only by cost considerations, but also for the purpose of accessing  
new ideas and human capital as a form of talent arbitrage (Contractor, Kumar, 
Kundu and Pedersen, 2010); or to seek competitive advantage by gaining 
strategic access to developing markets (Ramarapu, Parzinger and Lado, 1997). 
With the maturing of the business concept, companies are offshoring gradually 
more important business processes through integrated networks of 
interdependent subsidiaries or suppliers across the globe, increasing vulnerability 
to external risk factors. 
The familiar business risks for companies with extended supply or service chains 
involve disruption or cost implications of hidden or unanticipated risk, such as 
increased transportation costs, poor delivery performance, quality problems, lack 
of sufficient communication networks and logistics infrastructure to support 
operations (Modarress and Ansari, 2007). An indication of the potential impact of 
such hidden costs on the viability of the offshore engagements is underlined by 
Industry Canada, suggesting that only 42% of Canadian companies actually 
managed to reduce their total landed costs via low cost country sourcing (Chow, 
2008).  
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While political risk is not a new phenomenon, the wider spread of low-cost country 
offshoring has introduced new exposures to political events and politically 
motivated actions that represent a more direct challenge to the performance of 
offshore strategies. The emerging variety of these non-business risks include 
direct or indirect actions of the host country political environment, like potential 
import or export license cancellation, governmental interference, government 
actions that prohibit contract fulfillment or currency transfer, freezing of bank 
accounts, confiscation of assets, export license restrictions and other political 
events, with various levels of disruption potential (Palugod and Palugod 2011). 
The risks could also include security considerations linked to politically motivated 
riots, strikes, sabotage and terrorism impacting directly or indirectly on 
operational performance (Monaghan 2010). As stated by Baas (2009) “countries 
still matter and companies are exposing themselves to political risk to an 
unprecedented degree as they compete in the global economy” (Baas, 2009 p. 
135-136). As political risk has evolved in character and manifestations (Minor, 
2003) the various facets of political risk therefore need to be assessed in more 
detail and correlated to the type of international involvement pursued (Agarwal 
and Feils, 2007). 
Despite the increased awareness of emerging political risks and vulnerabilities, 
research has indicated that companies apply limited risk management analysis 
when engaging in global sourcing activities (Christopher, Peck and Towill, 2006). 
This is concerning as an updated concept of political risk needs to be integrated 
into wider company level risk management strategies to secure performance of 
extended offshoring engagements. An improved understanding of the 
differentiated nature of political risk exposure for various offshoring engagements 
will allow firms to implement more informed strategies for mitigating corporate 
losses and minimize likelihood or impact of substantial disruption. As argued 
“those companies that are able to apply an analytical oriented, defensible system 
for managing policy risk, will greatly enhance their investment options and find a 
powerful source of competitive advantage” (Henisz and Zelner, 2010, p.8). In 
contrary terms, the companies that are unable to successfully access new frontier 
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sourcing destinations will face substantial opportunity loss in an increasingly 
competitive world economy.  
1.2.1.1 Uncertainties and risk  
For the purpose of this research the term uncertainty refers to the effect of the 
unpredictability of factors in the external environment in which the offshoring 
activity is taking place and that may impact negatively on the business operations 
(Van Wyk 2010). In this sense uncertainty is closely linked to the concept of 
bounded rationality in the Transaction Cost economics, indicating that offshoring 
entity takes rational business decisions, however may have limited information 
about actual threats and intentions of the external actors to enforce those threats.  
The term threat is understood as a potential action by an external entity intended 
to directly or indirectly impact on an offshoring operation. The term risk is 
understood as the point where threats are actioned by an external entity, often 
“as output from existing political systems, or as disruptive actions from entities 
outside the system” (Van Wyk, 2010, p.112). Either way the risk manifestations 
have an adverse impact on the business operations.  
On this notion risk levels can be determined as the combination of the likelihood 
that a certain threat may materialize, combined with the consequences linked to 
an offshoring engagement. In this overall context risk mitigation strategies are 
those strategic activities deliberately undertaken by firms to mitigate the 
uncertainties from the various risk sources (Miller, 1992). 
1.2.2 Exploring political risk challenges for the offshore service industry  
While offshoring has traditionally been associated with the manufacturing 
industry, the offshoring of business services has seen a similar dramatic growth 
over the years, transforming the way businesses are managing their operations 
in an increasingly globalized world. As technologies in ICT introduced 
digitalization, services no longer need to be done on location and it is possible to 
separate whole service processes for offshoring (Modarress and Ansari, 2007). 
The offshore service industry has been driven by technology improvements lifting 
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constraints on geography, time and communication expense, allowing overseas 
subsidiaries or suppliers to connect with customers globally, giving service 
offshoring both scale and momentum. With an offshore outsourcing service 
industry estimated at around 400 billion USD in 2013, and with an annual growth 
rate of 6% per year (Gartner Group 2015), the need for expanding research 
towards service industry specific risk constellations is growing.  
1.2.2.1 Classification of offshore services 
 
Offshored services have traditionally been classified either as an information 
technology (IT) service or as a business process service. If the services are 
outsourced to an external supplier, these services are referred to as Business 
Process Outsourcing (BPO) or Information Technology Outsourcing (ITO), or 
collectively as Technology Enabled Services (TES). The offshoring of services 
has evolved from mainly IT services towards business process services to 
gradually more knowledge-based services such as research and development 
(R&D) (Palugod and Palugod, 2011). The notion of R&D can be defined as 
services related to the design and development of new or improved products and 
processes (Martinez and Garcia, 2011). Hence, it is argued that an additional 
classification can be added, termed Knowledge Processing, or Knowledge 
Process Outsourcing (KPO), if undertaken by an external suppliers. The three 
outsourcing classifications types compound specific structures and properties 
that potentially may vary in their exposure to the external environment, hence the 
following research will maintain a specific distinction between BPO, IPO and 
KPO. 
1.2.3 Classifying entry modes and the importance of control 
The term offshoring strategies refer to the geographic transfer of operations 
outside the borders of the home country, fundamentally meaning exposure to a 
foreign environment. The offshoring literature has mainly focused on entry modes 
relating to equity or non-equity alliances, strategic partner decisions or 
engagement through subsidiaries; defined as any long-term private investment in 
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which business is controlled from abroad, incorporating both ownership and 
managerial involvement (Schmidt, 1986). The choice of entry mode remains a 
fundamental decision that every firm engaging in the international market needs 
to address (Kulkarni, 2001) and is of interest to business managers and 
governments alike, as it has both management and macro-economic 
implications. 
The notion of entry mode has been defined as “an institutional arrangement that 
makes possible the entry of a firm’s products, technology, human skills, 
management, or other resources into a foreign country” (Root, 1994, p.5). This 
classic entry mode definition covers host country production and marketing 
mode, as well as export, contractual and foreign investment modes. Similarly, 
entry mode has been defined simply as the way of organizing a firm’s business 
activities in a foreign country (Hill, Hwang, and Kim, 1990). For this research the 
offshoring options will focus on two main forms of entry mode; the contractual 
entry mode (offshore outsourcing) and the ownership-based (captive) entry mode 
including joint ownership engagements with a local partner (joint venture).  
In offshore outsourcing the term outsourcing refers to the transfer of the internal 
production of goods or services to a third party or an outside supplier to perform 
a task, function, or process, in order to incur business-level benefits (Sanders, 
Locke, Moore and Autry, 2007). The notion of using an external provider means 
that the buying company relinquishes ownership control but increases flexibility, 
unlike when the buying company engages through a fully owned subsidiary, or a 
joint venture partnership.  
The wholly-owned subsidiary or captive will refer to divisions or subsidiaries of 
multinational companies that provide services to the home company. A wholly-
owned subsidiary is expected to offer the highest degree of control for the entrant 
and represents substantial resource commitment and risk. The joint venture entry 
mode refers to a business agreement in which the offshoring firm agree with a 
local partner in the host country to develop, for a finite time, a new entity and new 
assets by contributing equity. In a joint venture, both parties are equally invested 
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in the offshoring project in terms of money and time, and therefore represent less 
control than the subsidiary as any changes needs to be agreed with the partner 
entity.  
The below figure illustrates the classification of offshoring strategies on a market 
versus hierarchy continuum and the associated firm control implications.   
Figure 1: Range of Offshoring Strategies 
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1.3 Theoretical Conceptualization and Underpinning 
1.3.1 A review of the entry mode literature 
While understanding key motivations for the firm to engage in offshoring is 
important, the determination of the most appropriate entry mode constitutes a 
critical component of any offshoring strategy (Kulkarni, 2001). As stated by Miller 
(1992) “A firm’s strategy deals with the alignment of the organization to its 
uncertain environment and thereby organizational strategic choices determine a 
firm’s exposure to uncertain environmental and organizational components that 
impact firm performance” (Miller, 1992, p. 312). The analysis of the entry mode 
choice implies determining the degree of commitment that the investing company 
wants to assume in a given host country. The notion of entry mode choice is 
therefore considered one of the most critical decisions in offshoring with 
implications for organizational control, investment risk and the resource 
commitment required to ensure successful operations of offshore engagements 
(Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004).  
A review of the entry mode literature suggests a vast domain dominated by three 
theoretical paradigms, namely the market imperfection paradigm, the behavioural 
paradigm and the market failure paradigm (Sharma and Erramilli, 2004). The 
paradigms embody at least six key entry mode choice theories including Product 
Life Cycle, Internationalization, Internalization, Eclectic and the Transaction Cost 
Theory that provide theoretical explanations of foreign entry mode choice. The 
paradigms provide a framework for understanding key drivers and motivations 
behind companies’ international engagement and predicting behaviour when 
confronted with entry choice considerations. (See Chapter 2. for more detail on 
paradigm origins and scope). 
As the main concern of this study is the impact of the external environmental 
uncertainty, the paradigm with the most explanatory strength is considered the 
market failure paradigm and the Transaction Cost Theory framework. Previous 
literature has ascertained that TCE has served as the overriding perspective for 
theorizing entry mode choice, and accordingly transaction-cost related covariates 
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have been recognized as major determinants of entry mode decisions (Zhao, Luo 
and Suh, 2004; Ellram, Tate and Billington, 2008; Lopez-Duarte and Vidal-
Suarez, 2010; Martinez and Garcia, 2011).  
While other perspectives supplement the entry mode choice discussion, the basis 
for this research is that entry mode choice is an economic decision, and the firm 
is expected to choose the entry mode that offers the highest risk-adjusted return 
on investment (ROI) (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). On this basis the 
assessment of TCE determinants remain important as the alignment between 
entry mode and transaction properties has consequences for the firm and the 
offshoring operation (Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004). In this context political risk is 
addressed by transaction cost analysis, in which a firm weighs in the costs and 
benefits of governance structures, polices and likely political exposure in the host 
country. The following section will highlight the key premises of TCE explanations 
of foreign entry mode choice in light of uncertainty in environmental conditions 
and its relevance to the research. 
1.3.2 The concept of uncertainty in Transaction Cost Economics  
 
The Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) approach focuses on the cost of making 
each contract i.e. the process of supplier evaluation, negotiation and monitoring 
(Coase, 1937). These costs relate to the "transaction" of the process, and appear 
both when engaging with markets (outsourcing) and in hierarchy (internalization). 
The TCE approach fundamentally focuses on the identification of the governance 
structure that entails the least cost per transaction. The transactions take place 
in an environment based on information asymmetry and bounded rationality i.e. 
the inability to predict an outcome and possible opportunistic behavior of the other 
entities in the market place (Ellram, Tate and Billington, 2008) and the 
characteristics of transactions focus on asset specificity, uncertainty, 
performance measurement and frequency (Williamson, 1985). 
 
Empirical studies have supported the basic principles of transaction cost 
variables (Aubert, Rivard and Patry, 2004) and TCE attributes are considered key 
 11 
 
in determining the governance form for offshore engagements. TCE predicts 
offshore outsourcing to prevail for transactions of low-frequency, characterized 
by a low level of uncertainty, with few transaction specific investments and simple 
performance measurement requirements. Alternatively, when the transaction is 
high due to above factors, the firm will prefer to internalize the transaction and 
enter the market through a subsidiary (Madhok and Tallman, 2006). Hence the 
TCE framework provides an indication of when certain products or services are 
internalized, or in the international context produced through a wholly-owned 
subsidiary (captive), and when firms prefer outsourcing to the market, based on 
relative cost and risk considerations associated with a given operation. The key 
consideration of TCE is hence cost minimization in terms of selecting the 
governance form that will minimize the sum of transaction costs (Zhao, Luo and 
Suh, 2004). 
 
According to TCE a rational firm will prefer its transactions to be governed by the 
market if transaction costs are low, however if the costs of adaption, performance 
monitoring and safe guarding against opportunistic behavior is too high, the firm 
will prefer an internal governance structure such as a wholly owned subsidiary or 
dominant joint venture (Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004). In cases where the limitations 
of bounded rationality are substantial and opportunistic behavior more likely, an 
internal governance structure will be considered more attractive (Anderson and 
Gatignon, 1986). For example, in host countries with limited governance 
infrastructure or institutional capacity local suppliers may use loopholes in the 
legal system or bureaucracy to act opportunistic (Slangen and Tulder, 2009), 
hence constituting a risk of opportunistic behavior. 
 
The TCE perspective therefore views the entry mode choice as a critical decision 
of governance anchored on the interplay of the two key assumptions of bounded 
rationality and opportunism, and the three key dimensions of transaction i.e. asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency (Williamson, 1995;  Zhao, Luo and Suh, 
2004). 
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1.3.3 External uncertainty and the entry mode choice 
 
The term “uncertainty” has been used in the literature as a means to refer to the 
unpredictability or lack of data on the environmental variables that impact 
corporate performance (Van Wyk, 2010). Hence uncertainty about environmental 
variables reduces the predictability of corporate performance, which in turn 
increases the risk (Miller, 1992). In the TCE literature uncertainty tends to be 
categorized as the sum of internal uncertainty and external uncertainty (Erramilli, 
1992), stating that both external and internal uncertainties surrounding a 
transaction will influence entry mode choice.  
Previous work has established that uncertainty in the international environment 
in turn affects the choice of the international entry mode (Miller, 1992; Brouthers, 
1995; Demirbag and Glaister, 2010; Werner, Brouthers and Brouthers, 1996). 
This previous research has suggested that, firstly, international risk plays a critical 
role in entry strategy formation, and secondly, a multi-dimensional perspective of 
risk yields a more complete understanding of risks impact on risk strategy 
decisions (Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner, 2002). 
TCE states that internal uncertainty arises when a firm is unable to accurately 
assess its agent’s performance through output measures (Anderson and 
Gatignon, 1986), often manifested through the firm’s lack of experience or 
knowledge of foreign markets, which will impact on their willingness to pursue 
foreign market entry aggressively (Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004). From the TCE 
perspective the notion of external uncertainty has both been defined as the 
degree of cultural distance (CD) between the home and the host countries 
(informal environment), and the degree of political risk observed in the host 
countries (formal environment) (Agarwal and Feils, 2007; Miller, 1992; López-
Duarte and Vidal-Suárez, 2010). In addition research has suggested that external 
uncertainty can be conditioned by language difference (LD) as a third component 
of external uncertainty (Lopez-Duarte and Vidal-Suarez, 2010). An overview of 
empirical studies testing the impact of cultural distance on the choice between JV 
and WOS indicates MNEs are inclined to invest through JV rather than WOS 
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when investing in culturally distant countries, suggesting that cultural distance is 
an important proxy for external uncertainty (Slangen and Tulder, 2009).  
While research has expanded and empirically verified the external uncertainty 
concept in the informal environment, uncertainty in the formal environment, often 
defined as country or political risk remain under-conceptualized. Several studies 
have used the level of political risk in the host countries as a proxy for formal 
external uncertainty, referring to the likelihood of an unfavorable change in the 
government regime or policies issued by this regime (Miller, 1992; Henisz, 2000). 
However, emerging literature has criticized the narrowly defined concept of 
political risk for only covering limited aspects of the formal environment. It is 
contended that external uncertainty needs to be conceptualized more broadly 
and also include the concept of governance infrastructure of host countries 
covering “public institutions and policies created by governments as a framework 
for economic, legal and social relations” (Slangen and Tulder, 2009, p. 279), 
predicting that the lower the quality of governance infrastructure, the higher the 
level of external uncertainty. Other research suggest that determinants of foreign 
investment flows should be extended beyond the traditional factors like 
government stability, internal/external conflict and ethnic tensions, to also include 
aspects of local corruption, quality of bureaucracy and law and order (Busse and 
Hefeker, 2008). 
The emerging research highlights the need to expand the conceptualization and 
operationalization of formal external uncertainty, and encourage entry modes 
research to measure external uncertainty through a broader spectrum of political 
dimensions such as government effectiveness, regulatory quality and control of 
corruption.  
1.3.4 Re-visiting the conceptualization of external uncertainty 
This research proposes that the inconclusive findings on uncertainty and entry 
mode choice are partly due to the non-diversified and simplistic operationalization 
of the concept of political risk. As highlighted by the literature the integration of 
mechanisms to capture institutional differentiations is one added dimension of an 
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expanded conceptualization of external uncertainty beyond the reliance on 
composite political risk indicators (Slangen and Tulder, 2009; Zhao, Luo and Suh, 
2004). It has further been suggested that the influence of the uncertainty type on 
a firm’s entry mode choice has not been sufficiently highlighted (Kulkarni, 2001) 
or the linkage between risk perceptions and strategic decisions has not been well 
established (Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner, 2002). 
Similarly, as indicated all TCE determinants are considered industry specific, 
underlining the need to consider a differentiated approach to various forms of 
offshoring activities i.e. ITO, BPO and KPO. As external uncertainty can impact 
at a firm, industry and country specific level, TCE predictions would be subject to 
industry specific control parameters. Zhao, Luo and Suh (2004) propose that the 
industry moderating effect on country risk may be eliminated if more dimensions 
of environmental uncertainty such as protection of intellectual property rights, can 
be captured in future empirical testing to offer more insights into the relationship 
between external uncertainty and OBE (Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004).  
The following section develops an expanded operationalization of political risk 
definition in offshore outsourcing, which captures broader dimensions of risk 
towards business activities.  
1.4 Developing a Political Risk Definition for Offshoring  
There is no consensus in the offshoring literature on a coherent definition of 
political risk, and hence the term has been applied across a broad range of risk 
types and contexts (Alon, Gurumoorthy, Mitchell and Steen, 2006; Alon and 
Herbert, 2009). Despite the expanding literature base, it is argued that no 
satisfactory definition has yet been developed that takes into account the unique 
dimensions of political risk in global supply or service chains, since the literature 
only provides a range of independent definitions and conceptualizations that fails 
to distinguish terms such as risks, uncertainties, vulnerabilities with sources of 
risk (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008).  
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Political risk was originally referred to as “discontinuities” occurring in the 
business environment and in order to constitute risk, changes in the business 
environment need potential for significantly affecting the profit or other goals of a 
particular enterprise (Robock, 1971; Kobrin, 1981). Similar perspectives defined 
political risk as host government policies that constrain the business operations 
of a given foreign investment (Schmidt, 1986). The Weston and Sorge (1972) 
definition is representative, stating that “political risk arises from the actions of 
national governments which interfere with or prevent business transactions, or 
change the terms of agreements, or cause the confiscation of wholly or partially 
owned business property” in (Weston and Sorge, 1972 cited in Kobrin, 1979, 
p.67). According to this government centric definition the loss types for investors 
would mainly involve confiscation; contract repudiation; currency inconvertibility; 
discriminatory taxation; embargo; expropriation of property; nationalization; or 
war risk (Howell, 2007). 
The earlier definitions of political risk has focused on the role and actions of 
national governments vis-à-vis foreign investors i.e. the likelihood that political 
forces will cause drastic changes in a country’s business environment affecting 
profit and strategic goals of the particular business enterprise (Gilliespie, 1989). 
However, the number of outright expropriations has reduced from 336 in the 
period 1970-1975, to only 2 in the period 1986-1992 (Minor, 1994, cited in Clark 
and Tunaru, 2003). These findings indicate that the nature of political risk, and its 
sources and implications, are changing suggesting a need to broaden the scope 
of the definition to enhance practical utility.  
Fitzpatrick classified political risk into several categories, namely political risk 
referring to government or sovereign action; occurrences of political events or 
constraints imposed at the specific industry level; and finally political risk within a 
larger conceptual environment (Fitzpatrick, 1983). Fitzpatrick thereby broadened 
the perspective beyond the focus on events and added the notion of process, 
recognizing that political risk emanates from political processes which are in turn 
influenced by various environmental variables (Fitzpatrick, 1983).  
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Further to this perspective political risk has been defined as the probability of 
politically motivated change that affect the outcome of (FDI) activities, 
distinguishing between explicit events and ongoing change (Clark and Tunaru, 
2003). Explicit events referring to actions like expropriation, nationalization, 
devaluations or direct actions such as strikes, boycotts and terrorist attacks (Clark 
and Tunaru, 2003). On-going change on the other hand, takes the form of 
continuous activities such as macroeconomic management and monetary policy, 
legislation, social or political evolution that affects the overall environment (Clark 
and Tunaru, 2003). This notion established the differentiation between risk events 
and risk environment, and underlines the need to conceptually separate the two 
in order to establish causality and potential impact on offshoring activities.  
As research has changed focus from events to sources of risk, research has 
applied definitions understanding political risk as negative perceptions emanating 
from internal instability, intergovernmental relationships, anticipated and non-
anticipated government actions, or government discontinuities all brought about 
by social, economic, or political imperatives existing in a country’s internal or 
relevant external environment (Fatehi-Sedeh and Safizadeh, 1989). This 
approach supports the notion that the separation of economic and social 
dynamics from politics is arbitrary, as many political issues concern economic 
issues and therefore inseparable, managers should monitor key economic and 
social variables, as well as political variables (Rice and Mahmoud, 1990).  
The difficulty of separating political and economic risk is also noted by Robock 
(1971) and Sethi & Luther (1986), highlighting that environmental changes can 
prompt government action and visa-versa, determining an interdependent 
relationship between the political, economic and societal dimensions of political 
risk. On this basis it has been argued that political risk should not be seen in 
isolation but rather understood in the context of broader country risk, determined 
as a function of the economic and political events occurring at the sovereign or 
sub-sovereign level in a country that threaten firm profitability and are the result 
of forces and conditions external to the firm and its industry (Oetzel, 2005).  
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Furthermore, actions in the political domain resulting in business losses, do not 
necessarily emanate from the government itself. Often national governments are 
not the authoritative source of loss problems, meaning that increasingly regional, 
provincial, state and local governments are dealing with investors directly in ways 
that the national governments is unable to control  (Howell, 1992). The external 
agents cause threat and disruption outside the control of legitimate governments 
and may include nationalistic buyers, suppliers, employees and other key 
stakeholders (Agarwal and Feils, 2007); (Hanner, 1979). Mudambi and Navarra 
(2003) further notes that political risk literature has overly focused on observable 
government policies towards MNEs, ignoring the more subtle aspects of local 
business culture (Mudambi and Navarra, 2003). 
In order to establish definitional clarity and enhance utility for practical application, 
it is suggested that political risk should be viewed as a broader concept grounded 
in and influenced by many environmental factors (Alon and Herbert, 2009). For 
example the definition of the US governments Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) focuses their risk definition only on expropriation, 
inconvertibility, war damage, civil strife damage and breach of contract by a 
government or by reason of government interference. However, this insurance-
based definition does not address the wider list of politically-based damage 
directly or indirectly due to corruption, interference in personnel decisions, 
security concerns for personnel, deteriorating political and social situations that 
may impact on the investment assumptions (Howell, 1994).  
Based on this view a definition has been proposed which includes both the more 
obvious political risks, as well as the more subtle mentioned above, defining risk 
as “the possibility that political decisions, events or conditions in a country, 
including those that might be referred to as social, will affect the business 
environment” (Howell and Chaddick, 1994, p. 71). Political risk is therefore 
understood as the possibility that political decisions, events or conditions in a 
country, including those that might be referred to as social, will affect the business 
environment such that investors will lose money or have a reduced profit margin 
(Howell and Chaddick, 1994). 
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Encompassing this notion, Simon (1984) defined political risk as “governmental 
or social actions and polices, originating either within or outside the host country, 
and negatively affecting either a select group of, or the majority of foreign 
business operations and investments” (Simon, 1984,  p. 68). This definition 
reflects the emerging perspective on political risk and the incorporation of 
environmental context, and was further expanded by the delineation of the 
economic underpinnings of political risk (Rice and Mahmoud, 1990; Alon and 
Herbert, 2009). Simon’s definition is broadly accepted in the literature (Alon, 
Gurumoorthy, Mitchell and Steen, 2006; Alon and Herbert, 2009), and will form 
the foundation of the broadened political risk definition informing this research. 
1.4.1 Introducing an expanded political risk definition 
From above definitional discussion it is clear that political risk in one form or the 
other is present in most international offshoring activities, whether a captive or 
contract-based offshoring, and that it arises from a wide range of disparate 
sources. Political risk is the critical interface between the external environments 
and the local political system and needs to both analytically and operationally 
capture the full scope of risks that can impact on the various forms of offshoring 
modes.  
On this note Agarwal and Feils (2007) propose a political definition that 
encompass the various types of international business activities, defined as “the 
probability that an actual or opportunity loss will occur due to the exposure (of 
firms involved in international business) to a set of contingencies that range from 
the total seizure of corporate assets without compensation to the unprovoked 
interference of external agents, with or without governmental sanction, with 
normal operations and performance expected from the firm” (Agarwal and Feils, 
2007, p. 167).  
The definition further needs to capture risks associated with empowerment of 
local, regional and non-governmental interests, including cultural and religious 
interests, non-governmental organizations and transnational crime (Garver, 
2009). This implies an understanding of a range of declared and un-declared 
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political stakeholders including losses resulting from government decisions, lower 
level government decisions and independent social actions. Finally, the definition 
should acknowledge the potential importance of alternative power structures of 
many low cost countries, where the legitimate state apparatus may be wholly or 
partially “captured” by elites or independent actions of organized crime. 
The definition of political risk has further been deepened to address micro risks 
that are industry, firm or even project specific (Robock, 1971; Kobrin, 1981; 
Micallef, 1981; Erol, 1985). Micro political risk can be defined as “the uncertainty 
associated with outcomes or events from political processes, which have 
potential and specific consequences for the firm” (Alon and Herbert, 2009, p.130). 
While political risk analysis has focused on macro-level political analysis i.e. 
national political developments and government policies towards FDI, research 
has highlighted that most politically risk originate from the micro level (Oetzel, 
2005; Rice and Mahmoud, 1990). On this note an analysis of political risk would 
need to consider both micro and macro levels of politics and business (Simon, 
1985; Brewer, 1993), in order to address the industry specific nature of political 
risk impact on offshoring outcomes. 
For the purpose of this study political risk will therefore be defined as “the 
exposure of offshoring companies to unprovoked interference of external agents, 
with or without governmental sanction, originating either within or outside the host 
country, resulting in the overall restriction of business operating conditions or the 
industry specific environment, and negatively impacting on the company’s 
subsidiary or outsourcing supplier’s ability to ensure continuity of service delivery 
with consistent quality and at agreed cost”. The extended definition will allow a 
holistic approach to understanding political risk and the explicit effects on various 
industry specific offshoring entry modes, in line with the call for research on the 
effects of political risks on company operations. Based on the identified concepts 
from Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the extended definition of political 
risk in the context of offshore outsourcing, the following section will outline the 
research strategy and ontological considerations underpinning the study. 
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1.5 Overview of Research Process and Methods 
1.5.1 Theoretical position and methodology 
As a fundamental part of any social enquiry the following section will outline the 
main choices and implications of the chosen research strategies. 
1.5.2 Research strategy 
The logic of inquiry guiding the research is based on a combination of an inductive 
and deductive reasoning approach applying mixed methods. The notion of 
inductive reasoning involves the movement from specific statements to general 
statements, while the deductive reasoning involves the movement from general 
statements to specific cases (Blakie, 2007).  
With the combination of an inductive and deductive strategy the logic of the 
overall research process follows the cycle of theory construction and testing 
proposed by (Wallace, 1971 cited in Blakie, 2007). The scheme proposes to 
combine inductive and deductive approaches to overcome, on one side naïve 
induction and naïve falsification on the other side, by two sets of overlapping 
research processes. Wallace argues that these processes are related in a series 
of cyclical stages beginning with observations, then moving from empirical 
generalization to theory development, to hypothesis development, to testing of 
the hypotheses, finally leading to further observations (Blakie, 2007).  
Following this logic the research strategy starts with addressing RQ (1) by 
exploring the nature of political risk impacting on offshore service engagements, 
both contract-based and captive, and establishing generalizations based on 
pattern explanations. For Wallace (1971) this is the inductive research stage of 
the cycle in which concepts are measured and associations established. In the 
research this process is achieved through a qualitative interview process 
engaging offshoring practitioners across an industry-wide sample of companies, 
and discussing political risk implications for case specific offshoring 
engagements. 
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These findings provide a descriptive answer to “what” kind of political risk impact 
the industry is exposured to and allows the description of characteristics and 
patterns of industry relevant political risk manifestations. As per the systematic 
literature review, it is necessary to first determine the nature of the political risk 
constructs specific for the contract-based offshore service industry, as no 
previous research had been conducted on this phenomenon previously.  
Based on the findings from the inductive research, Transaction Cost Theory was 
applied to provide a model for explaining the implications of external uncertainty 
for offshore location flows within the offshore service industry. The TCE provided 
a framework for hypothesizing on the implications of firm behaviour by applying 
the political risk constructs identified by the exploratory research within the 
context of the offshore service industry. 
Following the inductive theorizing stage, applying theoretical concepts from TCE, 
a series of hypothesises were deduced with the objective of testing the concepts 
through a deductive approach in order to address RQ (2). As the deductive 
research stage requires the translation of the concepts in the hypothesis into 
“measurement procedures and involving instruments, scales and sampling 
techniques” (Blakie, 2007, p. 82), the political risk constructs were 
operationalized through deriving data from the World Economic Forum (WEF) 
and Political Risk Services (PRS) sources. Similarly, historical data of offshore 
service flows was extracted from IMF Balance of Payment (BoP) data.   
Finally, the hypothesises were tested by matching them with the established data 
sets using quantitative statistical methods, leading to a series of full and partial 
validations of TCE concepts within a contract-based and captive entry mode 
context. 
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Figure 2: Wallace’s cycle of theory construction and testing 
Theory
Hypothesis 
Development
Empirical 
generalizations
Testable 
propositions
Data Analysis
Data 
collection
Test of 
Theory
Operationalization 
of concepts
DeductionInduction
 
1.5.3 Methodological approach 
As further to the review of the research strategy, the following section will 
introduce the objective and challenges with the methodological approach. 
1.5.3.1 The mixed method approach 
For the purpose of reaching the research objective the study has applied a mixed 
methods research design. In general, mixed methods has been defined ”as 
research that involves collecting, analysing, and interpreting quantitative and 
qualitative data in a single study or in a series of studies that investigate the same 
underlying phenomenon” (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2009, p. 267). While the use 
of mixed methods is growing within the disciplines of social sciences (Cameron, 
2011), there is a standing critic in the literature on mixing research paradigms 
and hence a need to reflect on the potential ontological and epistemological 
tensions (Modell, 2009).  
In order to position the research within the mixed method domain it is useful to 
refer to the three-dimensional typology developed by Leech and Onwauegbuzie, 
(2009). As the research design applies qualitative method as an exploratory first 
stage of redefining the constructs of political risk, followed by a hypothesis testing 
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stage using quantitative method, the design would be classified as a “partially 
mixed sequential equal status design” (Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2009, p. 269). 
The notion that the design is only partially mixed, implies that each stage of the 
research applies one method only, and that it is a sequential process of 
application. For this research the qualitative and quantitative components are 
conducted sequentially and in their entirety, before being synthesized at the final 
data interpretation stage. For this research the qualitative exploratory findings, 
together with the findings from the systematic literature review, inform 
hypothesises formulation for quantitative testing. It is argued that hypothesises 
emerging from qualitative studies are hence corroborated by subsequent 
quantitative research, as long “as there are no unresolved construct or internal 
validity threats” (Modell 2010, p. 210).   
An advantage of using mixed methods is the notion of using triangulation as a 
technique for addressing internal and external validity of constructs. The main 
value of conducting the practitioner oriented interviews was to develop and 
validate the constructs of political risk in the specific context of the offshore 
service industry, hence ensuring high construct validity before launching the 
wider quantitative study. The qualitative data further substantiated causal 
explanations between different offshoring engagements and risk types. For 
example elaborating on the implications of experience and risk appetite to explain 
company specific risk perceptions. The identification of potential alternative 
causal explanations enhances internal validity and further informs areas of future 
research beyond the immediate scope of this study.  
Another advantage of mixed methods is that it supports the logic of the inductive-
deductive research cycle, allowing the study to engage in both theory generation 
and hypothesis testing within the same research continuum. Previous studies on 
application of mixed methods has highlighted that by matching the inductive-
deductive dichotomies at the methodological level better inferences is provided 
when studying a social phenomenon (Jogulu and Pansiri, 2011). This is also 
confirmed by this study, where the initial exploratory qualitative engagements 
with the industry allowed a rich contextualization of the risk constructs and an 
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insight into the mind-set driving individual practitioners. The outsider position of 
the researcher also permitted a better understanding of the key drivers and 
challenges facing the industry. This added knowledge allowed a better matching 
of the interviewee’s subjective interpretations and explanations with the 
offshoring trends established through the quantitative research to make more 
confident inferences.  
1.5.4 Research paradigm 
The following section outlines the philosophical and theoretical position of the 
research in order to explain the underlying ontological and epistemological 
assumptions about the reality as perceived by the researcher.  
1.5.4.1 Ontological assumptions 
Some critics of using mixed methods due to potential ontological and 
epistemological inconsistencies suggest that triangulation is not a legitimate 
validation technique when research incorporates both functionalist and 
interpretive paradigms (Modell, 2010). The following section will seek to bridge 
this critic and explain the ontological stance of the study.  
The use of an inductive research strategy implies the embodiment of a realist 
ontology, which generally assumes that “there is a reality out there with 
regularities that can be described and explained” (Blakie, 2007, p. 60). The 
inductive research strategy therefore implies that research simply requires 
numerous observations of the phenomenon under investigation in order for the 
researcher to provide descriptions of patterns and association (Blakie, 2007). 
As this research is limited to engaging with a sample size of offshoring 
practitioners it is not assumed to produce the full truth. Instead the research 
applies a revised inductive strategy using a more cautious inductive logic aiming 
at “establishing limited generalizations about the distribution, patterns of 
association” (Blakie, 2007, p.64) amongst engagements and political risk 
manifestations in the offshore service industry. The more cautious interpretation 
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of the findings generated by the inductive logic revises the ontological assumption 
to one of cautious realism.  
A deductive research strategy is also generally based on cautious realist ontology 
and the epistemology of falsification, commencing the research process by 
developing proposed answers to the research problem (Blakie, 2007). The 
cautious realist ontological stance applied in the inductive component of the 
research is therefore in line with the ontology of the deductive research strategy 
for the second research component. While the realist approach is based on the 
underlying view of reality as an objective, unified and readily observable entity, it 
is acknowledged that if reality is subjectively constructed within an interpretive 
processes with the individual offshoring practitioners, the meaning of the political 
risk constructs would potentially vary in meaning and hence be ontologically 
inconsistent with the realist approach. To bridge this gap the research takes a 
critical realism stance that softens the need to produce accurate representations 
of an objective empirical reality.  
Within the stratified ontology domain of critical realism, which incorporates real 
objects and mechanisms, actual events and empirical experience, it is 
acknowledged that “humans are able to experience actual events generated by 
the causal powers embedded in real mechanisms” (Modell, 2010, p. 212). If that 
is the case these event observations can be recorded through a qualitative 
method, like a Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) applied in this research, to 
identify appropriate risk constructs. This notion, combined with the critical theory 
stance that human social and political structures are generally characterized by 
longevity and durability (Modell, 2010), it is suggested that a critical realism 
approach allows a consistent ontology across the partial and sequential mixed 
method design of this research.  
1.5.4.2 Epistemological assumptions 
For the purpose of this research TCE theory is applied, based on the patterns 
established by the use of the initial descriptive inductive process, to explain 
offshoring firms behaviour under varied forms of external uncertainty. By nature 
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the outcomes of a deductive process is understood as being tentative truths i.e. 
subject to revision once further falsified (Blakie, 2007). Hence the position of the 
research is not to find the final truth, but deduce explanations of offshoring 
behaviour that would be regarded as one among other possible explanations. 
The same epistemology can be adopted for the revised inductive research 
strategy more associated with the pragmatic conventionalism approach, when 
used in conjunction with a deductive strategy (Blakie, 2007). The findings should 
therefore be seen as part of an iterative process of developing knowledge, even 
tentative, within the domain of offshoring firm behaviour. The following table 
provides an overview of the research strategies, methodology applied and the 
corresponding ontological/epistemological position implicit in the research 
design. 
 Table 1: Overview of the research strategies and theoretical position 
 Inductive Deductive 
Research Stage: Project 2 Project 3 
Aim: To establish descriptions of 
characteristics and patterns of political 
risk experiences in offshore outsourcing 
To test TCE concepts, to eliminate or 
develop theory 
Ontology: Cautious realist/critical realist Cautious realist/critical realist 
Epistemology: Conventionalism Falsification 
Start: Collect data on characteristics and/or 
patters and produce descriptions 
Identify a regularity to be explained 
and deduce hypothesis 
Finish: Develop relevant risk constructs Test the hypothesis by matching them 
with data 
Methodology: (Qualitative): Repertory Grid Analysis in 
semi-structured interviews 
(Quantitative): Multivariate analysis 
using linear regression 
1.5.5 Research framework and project linkages 
This section provides an introduction to the research process followed during the 
development of the DBA, structured according to the three milestone projects, (i) 
the systematic literature review, (ii) the qualitative empirical study and finally (iii) 
the quantitative empirical study, with each milestone building on the preceding 
findings. The research process and interlinkages are captured in the following 
diagram for visualization.
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Figure 3: Overview of research process 
Review extant literature to map 
current knowledge of political risk 
impacting on offshoring.
Explore political risk manifestations 
and impact perceptions across 
offshore service industry 
engagements. 
Explore correlations between 
political risk factors and global 
offshoring  f lows in the service 
industry.
Systematic Literature Review
Repertory Grid Analysis
(Qualitative)
Multivariate Regression Analysis
(Quantitative)
 A taxonomy of political risk in 
offshoring literature developed.
 Absence of political risk 
research in the context of 
contract-based offshoring.
 Absence of research on industry 
specific political risk exposure 
across outsourcing typologies 
(BPO/ITO/KPO).
 Limited analytical 
understanding of  political risk   
exposure within  the offshore 
outsourcing entry modes 
confirmed.
 Limited understanding of  
political risk across outsourcing 
typologies.
 Empirically derived 
classification and weighting of 
political risk manifestations and 
impact perceptions among 
offshoring practitioners.
 Identification of 12 political risk 
constructs of main concern for 
offshoring industry.
 Expanding  understanding of 
political risk exposure through 
mapping of empirical findings 
with extant literature.
 Relationships between global 
offshore outsourcing flows and 
key political risk constructs 
explored. 
 Relationships between industry 
specific (BPO/ITO/KPO) location 
decisions and political factors 
explored.
 Distinction between  offshore 
outsourcing and FDI related 
exposure to political risk types 
analysed.
 Absence of large scale empirical 
testing of political risk impacts 
on location decisions across 
captive versus contract-based 
entry modes.
 Absence of large scale empirical 
testing of industry specific 
exposure concerns.
 Absence of empirical work on 
impact of company risk 
management capacity on entry 
mode choice and location 
decisions.
 Absence of models for 
conceptualization of political 
risk formation and operational 
impact prediction.
Project 1 Project 2 Project 3
Aim
Method
Findings
Gap
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1.5.6 Project 1 – The systematic literature review   
The following sections will outline the main findings of the literature review and 
discuss implications for design of the proposed research agenda.  
1.5.6.1 Main findings of the literature review 
Based on the review of the extant literature on political risk in offshoring, the key 
political typology dimensions and their underlying manifestations were mapped 
and classified by merging the risk classifications presented by (Miller, 1992; 
Agarwal and Feils, 2007; Rao and Goldsby, 2009). The framework incorporates 
prevalent risk types for both FDI and offshore outsourcing modalities accordingly.  
From the review it is suggested that Transaction Cost Theory (TCE) remains the 
main basis for the academic conversation on political risk and implications on 
offshoring strategies, mainly in the form of analysing determinants of firm entry 
modes. The TCE framework has mainly lent conceptual support to the linkage 
between uncertainty and offshore strategy decisions, however firm specific 
considerations such as experience and cultural distance has also been 
researched under the framework of Internationalization and Motivational Theory.  
The descriptive review of the political risk literature on offshoring highlights that 
the literature domain is rooted in a vast volume of conceptual contributions with 
a primary focus on ownership-based offshoring (OBO) in the context of FDI, and 
with a weighting on North American, and later European business oriented 
research. While the literature has mostly been conceptual, the empirical work on 
political risk has mainly been quantitative of nature, with only few qualitative semi-
structured interviews and case studies undertaken. The research focus has been 
mainly on FDI determinants and political risk assessment, with limited focus on 
developing comprehensive models integrating risk management considerations 
into theoretical frameworks.  
The empirical findings across FDI research has generally been consistent in 
determining a negative correlation between FDI inflow activities and higher levels 
of political risk, underlining the negative correlation between perception of high 
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political risk and investment activity. Prevailing research has however been 
unable to distinguish between the relative significance of political risk variables 
and shown limited ability to provide guidance on offshore strategy choice and 
industry specific risk mitigation measures. 
The review confirms that existing research on political risk has focused on 
ownership based offshoring leaning on FDI theory, with only nascent research on 
contract-based or offshore outsourcing. The literature remains unable to 
analytically disentangle offshoring activities and demonstrate causality between 
political risks and their impact on various entry mode strategies, and whether the 
same political typologies would apply equally to contract-based ownership 
outsourcing. While the literature base on political risk in contract-based 
outsourcing is relatively limited, the emerging research underlines the relevance 
of the subject, both within the theoretical and practitioner domain.   
The review produces a set of political risk typologies from the extant literature, on 
which basis a comparison of further industry specific empirical findings can be 
structured and compared.  
The findings affirm the need to expand the analysis of political risk against a 
broader spectrum of entry modes extending from fully controlled subsidiaries, to 
the more flexible offshore outsourcing modalities. The growing importance of 
offshore outsourcing as a business activity reiterates the need for extending 
political risk and offshoring entry mode research. On this background the 
research will seek to establish a more in-depth understanding of the political risk 
factors that impact on various offshoring modes by developing differentiated 
political risk typologies capable of measuring business impacts on various 
industry types. The systematic literature review provided the basis for determining 
the research questions guiding the design of the empirical study in Project 2: 
 What are the key contingent political risk factors impacting on offshore 
outsourcing activities? 
 How do these key political risk factors differ in importance depending on 
the offshore entry mode? 
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1.5.7  Project 2 – Mapping political risk in the offshore service 
industry 
Following the mapping of the political risk constructs from the extant literature in 
the Systematic Literature Review, the P2 was designed to identify the key 
contingent political risk factors impacting on the offshore service industry to 
understand political risk dynamics across a wider spectrum of entry modes.  
1.5.7.1 Methodological selection and process 
A qualitative research design was applied to identify and map political risk types 
experienced within the offshore outsourcing industry, using a repertory grid-
analysis technique to capture frequency and perceived impact on offshoring 
engagements (More on Repertory Grid Analysis Technique in section 3.2.). The 
qualitative design was selected as the most appropriate research method based 
on a methodological fit discussion, allowing for an evidence-based approach, 
soliciting data from 25 interviewees and reviewing a total of 91 individual offshore 
outsourcing engagements. The application of repertory grid technique for 
conducting qualitative semi-structured interviews for exploring risk perceptions is 
innovative and underlines the utility of the methodology outside marketing 
studies. The use of repertory grid analysis in the context of political risk research 
has allowed the project to fill a qualitative void within the domain as identified in 
the literature review.  
1.5.7.2 Key findings of the study 
The findings of the exploratory research are summarized as follows:  
Finding 1: The traditional political risk definition confirmed insufficient to capture 
the exposure of offshore outsourcing firms: The comparison of the empirical 
findings and the extant literature suggest that political risk research has mainly 
explored traditional location considerations, like concerns with organized crime, 
social unrest, host country bureaucracy, geo-political risk and limitations to 
revenue repatriation, and not focused on addressing a series of key risks affecting 
offshore outsourcing activities. In fact, only the loss of IP rights, corruption and 
currency fluctuations has featured in the extant literature to date, while the top 
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offshore outsourcing exposures like organized labour strike and home country 
risk have not been addressed. Similarly, emerging risks pertaining to legal 
transparency, change of data management regulatory frameworks, predictability 
of labour regulations, policy change on foreign ownership and wage inflation 
suggest that discussions on external uncertainty, based on a narrow concept of 
political risk, is insufficient to capture the exposure of offshore outsourcing 
activities.  
Finding 2: The nature of offshore outsourcing risk exposure revolves increasingly 
around policy and legal predictability and institutional capacity: The identified risk 
pertaining to changes in data management and HR regulatory frameworks, 
closely followed by loss of intellectual property (IP) and corruption, suggest that 
the nature of offshore outsourcing political risk exposure revolves increasingly 
around the key categories of regulatory policy, legal predictability and institutional 
capacity, confirming the relevance of integrating mechanisms to capture 
institutional differentiations as a means of expanded conceptualization of external 
uncertainty. The findings support emerging critic contending that external 
uncertainty needs to be conceptualized more broadly and should incorporate the 
concept of governance infrastructure of host countries. The exploratory research 
confirms the need to expand the conceptualization and operationalization of 
formal external uncertainty, and the need for entry modes research to measure 
external uncertainty by other political dimensions such as government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality and control of corruption.  
Finding 3: Increased importance of home/client-country political fall-out or change 
of regulatory frameworks with implications for the outsourcing business model: In 
regards to risk types and perceived impact on offshore outsourcing activities it 
was established that political risk concerns related to home/client-country political 
fall-out or change of regulatory frameworks with implications for the offshoring 
business model was most prominent. This observation highlights that political risk 
exposure has a dual nature with potential impact on both the location side and 
the manner in which the outsourcing activity is executed. The impact of the home 
political risk was further determined to be sector specific i.e. the highly regularized 
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utility industry would be more exposed to policy changes pertaining to data 
access and security profiling. The significance of the featured risks pertaining to 
home country repercussions or change of regulatory requirements, and the 
strong emphasis on labour and regulatory related vulnerabilities, highlight that a 
broader conceptualization of political risk considerations is valid and the need to  
define political risk in a manner that allows for unambiguous classification against 
relevance and impact. 
Finding 4: Political risk exposure determined by the nature of the offshoring 
activity (knowledge content): Finally the findings suggest that there is limited 
evidence that ITO and BPO engagements are detrimentally different in terms of 
political risk exposure. However, compared with the KPO findings it was possible 
to observe a scope shift towards concerns relating to regulatory frameworks and 
contract enforcement, hence more impacted by potential IP loss, contract 
enforcement limitations and legal predictability. The association of Knowledge-
based Outsourcing (KPO) with loss of IP, policy change on foreign ownership and 
contract enforcement risks, suggests that institutional capacity i.e. legal 
enforcement of IP rights and contracts becomes increasingly important as the 
value of product or service is enhanced. The findings suggest that the firm 
specific risk profile changes subject to the level of value or knowledge content 
involved in the offshoring engagement and that risk should be considered in the 
context of low versus high value/knowledge service delivery as a key distinction 
for the nature and level of exposure. 
The exploratory research suggests that the constraining nature of regulations and 
policies have an impact on offshoring activities, and more importantly that a 
poorly designed regulatory framework or erratic enforcement of regulations can 
have a negative effect on offshore activities as it has the potential to alter the 
underlying costing assumptions of the business model. Hence the key concern 
pertains to the unpredictability of policy and regulatory application and 
enforcement of same.  
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Finally, the exploratory research highlighted a series of external business 
variables like available support infrastructure, educated workforce and research 
talent for upstream knowledge-based outsourcing, with a potentially moderating 
effect on location choice. 
1.5.8 Project 3 – Measuring impact of political risk on offshoring 
flows 
Based on the literature review and the findings of the exploratory P2 study on 
post-contract political risk exposure among offshoring practitioners, a series of 
proposed correlations between offshoring flows and political risk constellations 
were hypothesized for empirical testing in P3. 
According to the literature review, the perception is that since offshore 
outsourcing modalities have less capital at stake and no physical facilities at risk 
on the ground, political risk considerations are a less significant concern. 
However, according to the exploratory research findings in P2, the distribution 
and attributes of political risk in the context of contract-based offshoring 
engagements, were very similar to those of captive engagements. Applying the 
new political risk typologies for offshore outsourcing identified in the exploratory 
research, the relationship between offshore outsourcing and political risk is 
explored. The research first analyses the effect of political risk on predicting 
offshore outsourcing flows, and secondly, compares offshore outsourcing and 
regular FDI in terms of the sensitivity to political risk in their offshore 
engagements. The research is guided by the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Offshore outsourcing activities, as a non-equity and contract-based 
modality, are less sensitive to political risk considerations than general inward 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the choice of offshore locations. 
The findings of the exploratory research further suggested that the nature of 
offshore political risk exposure revolves increasingly around policy and legal 
predictability, including institutional capacity, confirming the relevance of 
incorporating institutional differentiations in the determination of external 
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uncertainty. The findings supplement emerging research suggesting that 
determinants of foreign investment flows should be extended beyond the 
traditional factors like government stability, internal/external conflict and ethnic 
tensions, to also include aspects of local corruption, quality of bureaucracy and 
law and order (Busse and Hefeker, 2008). Other research argues that using a 
narrow political risk definition in exploring uncertainty in the formal external 
environment is suboptimal, contending that government quality is a better proxy 
for determining external uncertainty. (Slangen and Tulder, 2009). On this basis 
the research explores the impact of institutional and regulatory factors in 
predicting contract-based offshoring flows. 
Hypothesis 2: When the institutional and regulatory factors in the host country are 
strengthened, the volume of overall (ITO/BPO/KPO) contract-based offshore 
outsourcing will increase.  
The further association of Knowledge-based Outsourcing (KPO) with loss of IP, 
policy change on foreign ownership and contract enforcement risks, suggested 
that institutional capacity i.e. legal enforcement of IP rights and contracts 
becomes increasingly important as the knowledge content and value of services 
are enhanced. The findings imply that the company specific risk profile changes 
subject to the level of service value or knowledge content involved in the 
offshoring engagement and that risk should be considered in the context of low 
versus high knowledge content or value of the services as a key distinction for 
the nature and level of exposure. Hence for purely transactional work most firms 
appear comfortable outsourcing to third-party, while for high-end activities they 
prefer to keep the process internal through a captive entry mode or under strong 
IP regulation.  
Hypothesis 3: When the institutional and regulatory factors in the host country are 
strengthened, the offshore outsourcing volumes of business activities with a 
higher knowledge content (KPO) is likely to increase. 
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1.5.8.1 Methodological selection and process 
The application of quantitative methods and regression analysis to political risk 
research is a common approach within the political risk research domain (See 
Annex. C.2).To analyse the significance of the hypothesises the research applied 
a linear multiple regression methodology based on aggregate and activity specific 
(ITO, KPO and BPO) offshoring volumes generated from the IMF Balance of 
Payment (BoP) database to function as the dependent variables. For the purpose 
of identifying appropriate data sources to operationalize the identified political risk 
indicators  as independent variable datasets, a comprehensive review of existing 
governance and country indicators was conducted (See Annex C.1) and a 
dataset compiled from various sources, including the ICRG Index and the Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI) from the World Economic Forum (WEF). As 
research on offshore outsourcing has been hampered by the absence of available 
data, one additional contribution of this research is the design and compilation of 
a dataset capturing location specific offshore outsourcing flows and the 
corresponding break-down into ITO, KPO and BPO specific categories (For more 
detail see P3 methodology in Section 4.3). 
The main application of the regression variate was to determine the relative 
importance of the individual political risk indicators in determining offshoring flows 
across entry modes and business activities (ITO/BPO/KPO). The methodology 
further allowed for a measure of the individual impact of each political risk variable 
as a predictor of offshore flows, as a means for classification of relative 
importance and potentially forming the basis for developing a weighted risk index. 
1.5.8.2 Key findings of the study 
Firstly, the quantitative research validated that political risk is a genuine issue of 
concern in offshore outsourcing, despite being contract-based, and therefore 
technically a means of “outsourcing” risks to the suppliers. The research indicated 
that the 12 identified political risks accounted for 38.0% of the variability in the 
offshoring outsourcing flows implying that concerns about service disruptions 
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and/or cost implications of external uncertainties features as a factor in 
considering supplier and location choice.  
The findings further highlight a consistent overlap of key predicative variables, 
including intellectual property protection; quality of bureaucracy and burden of 
customs all significant at <0.001 for both for offshore outsourcing and captive 
activities. This is a significant finding as it highlights that for both captive and 
outsourcing activities, institutional and regulatory factors in the host country are 
a key concern. Furthermore, it is indicated that the domestic market size is a key 
external business variable for both modalities suggesting an interlinkage between 
entry mode strategies, and that offshore outsourcing should not be seen in 
isolation from companies longer-term market entry considerations. 
The important distinction between offshore outsourcing and captive activities 
identified from the research, is not whether political risk is a concern, but 
specifically what kind of political risks is a concern. The research yielded 
significant and positive relationships with intellectual property protection and 
bureaucracy, for both offshore outsourcing and captive activities, while captive 
engagements were also significantly related to security and internal/external 
conflict related variables. The findings confirm logically that political risks, like 
security and conflict, will have a higher impact on investments with a physical 
presence including captive manufacturing plants or service centres, while 
contract-based outsourcing and captive activities will be equally concerned with 
risks concerning IP loss and quality of bureaucracy.  
Another interesting finding is that the innovation capacity associated with 
offshoring locations appear to be a stronger predicative feature for contract-
based offshoring than for captive engagements. This findings suggest that while 
captive engagements is often designed as a means to access foreign markets or 
leverage labour arbitrage for manufacturing, offshore outsourcing is often more 
than a cost consideration and also a means to access foreign talent and 
knowledge for competitive advantage. As these talent pools may not be available 
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on the home market, or cost restrictive, offshore outsourcing becomes a tool for 
tapping into accessible innovation centres around the world.  
Secondly, the results validated the findings of the exploratory research, by 
confirming a positive relationship between offshoring flows and institutional and 
regulatory factors. The research findings highlighted a positive and significant 
relationship between both intellectual property protection and the quality of 
bureaucracy, and increased inflows of contract-based offshore outsourcing 
activities. The findings validated the hypothesis that “When the institutional and 
regulatory factors in the host country are strengthened, the volume of overall 
(ITO/BPO/KPO) contract-based offshore outsourcing will increase”.  
Thirdly, the research analysed activity specific offshore activities and mapped the 
political risk accounting for the highest variability in the offshoring flows. The 
findings showed a dispersed distribution of political risk variables across ITO, 
BPO and KPO engagements, confirming the relevance of also analysing offshore 
according to the nature of the offshoring activity, rather than solely as a 
consolidated industry. Despite the mixed results from the cross-industry analysis, 
the research obtained a significant (and positive) coefficient for intellectual 
property rights protection with a very high beta-value for KPO activities, a 
significant but lower positive relationship for BPO and no indicated importance 
for ITO activities. Hence, for KPO outsourcing flows, a positive relationship with 
intellectual property protection, with the highest Beta value, was noted. While a 
statistical positive relationship was noted between KPO outsourcing flows and 
intellectual property rights protection, the research does not establish the basis 
for causality, however suggests a partial validation of hypothesis #3: When the 
institutional and regulatory factors in the host country are strengthened, the 
offshore outsourcing volumes of business activities with a higher knowledge 
content (KPO) is likely to increase.  
In terms of external business variables, domestic market size and basic electricity 
and telephony were found to be the most important factors across all offshore 
activities. While the need for a functioning basic electricity and telephone 
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infrastructure is intuitive it is surprising in the sense that most of the offshoring 
activities are assumed to take place in developing economies, and hence the 
infrastructure requirements will, despite any cost incentives, bring a natural limit 
to offshoring flows to many economies. More surprising is perhaps the effect of a 
large domestic market, as contract-based offshoring is generally assumed to 
serve external entities i.e. through call centre activities, IT application 
management etc. The pull-effect of larger markets, and positioning of contract-
based offshore outsourcing activities in potential domestic markets, suggests that 
offshore outsourcing could be considered part of a larger market entry strategy. 
As potential host countries compete to attract offshore activities as a basis for 
enhancing employment and knowledge transfer opportunities into their 
economies, it would be prudent to take note of the perceived importance of 
strengthening institutional and regulatory factors. If the host country is seeking to 
attract contracts within the areas of R&D, it would be especially important to 
ensure that the appropriate IP regulatory frameworks are in place, while for the 
more labour intensive BPO activities, a well-functioning labour market and 
minimal bureaucracy would have a high impact.  
1.6 Discussion of Findings and Contribution 
The following section highlights the existing knowledge gaps identified in the 
extant literature and presents the theoretical contributions to the literature domain 
and the practical application of the findings within the offshore service industry. 
1.6.1 Extant knowledge and gaps 
Based on the literature review there is an established need to examine the 
specific political risk scenarios associated with each offshore entry modality and 
tailor political risk assessment to different entry modes in foreign markets 
(Agarwal and Feils, 2007). In extension, Luo highlights that while several studies 
have shed light on the range of critical factors underlying entry mode selection, 
some factors remain unexplored, including host governmental intervention and 
environmental uncertainty (Luo, 2001). In addition, Luo (2001) concludes that 
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applicability of major results from prior studies on risk and entry modes is largely 
limited to developed market economies, and issues pertaining to emerging 
economies need to be advanced, as these are often the destination of offshoring 
activities (Luo, 2001).  
1.6.1.1 Gap in research on offshore outsourcing entry modes 
While previous studies of entry mode has focused on captive offshoring and joint 
ventures (Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004), the emergence of a growing offshore 
outsourcing industry prompts the interest in extending the entry mode research 
typologies. The offshore outsourcing literature reaffirms the relevance of 
analysing external risks such as political instability and legal infrastructure in 
vendor host countries, including differences in legislation towards intellectual 
property rights, labour contracting and employment law (Weiss and Azaran, 
2007). The need to conduct country risk analysis for offshore outsourcing 
projects, preempting political risk that can impact on partner company 
performance, is well established (Goodman and Ramer, 2007). In fact, the 
Gartner Group coined the phrase “country before company” to describe the 
precedence of country location selection over vender selection in strategic 
offshoring decisions (Hahn, Doh, and Bunyaratave, 2009).  
Despite the increased relevance of researching external uncertainties relating to 
the offshore outsourcing entry mode, limited systematic research has been 
focused on identifying the specific risk sources and consequences of political 
risks facing offshore outsourcing firms (Alon and Herbert, 2009). The evidence-
based identification and ranking of significant political risks conducted in this 
research project is therefore a significant contribution. As previously argued, "it 
still remains largely unclear whether the same factors that promote ownership 
based offshoring encourage the firm to make an outsourcing decision in which 
control is passed to the foreign vendor/partner” (Hatonen, Eriksson and Paju, 
2009, p. 162). Similarly, Agarwal and Feils (2007) identify that "there is a need to 
examine carefully the various entry modes of internationalization and the specific 
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political risk scenarios associated with each entry modality within an integrated 
theoretical framework" (Agarwal and Feils, 2007, p. 178). 
1.6.1.2 Gap in research on moderating impact of industry type  
According to the literature the cumulative understanding of the TCE determinants 
in relation to entry mode is mixed and inconclusive, with disparate results and 
inconsistent findings generated by a range of methodologies (Zhao, Luo and Suh, 
2004). Based on a meta-analytical review, covering 38 empirical studies on entry 
mode choice from the period 1986-2002, the study offers a comprehensive review 
of empirical findings from prior studies on predictive abilities of TCE, including the 
application of external uncertainty (Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004). The aggregate 
results of the review suggests that all six TCE determinants are found to be 
significantly influencing ownership-based entry (OBE) choice, while country risk 
and international experience both score the highest, country risk, representing 
external uncertainty turns out as “the single most influential determinant of OBE 
choice” ( Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004, p. 530). 
Importantly, the meta-analysis highlights the impact of moderators on predictions, 
including the effect of the country of origin, offshoring location and industry type 
in various TCE based studies. The moderating effects have raised concerns 
about the generalizability of TCE predictions across national and industry settings 
(Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004). The moderating effect of the country of origin refer 
to findings suggesting effects of cultural distance, international experience and 
advertising intensity vary significantly depending on firm’s home country. For 
example, a study by Hahn, Doh, and Bunyaratave (2009) examined determinants 
of firm offshoring behaviour with respect to location risk within the information 
system industry. The findings suggest that firm-specific experience and the core 
"risk-gap" between home and host country is predictive of companies pursuing 
progressively riskier locations, but that their effects dissipate as environment-
wide experience is incorporated (Hahn, Doh, and Bunyaratave, 2009).  
The effect of industry type is found to moderate all TCE variables, suggesting that 
TCE determinants are industry specific, highlighting the need to treat different 
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industries separately when analysing entry modes determinants. It is noted that 
while all TCE determinants were impacted by the moderators, country risk, as an 
external uncertainty factor was least affected by the moderators among all TCE 
determinants (Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004). While TCE points to external 
uncertainty as a decisive factor in conditioning entry mode choice, it has not been 
conclusive on how and when external uncertainty affects the strategic entry mode 
decision, and how perception of external uncertainty and corresponding firm 
behaviour might vary depending on industry and firm specific attributes.  
From the literature it is apparent that TCE can accommodate inherently 
contradictory predictions of firm behaviour towards external uncertainty. In 
accordance with TCE, the greater the external uncertainty the higher the 
transaction cost of managing the contracts, as bounded rationality would prevent 
the firm from anticipating all contingencies and institutional unpredictability hinder 
ability to enforce corporate contracts. On this notion TCE would predict that firms 
would prefer to internalize the business process through establishment of wholly-
owned subsidiaries (captives) (Williamson, 2002; Williamson, 1995).   
On the other hand empirical evidence has been fairly consistent in determining 
that countries with high external uncertainty are more likely to be entered through 
a non-equity modality rather than WOS, compelling firms to choose a flexible 
entry mode rather than an ownership-based entry mode (Zhao, Luo and Suh, 
2004; Slangen and Tulder, 2009). Similarly research on MNEs choice of capital 
structure in response to political risk suggest that as political risk increases 
ownership tends to decrease, which is in contradiction with the premise of TCE 
stipulating that if uncertainty increases, the level of internalization will increase 
accordingly (Kesternich, 2010).  
On one side it can therefore be expected that when informal and formal sources 
of external uncertainty increase, firms prefer investing through entry modes which 
guarantee a higher level of control over their internalized project. On the other 
side, in an offshore setting, firms facing higher external uncertainty may prefer 
flexibility and be less willing to commit resources. The existence of contradictory 
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empirical evidence suggests that the factors of external uncertainty need to be 
explored in more depth. 
1.6.2 Contribution to theoretical knowledge 
The theoretical contribution of the proposed research is significant, as while TCE 
has been the main theoretical framework for the conversation on political risk and 
offshoring strategies, the theory and corresponding empirical findings have not 
been conclusive on how the notion of external uncertainty impacts on offshoring 
entry mode decisions. This research has offered a new conceptualization and 
operationalization of the formal external uncertainty concept within TCE, allowing 
empirically based differentiation between various dimensions of formal 
uncertainty and implications subject to entry mode choice and offshoring activity. 
The identification of new industry relevant political risk factors, like home country 
risk and institutional framework, support emerging critic contending that external 
uncertainty in TCE needs to be conceptualized more broadly and incorporate the 
wider concept of governance infrastructure. As highlighted by Zhao, Luo and Suh 
(2004) and Slangen and Tulder (2009), the integration of mechanisms to capture 
institutional differentiations is one added dimension of an expanded 
conceptualization of external uncertainty beyond the reliance on composite 
political risk indicators (Slangen and Tulder, 2009; Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004). 
The findings further confirm the importance of incorporating industry-specific 
moderators into TCE-based entry mode perceptions of external uncertainty. As 
indicated all TCE determinants are considered industry specific, underlining the 
need to also consider a differentiated approach to various forms of offshoring 
activities i.e. ITO, BPO and KPO. A review of the relationship with key political 
risk variables across offshore outsourcing engagements confirm that the offshore 
outsourcing industry cannot be assessed as one holistic group in terms of risk 
exposure, but should be reviewed through the lens of their activities. This 
confirms that external uncertainty exposure is moderated by the industry type and 
activity, and needs to be systematically incorporated into the TCE application of 
external uncertainty impact on entry mode determination.  
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The research validated that institutional capacity i.e. legal enforcement of IP 
rights and contract enforcement, becomes increasingly important as the 
knowledge increases. These findings support the TCE notion that cases where 
the market is imperfect due to bounded rationality and opportunism leading to 
increased transaction costs due to uncertainty, an internal governance structure 
will be considered more attractive (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). For example, 
in host countries with limited governance infrastructure or institutional capacity 
local suppliers may use loopholes in the legal system or bureaucracy to act in 
self-interest, hence constituting a risk of opportunistic behavior. Similarly, the 
findings touch upon the notion of asset specificity, which is another principle 
factor to which TCE explain vertical integration (Williamson, 1985). TCE has 
distinguished asset specificity as either site specificity, physical asset specificity, 
human asset specificity and dedicated specificity with the main premise 
suggesting that when asset specificity increases, the “balance shifts in the favor 
of internal organization” (Williamson, 1985, p.90). In the context of offshoring of 
services, the research proposes to introduce the additional concept of knowledge 
specificity to be considered as an additional determining aspect of vertical 
integration decision. 
Consistent with the TCE perspective the research suggests that companies 
engaged in the offshore service industry will ensure higher control or avoid 
locations, when engaged in service offshoring with a high-knowledge-content and 
in environment of high institutional and legal uncertainty. Therefore as the 
institutional and legal uncertainty decreases at an offshoring location the level of 
offshoring activity with a higher knowledge-content will increase.  
1.6.3 Contribution to practice 
In practical terms, the research is in line with the call for more research on the 
questions of how and where to source (Kotabe and Murray, 2004). While the 
political risk research is extensive, research remains unable to analytically 
disentangle causality between political risk types and their impact on various 
investment strategies. The key practical contribution is the development of 
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differentiated political risk map of typologies that can capture the nuances in 
offshore business risks, allowing for more accurate risk assessment of various 
offshoring locations and advise on the optimal risk-adjusted investment model, 
plus ensure effective monitoring of post-contract political risk exposure. The 
research findings has allowed for a clear classification of political risk indicators 
influencing offshoring location decisions and forms the basis for establishing a 
framework for more effective post-contract award risk monitoring.  
The categorization of barriers and enablers attracting offshore investment in the 
form of captive hubs or offshore outsourcing is a strong tool for informing policy 
formulation and investment partnership strategies formulated by national 
governments. As potential host countries compete to attract offshored business 
activities, as a basis to enhance employment and knowledge transfer 
opportunities into their economies, it would be important to take note of the 
perceived importance of strengthening institutional and regulatory factors. If the 
host country is seeking to attract investments or outsourcing contracts within the 
areas of R&D, it would be especially important to ensure that the appropriate IP 
regulatory frameworks are in place, while for the more labour intensive BPO 
activities, a well-functioning labour market and minimal bureaucracy would have 
a high impact. 
While beyond the immediate scope of this research, the findings also capture the 
relative importance of non-political predictors of offshoring flows including 
educational levels, infrastructure, and technology and innovation space. The 
findings provide an instrument for policy formulation beyond political risk. For 
example important to acknowledge that a well-functioning supporting ITC 
infrastructure in potential host countries is fundamental in order to attract offshore 
outsourcing activities. Similarly, the findings suggest opportunities for innovation 
centres that compete on more parameters than merely cost efficiencies, but also 
provides opportunities for tapping into local talent and education pools. 
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1.6.3.1 Developing an industry-specific risk monitoring platform 
As per the empirical findings the offshore industry have to date established limited 
capacity for ensuring monitoring of supplier location specific risk indicators, 
exposing them to potential service disruption. With an increasing volume and 
scope of business services being offshored, systematic monitoring of political risk 
indicators should feature in all business process offshoring strategies and 
extended Enterprise Risk Management frameworks. From a practical perspective 
the research highlights the need for developing managerial tools to improve 
timely identification and monitoring of both existing and emerging risks. The 
systematic categorization and impact weighting of the relevant political risk 
indicators within the industry, allows for the development of a web-based risk 
monitoring platform that can both inform the initial offshoring location decisions 
and continue monitoring indicators during the contract implementation period.  
The weighted risk index of offshoring locations can provide real-time location 
analysis and trends, followed by systematic event mapping in the form of heat 
maps informing buyers of developing location specific events with disruption 
potential for their specific offshoring activity. Based on the event notifications 
provided by the automated platform, the service buyers are able to engage in 
timely disruption mitigating measures with the concerned supplier, or initiate 
scale-up of service delivery from alternative suppliers at other locations 
unaffected by the emerging events. An industry-wide risk monitoring platform can 
potentially leverage existing Big Data sources, like Google Big Data or GDELT, 
providing daily codified country events data for operationalizing the identified risk 
indicators and activity-specific impact weightings. An automated risk monitoring 
platform supporting the offshoring industry in navigating location risks and 
proactively monitoring the supplier operating environment is a powerful 
contribution to enhancing confidence in offshored supply and service chains, 
reducing the need for investing in excess capacities, inventories or multiple 
sources of supply, hence improving efficiencies and overall performance of 
offshore operations. The domains and extent of the contribution are summarized 
and shown in the “Contribution to Knowledge Table”. 
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 Table 2: Contribution to knowledge 
Domains of 
Contribution 
Extent of Contribution (Cranfield School of Management – Table) 
What has been confirmed What has been developed What has been found which is new 
Theoretical 
Knowledge 
 The traditional political risk 
definition confirmed 
insufficient to capture the 
exposure of offshore 
outsourcing firms. 
 
 
 Developed and operationalized an expanded political risk 
definition applicable for contemporary offshoring based on a 
robust systematic review of extant literature. 
 Findings of additional political risk factors support emerging 
critic contending that external uncertainty in Transaction 
Cost Theory needs to be conceptualized more broadly and 
incorporate the concept of governance infrastructure. 
 Findings empirically support that IP considerations and 
enforcement is a key feature in companies R&D offshore 
location and entry mode decisions. 
 
Empirical 
evidence 
 Statistically confirming a 
positive relationship 
between offshore 
outsourcing flows and 
institutional and regulatory 
factors for both Offshore 
Outsourcing and FDI 
activities. 
 
 The research has confirmed that the nature of offshore 
outsourcing risk exposure revolves increasingly around 
policy/legal predictability and institutional capacity of host 
country.  
 
 Identified the importance of home country political fall-out or 
change of regulatory frameworks with implications for the 
offshoring business model. This observation highlights that 
political risk exposure has a dual nature. 
 The findings validated that when institutional and regulatory 
factors in the host country are strengthened, the volume of 
overall (ITO/BPO/KPO) contract-based offshore outsourcing 
will increase. 
Knowledge of 
practice 
 
 
 
 Developed a comprehensive and systematic taxonomy of 
political risk constructs and impact perceptions across the 
offshore outsourcing industry to inform industry risk 
management.  
 Determined the relevance of political risk management in 
offshore outsourcing engagements and identified relative 
importance of political risk indicators in supplier location 
choices. The findings provide the basis for development of a 
weighted location risk indexes for the industry. 
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1.7 Research Limitations and Areas for Further Research 
1.7.1 Research limitations 
In the qualitative component of P2, the study was able to elicit political risk 
experiences from a total of 91 offshore outsourcing engagements, with a sample 
of interviewees at 25 outsourcing practitioners from a varied group across 
industry types. While the overall number of engagements and interview sample 
size is significant at a total of 91 engagements, the sample size decreases 
substantially when divided across the three main outsourcing types i.e. 32 BPO 
engagements, 33 ITO engagements and 26 KPO engagements. Due to the 
limited industry specific sample size, the research component was classified as 
exploratory, due to a clear limitation in terms deriving industry wide 
generalizability, and potential bias should be expected from host country 
locations, company size and experience which was not compensated for in the 
analysis. In terms of offshoring locations it should be noted that the distribution of 
samples with a majority (30.8%) in South Asia, (17%) in East Asia & China, 
followed by (17.7% in EU) and (8.8 % non-EU) and (9.9%) in Latina America is 
representative of the general offshoring industry trends, suggesting an 
appropriate distribution of sample engagements. 
With reference to the key components of PCT it should also be considered that 
repertory grid analysis elicits constructs that are specific to the individual, and 
therefore it may not be possible to derive results that are representative of a 
population. Similarly, critics of RGT highlight that constructs changes over time 
and hence are time specific highlights the question of reliability of the results. The 
extracted data therefore needs to be understood to be time specific of nature. For 
these reasons the study should be viewed as exploratory work which has elicited 
constructs which can be validated using surveys of larger samples. However, 
overall the use of RGT provides a clear trail of evidence which is available for 
reanalysis by other researchers, and hence enhances transparency.  
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In the qualitative component of the P3, the research was faced with data 
completeness constraints when applying the combined data from the Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI) and the PRS Group Political Risk Index. For the 
GCI data most variables did not include comparable data from before 2005, due 
to a change in the data collection methodology, and hence limited the scope of 
timeline analysis. In regards to the PRS Political Risk Index the number of case 
countries and potential outsourcing destinations were excluded, like Mauritius. 
Similarly data constraints emerged when building a database from IMF Balance 
of Payment (BoP) data. Due to the varied methods of collecting BoP data across 
national economies, the sourced does not yield a comprehensive set of country 
BoP data for several key outsourcing destinations like Mexico, Indonesia. 
Furthermore, the inconsistent categorization of services across Computer 
Services, R&D and Other Business Services across countries can form a bias in 
the more detailed cross-typology analysis. The implication of the missing or 
inconsistent data has necessitated the removal of national economies with 
incomplete datasets and hence ultimately limiting the scope of cases in the 
analysis. 
As indicated in the section on Country Samples, there are some data 
completeness constraints with using the Global Competitiveness Report and the 
PRS Group Political Risk Index, as not all countries are represented with 
complete data sets. For the GCI data the key limitation is that most variables do 
not provide comparable data from before 2005, due to a change in the data 
collection methodology, and hence limits the scope of timeline analysis. Similarly, 
due to the varied methods of collecting BoP data across national economies, 
does not yield a comprehensive set of country BoP data for all countries, plus the 
potential for inconsistent categorization of services across Computer Services, 
R&D and Other Business Services which can form a bias in the more detailed 
cross-typology analysis. The implication of the missing or inconsistent data has 
been the removal of national economies with incomplete datasets and hence 
limiting the scope of analysis. 
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Finally, the time-series regression analysis likely involves some level of 
autocorrelation of the disturbances as indicated by the standard Durbin–Watson 
d statistic. For the political risk models the Durbin-Watson value ranges from .265 
for the ITO specific analysis to .486 for the Aggregate political risk analysis, 
indicating a positive first-order serial correlation for the data sample. One 
consequence of autocorrelation might be that some or all estimated coefficients 
are biased, which could affect the interpretation of the relative impact of the 
indicators for political risk on offshore outsourcing. Subsequently, the analysis of 
the relative impact of the political risk variables will need to be assessed with 
some caution. 
1.7.2 Areas for further research 
Firstly, the findings suggest that firm perception of uncertainty is conditioned by 
the perceived ability of the firm to mitigate more objective external uncertainties 
through proactive political risk management mechanisms. On this note it may be 
interesting to integrate risk management ability (or perception of ability) into the 
overall function of entry mode uncertainty determination. Such a study would 
explore the (risk) adaptive behaviour patterns of firms, as well as the implications 
on entry mode strategies. 
Secondly, the exploratory research established that political risk concerns 
relating to home/client-country political fall-out or change of regulatory 
frameworks with implications for the offshoring business model was one of the 
most prominent concerns. This observation highlights that political risk exposure 
has a dual nature with potential impact on both the location side and the manner 
in which the outsourcing activity is executed, a dynamic that remains unexplored. 
While the exploratory research suggested that the impact of home political risk 
was sector specific and regional, it would be interesting to further explore the 
actual impact on offshoring decisions and determine whether the risk is mostly 
rhetoric or real in its consequence. 
Finally, the findings suggests that a review of the impact of political risk 
considerations in offshoring entry modes would need to include moderators 
 50 
 
pertaining to firm experience and business volume. The findings therefore 
suggest that the premise of TCE alone may be insufficient to explain a firm’s 
decisions on applying a contract-based or captive entry mode when offshoring 
BPO/ITO or KPO business processes. In fact, the findings tentatively suggest 
that the choice of Entry Mode is not only influenced by level of external 
uncertainty, but also by business considerations relating to volume of trade, 
consideration to control requirements of the particular business processes i.e. 
data security or proprietary nature. Similarly, previous operationalization of the 
TCE framework has not factored the conditioning effect of the risk adaptive 
behaviour patterns of firms, as well as the implications of this adaptive behaviour 
for the application of TCE itself.  
The following sections will present the Systematic Literature Review (P1), plus 
the two empirical research components (P2 & P3) in their entirety, as per the 
milestone requirements for the DBA.  
 
  
 
2 A Systematic Literature Review 
2.1 Structure of the Review 
As per the Cranfield University guidelines, the following components provide the 
outline for the Systematic Review Framework.    
 
PART I – PLANNING THE REVIEW
Literature Scoping 
Data Synthesis
Data Extraction - Descriptive and Thematic Analysis
Quality Evaluation
Systematic Literature Search
 Research Motivation
Review Protocol Development
PART II – CONDUCTING THE REVIEW
Review Question(s) and Panel formation
PART III – REPORTING THE REVIEW
Reporting of Review Findings
Informing Research and Practice
 
 
2.2 The Systematic Literature Review Protocol 
The systematic literature review is a means of identifying, evaluating and interpreting 
all available research relevant to the review questions pertaining to political risk in 
international offshoring strategies. The main reason for undertaking the systematic 
review is: 
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 To summarize the existing evidence concerning political risk effects on offshore 
outsourcing strategy development and corresponding entry mode choice; 
 To determine the relevance of the proposed research by providing insights for 
intervention into the operational needs of practitioners; 
 To provide a framework/background of existing knowledge in order position the 
planned research activities. 
The overall objective of the literature review is hence to map and assess the relevant 
knowledge within the research area, in a systematic, transparent and reproducible 
manner, in order to specify a relevant research question which will further develop the 
knowledge base (Tranfield, Denyer and Smart, 2003).  
The systematic literature review follows an evidence-based approach adopting a 
replicable scientific and transparent process aiming at minimizing bias and providing 
an audit trail of review decisions, procedures and conclusions. The protocol 
methodology for the systematic review fulfils the premise of documenting the review 
in sufficient detail to enable the study to be replicated by others, thereby allowing an 
increased reliability of the findings. The protocol is hence considered a roadmap that 
protects objectivity through explicit description of the search strategy for identification 
of relevant studies and the criteria for inclusion and exclusion of studies in the review 
(Tranfield, Denyer and Smart, 2003). 
2.2.1 The systematic literature review question 
The literature review will be guided by the following review question: 
Review question: What are the types and dynamics of political risk that impact on 
international offshoring strategies? 
2.2.2 Key word identification 
The systematic search was commenced with the identification of keywords and search 
terms extracted from the review question and from the definition of key concepts to 
form the below search strings to guide the systematic review process. Acknowledging 
that the literature is discussing the phenomenon of political risk and offshore 
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outsourcing by use of various synonyms, a range of OR synonyms identified in the 
literature was included in the search string design. 
2.2.3 Applied search strings 
The keyword search strings were developed using the Boolean Logic (OR, AND, NOT) 
to isolate the most relevant research.  
Table 3:  Review search strings 
Review Question: What are the types and dynamics of political risks that impact on international 
offshoring strategies? 
Root search word Sub- search word(s) 1 Sub- search word(s) 2 Search area 
offshor* OR 
outsourc* OR 
sourc* OR 
International 
Business 
AND poli*OR geo-poli* 
OR countr*OR  
location* OR 
environment* 
AND Risk* OR hazard* 
OR uncertaint*OR 
contingenc* OR 
vulnerabilit* OR 
turbulenc* 
Title, 
abstract, 
keywords 
2.2.4 Identifying information sources   
The primary source of information is academic journals and books, which are 
searchable through academic databases. The University of Cranfield Library data 
base was reviewed and analysed, and the following databases were identified as 
providing the most relevant coverage; ProQuest, EBSCO, Emerald Journals and 
Science Direct. The four main databases were then further tested for the coverage of 
offshoring literature by first inserting the key words (Offshoring OR Outsourcing) to 
determine the volume of coverage to determine the substantive content of the 
databases relating to the specific subject matter. From this pilot it was established that 
ABI/ProQuest and EBSCO yielded the highest search result on the overall offshoring 
literature. Furthermore, it was established that ABI/ProQuest and EBSCO are the 
largest and most comprehensive of the four databases and that Emerald is a publisher 
database, which should therefore be captured within the former two databases. On 
this basis it was decided to exclusively use ABI/ProQuest and EBSCO as they 
supplement each other in terms of coverage.    
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Table 4: Identification of database resources  
Name of 
Database 
Coverage (extracted from website) Search 
in: 
Keywords: 
Offshoring OR 
Outsourcing 
ABI Inform 
Complete 
(ProQuest)  
 
Full-text access to approximately 2,500 international 
business periodicals contained within the ABI Inform 
Global, Trade and Industry and Dateline databases. 
Coverage: 1971 – current. 
ALL 102,663 
Business 
Source 
Complete 
(EBSCO)  
Full-text access to more than 2,800 scholarly 
business publications including over 900 peer-
reviewed journals. Also includes book content, 
conference proceedings, and industry and market 
reports. Coverage: variable, 1922 – current. 
ALL 35,962 
Emerald 
Journals  
 
Full text archives back to 1994. Subject coverage 
spans a spectrum of management disciplines as well 
as a substantial number of engineering, applied 
science and technology titles 
ALL 5,668 
Science Direct 
(Elsevier 
Science 
Journals)  
Full text journal articles in the field of science and 
technology. Also provides a current awareness 
service and a powerful scientific internet search 
engine called Scirus. 
ALL 12,770 
Date of search results: 28th December 2011 
A secondary source of non-academic applied literature, including insurance company 
reports, World Bank (MIGA), individual or company consultancy reports, and company 
annual reports was important in establishing the research motivation. However, for the 
purpose of conducting the Systematic Literature Review only peer-reviewed journal 
articles were considered under the assumption that peer reviewed research will have 
undergone a minimum level of scrutiny in regards to quality and academic 
methodology. In addition to the results obtained through the systematic application of 
the search strings and references, additional relevant papers identified previous to the 
review process were added following confirmation that they met the pre-defined 
criteria. 
2.2.5 The search methodology 
As per the Systematic Literature Review protocol, only studies that met pre-defined 
inclusion criteria specified in the review protocol, and which did not feature any of the 
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exclusion criteria, were incorporated into the review process. The following eligibility 
criteria were established accordingly. 
2.2.6 Basic review eligibility criteria 
Table 5: Eligibility criteria 
No. Area Inclusion criteria Exclusion 
criteria 
Justification 
1 
Language 
English or French  Any other 
language not 
formally 
translated 
Limited resources for translation 
2 
Peer Review 
Peer reviewed journals 
only 
Non-peer 
reviewed 
documents 
The notion that a journal has 
undergone a peer review assumes a 
minimum quality in terms of data 
quality and methodology applied. 
3 
Risk Type 
Political, economic, 
social and other 
country risk 
Financial risk A large amount of literature has 
focused on financial risk management 
in terms of Basil 1 & 2, which will not 
be included in the review.  
4 
Industry 
 
Manufacturing, 
Services and 
Knowledge & 
Research 
 Useful to map the varied risk 
exposure from manufacturing, to 
services and to knowledge based 
outsourcing.  
5 
Location 
Offshore Low Cost 
Countries 
High income 
countries 
See previous definitions 
6 
Entry Mode 
Ownership-based, 
Contract based and 
hybrid sourcing  
Domestic 
outsourcing, 
franchising and 
export  
 
7 
Sources 
Published journals 
listed in identified 
bibliographic 
databases, including 
conference 
proceedings and 
unpublished studies. 
Non-academic 
sources 
Valuable information is expected from 
i.e. books, company annual reports, 
consultancy reports, World Bank 
(MIGA), insurance company reports 
etc., however these sources will be 
excluded from the Systematic Review 
process. 
8 
Research 
methods 
All included Need to meet 
minimum 
quality criteria 
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For the purpose of identifying the most relevant literature and establishing the scope 
of the existing knowledge base within political risk management in offshoring, the 
review established a set of filters to select and identify studies. This method provides 
a systematic and explicit approach in its selection of studies and is designed to mitigate 
bias when using subjective criteria. The method has been modified from the outline 
provided in previous research (David and Han, 2004). 
2.2.7 Filtering methodology - applying the eligibility criteria 
 The first filter isolates articles from the pre-identified databases with substantive 
relevance for the overall research i.e. those which include the root search word 
and at least one of the sub-search words per sub-review question. Only the 
articles that include minimum one of the additional keyword(s) or their 
synonyms in the title or abstract would be included. 
 The second filter reviews the identified literature against the pre-established 
eligibility criteria. 
 The third filter eliminates any duplicates. 
 The fourth filter review remaining articles for substantive relevance and 
academic quality. The quality review will include the criteria stipulated in the 
Quality Criteria section. 
 The final filter includes a full review of the entire article for substantive, 
theoretical, conceptual, special relevance and quality as per the criteria 
stipulated in the Data Extraction Form. 
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Table 6: Literature review filters 
No. Filter type Description Inclusion criteria 
Exclusion 
Criteria 
Focus 
1 Substantive 
Root search 
string 
Articles that include the root 
search word plus one of 
each additional search 
category (AND XYZ) 
Articles not 
including the 
search words in 
the title or 
abstract 
Title & 
Abstract 
2 
Substantive 
Mode of 
offshoring 
Articles concerning contract 
based and ownership based 
sourcing – and any hybrids 
Domestic 
sourcing 
Title & 
Abstract 
Substantive Geographic 
Articles with reference to 
low cost countries or 
synonyms 
High income 
country locations 
Title & 
Abstract 
Substantive Industry All  
Title & 
Abstract 
Methodological Method 
Empirical and Conceptual 
articles 
 
Title & 
Abstract 
3 Duplicates  Deletion of duplicates  Full text 
4 Substantive Quality 
Articles that meet the 
quality requirements in 
check list 
 Full text 
5 Substantive 
Review of 
full article 
  Full text 
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2.3 The Systematic Literature Search 
2.3.1 Identifying and selecting studies 
The following matrixes illustrate the selection flow of the key articles for the literature 
review based on the pre-defined protocol steps and criteria. 
Table 7: Review selection flow 
No. Filter type Description ABI/ Proquest EBSCO Reduction Total 
1 Substantive Root search string(s) 1657 1241  2898 
2 Substantive 
Title & Abstract 
screening 
154 94 (2650) 248 
3 Duplicates Remove duplicates   (24) 224 
4 Substantive Eligibility criteria   (128) 96 
(Inclusion of relevant referenced articles) 19 
5 Substantive Quality Evaluation   (81) 115 
 6 Substantive Review of full article    36 
 
2.3.2 Quality assessment criteria 
 
The quality assessment criteria applied for filter 4 are modified from papers on 
conducting Systematic Literature Reviews (Tranfield, Denyer and Smart, 2003; 
Denyer and Aken, 2008; Denyer and Tranfield, 2009) and will follow the self-
explanatory grading system below. 
  
 
Table 8: The quality assessment criteria  
Elements to consider Level 
0-Absence 1-Low 2-Medium 3-High Not Applicable 
1. Literature 
review 
The article does not provide 
enough information to 
assess this element. 
Literature review is 
inadequate. 
Basic understanding of 
the issues around the 
topic being discussed. 
Excellent review of previous 
literature. 
This element is not 
applicable to this paper. 
2. Contribution 
The article does not provide 
enough information to 
assess this element. 
The Paper adds little to 
the body of knowledge in 
this area. 
Contribution to 
knowledge is trivial in 
importance and 
significance. 
Significant addition to current 
knowledge and fills an 
important theory gab. 
This element is not 
applicable to this paper. 
3. Theory 
The article does not provide 
enough information to 
assess this element. 
No underlying theory 
base. 
Theoretical base is not 
well articulated. 
Strong theoretical basis. This element is not 
applicable to this paper. 
4. Methodology 
The article does not provide 
enough information to 
assess this element. 
The idea of study is 
poorly executed with 
inappropriate methods. 
Justified research 
design but not fully 
executed. 
Strong research design and 
solid methodological 
execution. 
This element is not 
applicable to this paper. 
5. Data 
Analysis 
The article does not provide 
enough information to 
assess this element. 
The data sample is 
insufficient. Inconclusive 
findings and weak 
connection between 
results and theory. 
Limiting data sample. 
The results relate to 
the theoretical 
framework. 
Adequate data sample. Well 
explained results and linkage 
to theory. Include limitation 
analysis. 
This element is not 
applicable to this paper. 
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2.4 Data Extraction – Descriptive and Thematic Review 
Based on the detailed review and quality appraisal a list of key articles were 
compiled for in-depth analysis and will constitute the core of the literature review 
on political risk in offshoring. The journals are rated according to the Cranfield 
University rating of academic journals and annexed in Appendix A-2. 
The articles selection was based on an individual quality assessment and scoring 
captured in the data extraction form of the total of 115 articles and constitutes the 
responds to Sub-Review Question 1. The 35 core articles were selected based 
on the filtering process against the pre-defined quality assessment criteria sorting 
all articles with a total score of minimum 9 out of 15, and a minimum contribution 
score of 2 out of 3. Note that while the listing will form the basis of the data 
analysis and synthesis of the Literature Review, the full 115 articles will be 
included in the descriptive and thematic review of the political risk literature.  
The descriptive and thematic analysis is conducted by application of descriptive 
statistics using the categories from the data extraction form (Tranfield, Denyer 
and Smart, 2003). The purpose of descriptive statistics is to reduce large data 
samples into a simpler summary to describe patterns and general trends in a data 
set and is used to examine one variable at a time. On review of the articles the 
findings were inserted into the data extraction matrix in binary form allowing for 
cross tabulation with the use of pivot tables and organized into the descriptive 
and thematic tables presented in this section.  
2.4.1 Historical distribution of research 
As indicated the basic body of political risk literature reviewed comprised of 115 
papers. The allocation of the publications over the span of the research period 
1970 – 2012 (Feb) is captured in the figure below. Political risk is not a new 
phenomenon in international business. Based on the Review the academic focus 
on political risk seems to have emerged in the context of decolonization in the 
1960’s with an early managerial focus on major discontinuities in the international 
system, such as the revolution in Cuba, Nicaragua and Iran, and the 
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corresponding implications for US companies especially (Kobrin, 1981). The 
academic publications on political risk in offshoring as a research subject has 
since escalated in volume in recent years, indicating a consistent and evolving 
research interest in the subject. 
Table 9: Distribution of publications per year from 1970-2012 
 
 
It is telling that the distribution of articles focusing on political risk in offshoring is 
weighted more than 60% towards the last decade, indicating an intense increase 
in research interest and relevance.  
 
Table 10: Distribution of research from 1971 – 2012 (Feb)   
1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2011  
5 22 17 70  N=115 
4.4% 19.3% 14.9% 61.4%  
 
2.4.2 Distribution across offshoring modalities 
The main focus of political risk literature has been on ownership-based forms of 
offshoring, dating back to the early 1970’s. It is indicative that among 115 articles 
on political risk in offshoring, as many as 80 had a defined ownership-based 
offshoring (OBO), or joint venture focus. The Contract-based Offshoring (CBO) 
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focused research on political risk has increased in line with the emergence and 
growth of the outsourcing industry, especially from 2005 and onwards.  
Table 11: Distribution over offshoring modalities 
 Ownership-based 
offshoring (OBO) 
Hybrid (JV) Contract-based 
offshoring (CBO) 
Unspecified 
Total 66 14 16 19 
  
The overview also suggests a consistent and growing research interest in political 
risk on both OBO and CBO from beginning of this decade and onwards. The 
below provides a visualization of the historical focus of political risk research in 
offshoring distributed according to year of publication and in accordance with 
offshoring modality. 
Table 12: Historical distribution of research offshoring research 
 
 
2.4.3 Geographical and industry distribution 
While political risk research was conceptualized in the period 1970-80, the bulk 
of empirical work originates primarily from North America, focusing on the MENA 
region (Gillespie, 1989) and Latin America (Cupitt, 1990; Rice and Mahmoud, 
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1990). A later spike of interest focused on European firms and offshoring into 
Eastern Europe (Pfohl and Large, 1993); and investment decisions among 
Spanish companies within the EU and abroad (Jiménez, Durán and De, 2011; 
Jiménez, 2010; Belso-Martinez, 2010).  
Table 13: Origin versus offshoring modalities 
 
US & Canada Europe Asia Total 
OBO Click, 2005; Cupitt, 1990; 
Desbordes, 2010; Fatehi-
Sedeh, 1989; Kyaw and 
Zong, 2011; Rice, 1990; 
Zhao, 2003; Keillor, Wilkinson 
and Owens, 2005. 
Jiménez, Durán and De, 
2011; Kesternich, 2010; 
López-Duarte, 2010; 
Pedersen and Ørberg 
Jensen, 2011). 
Delios, 2003; 
Henisz and 
Delios, 2004. 
15 
CBO Ramarapu, Parzinger and 
Lado, 1997. 
Pfohl and Large, 1993; 
Pedersen and Ørberg 
Jensen, 2011). 
Wan, Wan and 
Zhang, 2010. 
 
3 
Total 9 6 3 18 
The following table provides an overview of research with empirical work targeting 
political risk considerations related to particular offshoring destinations. 
Table 14: Destinations versus offshoring modalities 
 
OBO CBO Total 
East Euro Wade, 2005; Liuhto, Heikkila and Laaksonen, 
2009. 
Pfohl and Large, 
1993 
3 
Russia & CIS 
Jakobsen, 2010. 
 1 
India 
Prasad, 2006. 
 1 
China 
Zhang and Zhao, 2007; Zhao, 2003; Blackman, 
1999; Wan, Wan and Zhang, 2010. 
Wan, Wan and 
Zhang, 2010; 
 
5 
MENA 
Gillespie, 1989; Wyk, 2010, (Fatehi-Sedeh and 
Safizadeh, 1989; 
 3 
South-East 
Asia Jakobsen, 2010; Lam, 2011; Howell and Xie, 1996.  
 3 
Latin America 
Jakobsen, 2010; Cupitt, 1990; Oetzel, 2005; 
Palacios and Griffin, 2011. 
 4 
EU Mudambi and Navarra, 2003.  1 
Africa Simon, 1984.  1 
 21 2 23 
From both tables there appears to be a dominance of political risk research 
among firms originating either in North America or Europe with very limited 
representation from other regions. Similarly, the destination focus has been on 
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mainstream offshoring markets in China, Eastern Europe, Latin America and 
South-east Asia.  
2.4.4 Distribution of industry specific outsourcing research 
The following table provides an overview of the industry focus distribution among 
offshoring literature and political risk considerations. In this regard it is interesting 
to note the increased interest in the emerging outsourcing industries including 
ITO, BPO and KPO sectors.   
 
Table 15: Overview of industry specific outsourcing research 
 Manufacturing Services (BPO) Services (ITO) R&D (KPO) Total 
CBO 1 1 7 1 10 
OBO 5 3 2 2 52 
Total 6 4 9 3 62 
2.4.5 Distribution of research focus 
The articles were differentiated into thematic categories subject to their key 
research orientation and focus. The review reveals that a bulk of the literature 
has been focused on political risk assessment and analysis within the realm of 
ownership-based FDI or in terms of verifying the relative strengths of political risk 
assessment indexes (Howell and Chaddick, 1994; Oetzel, Bettis, and Zenner, 
2001. Another major research focus area has been on FDI location determinants 
exploring correlations between various country risks and inward FDI flow (Fatehi-
Sedeh and Safizadeh, 1989; Palacios and Griffin, 2011; Zhao, 2003). It is 
noteworthy that research on offshore outsourcing and direct or indirect political 
risk considerations is emerging as a major focus area, also linked to supply chain 
risk considerations. The review highlights a limited focus on risk management in 
the post-location stage, and instead underlines a focus on the pre-location 
decision process and risk assessment. While emerging research is questioning 
the mainstream political literature for taking the political environment as 
exogenous and considering firms as passive actors only (Frynas and Mellahi, 
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2003), the review suggests that there has been relative limited research on firm 
political risk management and attempts to develop a comprehensive risk 
management model. 
Table 16: Distribution of research focus  
Risk Assessment & Awareness 33 
FDI location determinants 13 
Risk analysis (Root causes) 12 
Offshore Outsourcing risk, decision and implementation 10 
Risk Management 8 
Risk Forecasting 5 
Supply Chain Risk Assessment and mitigation 5 
Determination of entry modes 4 
Institutional Assessment 3 
Sovereign Risk 2 
Risk Impact Measure 1 
Risk implications 1 
Sourcing risks 1 
Supplier selection 1 
Economic regionalization 1 
Others  - (Home political risk; Global conflict; Diplomatic risk; Security risk; Post-
location risks;  Market exit strategies and Industrial strategies) 
6 
Unclassified 7 
(N=115) 
2.4.6 Theoretical perspectives 
The review suggests a general absence of explicit theoretical underpinnings and 
perspective in the majority of the offshoring political risk literature. The majority 
of papers are conceptual with a focus on political risk assessment or limited to 
establishing correlations between business investment trends and countries with 
high perceptions of political risk. Only a limited number of studies have linked 
organizational perspectives to the concept of political risk in order to highlight 
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managerial implications of the phenomenon in international business and the 
impact on firm offshore strategies.  
Within this category the application of Transaction Cost Theory (TCE), either 
alone or in combination with premises from OLI framework, resource-based view 
(RBV) is confirmed as the dominating approach. The TCE framework has mainly 
provided conceptual support for the link between trade internalization and 
uncertainty (Feinberg and Gupta, 2009); analysing the fit between destination 
attributes and the attributes of offshored business activities (Pedersen and 
Ørberg Jensen, 2011) or in determining firms outsourcing decisions and 
corresponding supplier monitoring requirements (Vitharana and Dharwadkar, 
2007). 
Similarly, the Stages Model of Internationalization (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) 
has been used to determine the correlation between firm experience and entry 
strategies (Delios and Henisz, 2003; Henisz and Delios, 2004), highlighting the 
need to include firm specific considerations in explaining internationalization 
strategies. The OLI framework has been applied to explain FDI location 
decisions, including the impact of HR considerations (Graf and Mudambi, 2005) 
and local political risk considerations (Mudambi and Navarra, 2003). RBV is less 
prevalent and applied in the context of developing propositions in regard to the 
interactions among firm, industry and non-market actors as well as the impact of 
various forms of political behaviour approach on strategic management 
(Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). Finally, motivational theory has been used to 
measure impact of socio-cultural differences integrating socio-cultural variables 
with other non-economic factors into a comprehensive qualitative but structured 
approach to country risk assessment (Leavy, 1984). 
On a more isolated basis neo-contingency theory has been applied to examine 
the importance of sourcing country factors in explaining the level of FDI in China 
(Zhao, 2003); portfolio theory has been used to explore the impact of political risk 
on investors required return (Butler and Joaquin, 1998) and stakeholder theory 
to understand political risks and corresponding risk management strategies (Gao, 
 67 
 
2009). Different approaches have been applied including the SCOR model and 
Uncertainty Circle Model for supply chain risk analysis (Sanchez-Rodrigues and 
Naim, 2010); Krugman’s Economic Geography model for deterring FDI 
investment impacts on regional economic integration (Zhang and Zhao, 2007) 
and the Comparative Capitalisms approach for understanding institutional 
diversity and its implications for international business (Jackson and Deeg, 2008). 
 Table 17: Theoretical perspectives applied  
No explicit theoretical perspective 92 
Transaction Cost Theory (TCE) 4 
Transaction Cost Theory (TCE) & OLI framework 2 
Transaction Cost Theory (TCE) & OLI framework & Resource-based View (RBV) 2 
Transaction Cost Theory (TCE) & Institutional Theory 1 
Transaction Cost Theory (TCE) & Internationalization Theory 1 
OLI framework 1 
OLI framework & Investment Development Path (IDP) 1 
Resource-based View (RBV) 1 
Resource-based View (RBV) and Political behavior theory 1 
SCOR model and Uncertainty Circle Model for supply chain risk analysis 1 
Comparative Capitalisms (CC) approach  1 
Economic Geography model (Krugman) 1 
Linking Net Present Value (NPV) method and Prince Political Accounting method 1 
Motivational Theory  1 
Multinational Network Hypothesis (MNH) & Internalization Theory 1 
Neo-contingency Theory 1 
Political System Approach drawn from Political Science  1 
Portfolio Theory 1 
Stages Model of Internationalization  1 
Stakeholder Theory 1 
(N=115) 
2.4.7 Distribution of research methodologies  
The review was differentiated between five research methodologies, namely: 
Conceptual Papers; Literature Reviews; Empirical quantitative studies; Case 
studies; and Qualitative interviews. The following table provides an overview of 
the distribution of applied research methods within the political risk literature. The 
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distribution suggests an overweight of conceptual contributions and quantitative 
empirical research, highlighting a scarcity of qualitative empirical research.  
Table 18: Distribution of research methodologies 
Conceptual 
papers 
Literature 
reviews 
Quantitative 
studies 
Case studies Qualitative 
interviews 
39 6 37 4 6 
The use of empirical quantitative methods is by far the most applied methodology 
and can be clustered into the following main groups of data applications. Firstly, 
several surveys have focused on clusters of national firms engaged in various 
forms of offshoring, including Canadian companies ( Agarwal and Feils, 2007); 
Japanese manufacturing firms (Delios and Henisz, 2003; Henisz and Delios, 
2004; Spanish firms (Jiménez, Durán and De, 2011) and Danish firms (Pedersen 
and Ørberg Jensen, 2011). The application of country specific trade data for 
comparison with country risk profiles has also been applied, including research 
on the relationship between policy changes and governmental instability by 
analysis of national trade data (115 countries) in the period 1973-79 (Brewer, 
1983); or identifying patterns of Latin American countries (12 countries) 
liberalizing or stiffing non-tariff trade barriers (Cupitt, 1990); and finally exploring 
the role of political risk and institutions reviewing national data (83 countries) 
covering the period 1984-2003 (Busse and Hefeker, 2007).  
Other research have applied data from the US State Department for Commerce 
using time series and cross country Return on Assets (ROA) estimates to identify 
to construct a new index of political risk (Click, 2005) or examining the importance 
of source country factors in explaining the level of FDI in China by multiple 
regression of data from the Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and 
Trade in the period 1983-1999 (Zhao, 2003). Similar datasets have been 
extracted from International Organizations, including the merging of datasets 
from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (Hahn, Doh, and 
Bunyaratave, 2009); Heritage Foundation, World Bank Freedom Index, 
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UNCTAD1 and Transparency International (Jiménez, De and Duran, 2011) or 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics Database (Straub, 2008). Finally, several 
authors have used various political risk indices to support quantitative analysis 
including ICRG2 risk indexes combined with Belgium Export data (ONDD) 
(Jensen and Johnston, 2011); ICRG risk indexes combined with data from the 
Deutsche Bundesbank (Kesternich and Schnitzer, 2010) or as an independent 
composite to evaluate country risk (Desbordes, 2010); alternatively research has 
applied data from the PITF3 (Rios-Morales, Gamberger, Smuc and Azuaje, 2009) 
as a base for measuring political risk levels. 
The empirical case studies include testing FDI non-entry modes after the Iranian 
regime change in 1979 with a case study on the US-Iranian Tribunal (Gillespie, 
1989) and a case study on the Bauxite and Aluminium industry (Jakobsen, 2010), 
both focusing on FDI ownership–based offshoring in the extraction industry. 
Similar case studies have been undertaken to research offshore outsourcing, 
including Samsung Electronics’ supply chain risks in the consumer electronics 
industry (Sodhi and Lee, 2007) and a case exploring risk factors for a software 
service company outsourcing from Hong Kong to Guangdong (Wan, Wan and 
Zhang, 2010).  
The use of qualitative interviews has mainly focused on expert and practitioner 
opinions on relevant risk factors, including risks to IT outsourcing projects 
interviewing 30+ outsourcing experts (Nakatsu and Iacovou, 2009) and holding 
discussions with outsourcing executives on outsourcing typologies and risks 
(Sanders, Locke, Moore and Autry, 2007). Another study researched the 
awareness of risk management activities within public and private sector 
organizations using semi-structured interviews engaging a group of buyers 
(Gholami, 2012). 
                                            
1  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
2  International Country Risk Guide 
3  Political Instability Task Force 
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2.4.8 Distribution of stakeholder focus 
The following table captures the distribution of actor specific research within the 
offshoring literature, reiterating a focus on the dyadic relationship between 
government and MNC within the domain of ownership-based offshoring. While 
the scope of actors have included non-government actors such as NGOs, local 
business and institutions as a separate unit of analysis, the main concern has 
remained the Government as an independent entity of analysis. The findings 
further highlight that much of the political risk research has had an unspecified 
stakeholder focus.  
Thereby the research has been limited to generic notions of political risk, rather 
than identifying the source of the risk as a means of differentiation and potential 
basis for risk mitigation.  
Table 19: Distribution of stakeholder focus 
Actors  (N=115) OBO CBO 
Government 15 13 2 
Local Government 3 3 0 
Political Institutions 2 3 0 
Society (NGO) 2 2 0 
Local Business 2 2 0 
Home political actors 3 1 2 
Unspecified 89 - - 
2.4.9 Dimensions of political risk addressed in extant literature 
For the purpose of identifying the key dimensions of political risk captured in 
offshoring research, the key focus area of each article was inserted in binary form 
into the data extraction form during the review process. The review yielded 
around 50 individual research dimensions which were analysed either separately 
or in combination in the literature. By undertaking a thematic clustering exercise 
the following political risk dimensions were highlighted as the main areas of 
research focus. 
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Table 20: Dimensions of political risk (N=115) 
Political instability 23 
Instability of socio-economic environment 10 
Corruption 5 
Legal unpredictability 4 
Bureaucracy 4 
Regime instability 3 
Policy unpredictability 3 
Unspecified 63 
As captured in the above table, the vast amount of research articles have focused 
on political stability considerations, either in terms of political instability and 
turmoil (Bergner, 1982; Brewer, 1983; Coplin and O'Leary, 1983; Cupitt, 1990; 
Fatehi-Sedeh and Safizadeh, 1989; Goodman and Ramer, 2007; Green, 1974; 
Liuhto, Heikkilä and Laaksonen, 2009; Oetzel, 2005; Pfohl and Large, 1993; 
Robock, 1971; Wade, 2005; Herath and Kishore, 2009; Kobrin, 1981; Kumar and 
Sosnoski, 2009; Rios-Morales, Gamberger, Smuc and Azuaje, 2009) election 
upheaval (Oetzel, 2005) and internal conflict (Busse and Hefeker, 2007); or more 
broader incorporating the potential instability of neighbour countries (Oetzel, 
2005; Howell and Xie 1996) and external regional threats (Busse and Hefeker, 
2007; Howell, 2007). 
In extension of the political stability literature a relatively large body of articles 
included consideration to social stability or socio-cultural differences (Leavy, 
1984) in terms of considering the level of ethnic divide and religious tension 
(Busse and Hefeker, 2007); the presence of socio-political grievances (Jakobsen, 
2010; Busse and Hefeker, 2007; or in terms of consequence and focusing on 
social unrest (Liuhto, Heikkila and Laaksonen, 2009; Kumar and Sosnoski, 2009; 
Jakobsen, 2010) and law and order (Gholami, 2012). More recently research has 
considered unemployment; (Liuhto, Heikkila and Laaksonen, 2009, 2009); and 
level of foreign debt (Agarwal and Feils, 2007) as location decision considerations 
with potential performance impact. Other research has included regime stability; 
(Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Coplin and O'Leary, 1983) stability of ruling party 
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(Agarwal and Feils, 2007) in combination with predictability and frequent changes 
of government policy (Green, 1974; Brewer, 1993;  Oetzel, 2005; Howell and Xie, 
1996), which has historically been on the research agenda. 
Beyond the more traditional political risk dimensions more recent research has 
increased focused on corruption (Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Straub, 2008; Rios-
Morales, Gamberger, Smuc and Azuaje, 2009; Wade, 2005); or corrupt local 
government (Oetzel, 2005) and the impact on FDI inflow. Similarly, issues relating 
to legal predictability; (Busse and Hefeker, 2007); accountability (Herath and 
Kishore, 2009; Gholami, 2012) privacy rules (Gholami, 2012), as major 
constraints to offshoring are emerging as new research areas. Finally, offshoring 
research has included the notion of bureaucracy (Busse and Hefeker, 2007); or 
quality of bureaucracy (Gholami, 2012; Herath and Kishore, 2009), or similarly 
the degree of red tape (Agarwal and Feils, 2007) into the portfolio of offshoring 
considerations. 
2.4.10 Distribution of political risk manifestations 
The actual manifestation of political risk in the offshoring industry has been much 
less researched in specific terms. As indicated in the table below only a limited 
number of studies have focused on specific risk events and their manifestations. 
It is noteworthy that the most represented risk events are linked to more recent 
research focusing on currency exchange fluctuations and stability of foreign 
exchange rates (Agarwal and Feils, 2007;  Liuhto, Heikkila and Laaksonen, 2009; 
Oetzel, 2005). Equally prominent is the recent focus on loss of intellectual 
property rights (Ramarapu, Parzinger and Lado, 1997; Kesternich, 2011; Weiss 
and Azaran, 2007; Kumar et al., 2009; Herath and Kishore, 2009), particularly 
linked to the offshoring outsourcing literature. Another emerging research focus 
is compliance risk, relating to local laws and regulations, and their impact on 
offshoring activities (Ramarapu, Parzinger and Lado, 1997; Weiss and Azaran, 
2007; Kumar and Sosnoski, 2009). 
As was the case with stakeholder focus, much of the political research explored 
through the literature review maintained an unspecific notion of risk, hence not 
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differentiating between the various nature and sources of the risks and their 
individual impacts on the business activity.  
Table 21: Dimensions of political risk events (N=115) 
Currency exchange fluctuations 5 
Loss of intellectual property rights 5 
Expropriation 4 
Labour disturbance/strike 3 
Capital outflow repatriation restrictions 3 
Compliance risk (laws & regulations) 3 
Import/export restrictions 1 
Unspecified 91 
The more traditional risk event focus has been on expropriation (Bergner, 1982; 
Kesternich and Schnitzer, 2010; Micallef, 1981; Gillespie, 1989) and the risk to 
MNC’s, mostly in the context of decolonization in the 1970s. Similarly, capital 
outflow restrictions/profit repatriation or capital outflow restrictions (Agarwal and 
Feils, 2007); profit repatriation (Bergner, 1982); and import/export restrictions 
(Bergner, 1982) has been a consistent research focus. 
In conjunction with the earlier indicated diversification of political risk actors, the 
corresponding manifestations of events has included political influence of local 
suppliers (Oetzel, 2005) and acts by non-government actors (Jakobsen, 2010). 
The expansion of unit of analysis has also allowed the inclusion of consideration 
to labour disturbance/strike (Palacios and Griffin, 2011; Pfohl and Large, 1993;  
Ramarapu, Parzinger and Lado, 1997) as an independent phenomenon of 
analysis. Other more general restrictions in international business (Coplin and 
O'Leary, 1983) have included the level of protectionism (Agarwal and Feils, 
2007), non-tariff trade barriers (Cupitt, 1990) or confiscatory taxes (Kesternich 
and Schnitzer, 2010). 
2.5 Data Analysis and Synthesis 
The following data synthesis phase is divided into two parts: (1) data analysis, or 
“dissecting” individual studies into their component parts, extracting key 
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concepts, ideas, and theories; and (2) data synthesis, or making connections 
between the individual studies, overall themes and generalizations, and re-
casting the data into a new framework. 
2.5.1 Developing political risk typologies 
Previous attempts to categorize uncertainties includes Miller’s three level division 
of environmental and organizational components consisting of general 
environment; industry and firm specific variables each including a number of 
uncertainty components (Miller, 1992). The general environmental uncertainties 
include factors that affect businesses across industries including; Political 
uncertainties; Government policy uncertainties; Macroeconomic uncertainties; 
Social uncertainties and Natural uncertainties.  
In a similar attempt in formulating a framework for political risk factors Agarwal 
and Felis (2007) developed four categories of country-level political risk factors; 
internal-economic, external-economic, internal-political and external political. 
However, the limitation of this attempt was the exclusion of social factors, like 
ethnic and religious conflict, terrorism and crime, as a separate dimension. Rao 
and Goldsby (2009) developed, based on (Miller, 1992), a comprehensive range 
of supply chain risk typologies integrating the a three-level approach by 
classifying supply chain risk into variables constituting “framework factors”, 
consisting of environmental, industry and organizational factors (Rao and 
Goldsby, 2009).  
In this framework political uncertainties refer to major changes in political 
regimes, or changes in the political system as a result of war, revolutions, coup 
d’état or other political disturbances. Policy uncertainties refers to changes in 
government policy that impact the business community, including tax policies, 
employment laws, regulations and tariffs etc. (Miller, 1991) argues that the basis 
for differentiating between political uncertainty and policy uncertainty is that 
changes in the government may not necessarily result in changes in government 
policy affecting businesses (Miller, 1992). The term macro-economic uncertainty 
refers to fluctuations in prices of inputs including relative prices of labor, materials, 
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interest rates and currency stability. For labor intensive offshoring, this indicator 
can have a tremendous impact on ROI calculations. The notion of social 
uncertainty follows from the beliefs, values and attitudes of the population that 
are not reflected in the current government policy. According to Freeman (1984) 
in (Rao and Goldsby, 2009), the rational for separating political and social 
uncertainty is that they deal with two different, but interconnected stakeholders, 
the government and society at large. From this follows illegal activities outside 
the political system, including terrorism or organized crime activities that can 
impact on the offshore supply chain.  
A study by Busse and Hefeker (2007) of 83 developing countries over the period 
1984-2003, indicated that government stability, internal and external conflicts, 
corruption, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability and 
bureaucratic quality of governance matter for the investment decision of MNCs. 
The strongest indicators relate to governance, internal conflict, law and order and 
economic conditions, while corruption matters over time but only marginally 
(Busse and Hefeker, 2007). Similar, emerging research has featured institutional 
profile and strengths as a significant determinant of FDI-decision making 
processes and there is an emerging focus on the role of institutional analysis 
within the field of international business (Jackson and Deeg, 2008; Slangen and 
Tulder, 2009; Henisz and Henisz, 2000; Henisz, 2004). Institutional hazards are 
argued to impact on firms operations in various ways, including the risk of weak 
enforcement of contracts and unreasonable delay payments (Feinberg and 
Gupta, 2009). Previous research by Agarwal and Feils (2007) concluded that red 
tape emerged as the most important political risk factor in export modalities and 
significantly in FDI modalities (Agarwal and Feils, 2007).  The results indicate that 
exporters assign greater importance to external economic factors, while assigned 
greater importance to internal and external political factors with regard to the FDI 
mode (Agarwal and Feils, 2007). 
The framework incorporates prevalent risk types for both FDI and outsourcing 
modalities form the basis for hypothesizing about the differentiated impact on 
various offshoring strategies identified through the literature review. 
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Table 22: Political risk typology dimensions 
Political 
instability  
Political instability and turmoil (Bergner, 1982; Brewer, 1983; Coplin and 
O'Leary, 1983; Cupitt, 1990; Fatehi-Sedeh and Safizadeh, 1989; Goodman 
and Ramer, 2007; Green, 1974; Liuhto, Heikkila and Laaksonen, 2009; 
Oetzel, 2005; Pfohl and Large, 1993; Robock, 1971; Wade, 2005; Herath 
and Kishore, 2009; Kobrin, 1981; Kumar and Sosnoski, 2009; Rios-Morales, 
Gamberger, Smuc and Azuaje, 2009) election upheaval (Oetzel, 2005) and 
internal conflict (Busse and Hefeker, 2007); or more broader incorporating 
the potential instability of neighbour countries (Oetzel, 2005; Howell and Xie, 
1996) and external regional threats (Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Howell, 
2007). 
Instability of 
socio-economic 
environment 
 
Social stability or socio-cultural differences (Leavy, 1984); in terms of 
considering the level of ethnic divide and religious tension (Busse and 
Hefeker, 2007); the presence of socio-political grievances (Jakobsen, 2010); 
(Busse and Hefeker, 2007); or in terms of consequence and focusing on 
social unrest (Liuhto, Heikkila and Laaksonen, 2009;  Kumar, Kwong and 
Misra, 2009; Jakobsen, 2010) and law and order (upgrading). More recently 
research has considered unemployment (Liuhto, Heikkila and Laaksonen, 
2009, 2009). 
Macro-economic 
instability 
Level of foreign debt (Agarwal and Feils, 2007). 
Policy 
predictability 
Regime stability (Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Coplin and O'Leary, 1983; 
stability of ruling party (Agarwal and Feils, 2007) in combination with 
predictability and frequent changes of government policy (Green, 1974; 
Brewer, 1993;  Oetzel, 2005; Howell and Xie (1996). 
Institutional 
capacity 
limitations 
Corruption (Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Straub, 2008; Rios-Morales, 
Gamberger, Smuc and Azuaje, 2009; Wade, 2005) or corrupt local 
government (Oetzel, 2005); bureaucracy (Busse and Hefeker, 2007); or 
quality of bureaucracy (Gholami, 2012; Herath and Kishore, 2009), or degree 
of red tape (Agarwal and Feils, 2007). 
Legal 
unpredictability 
 
Legal predictability (Busse & Hefeker, 2007); accountability (Herath and 
Kishore, 2009; Gholami, 2012); privacy rules (Gholami, 2012). 
2.5.2 Variables of political risk analysis and empirical findings 
The complexity of political analysis may explain why Root originally found an 
apparent lack of any systematic methods being used to estimate political risk 
(Root, 1969, cited in Green, 1974). As political risk research emerged in the 
context of decolonization in the 1960’s and later, inspired by events in Cuba and 
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Iran, the managerial focus was narrowly concerned with mainly three host 
government actions, including expropriation, controls of profit remittances and 
war/instability (Kobrin, 1979); (Robock, 1971), and later contract repudiation 
(Brewer, 1983). The specific concern with major conflict and internal violence 
leading to regime change motivated the earlier attempts to develop analytical 
models for political instability (Green and Korth, 1974; Green, 1974). On this 
background a group of research has focused on radical political change, which 
refers to the “ascendancy to power of a person or group holding a different 
political philosophy than the person or group it replaced” (Green, 1974, p. 29). 
The analysis of main types of political systems and the corresponding risk of 
radical change provided an indicator of the political conditions for FDI in the early 
stages of political risk analysis (Green, 1974). However, in accordance with 
quantitative studies focusing on political instability (Kobrin, 1976; Brewer, 1983) 
there are diverse types of instability with various implications for international 
business, hence political risk should not be treated as a one-dimensional concept 
(Brewer, 1993). On this basis a range of variables and dimensions of political risk 
has been explored in the context of international business as indicated in the 
descriptive analysis. 
As indicated, the political risk literature on offshoring has mainly explored the 
association between investment flows and various explicit events of political risk, 
mainly instability and social unrest. In an attempt to determine correlation 
between US MNCs investment (FDI) patterns and political instability, Fatehi and 
Safizadeh (1989) reviewed US FDI investment from 1950-82 across 15 countries, 
applying multiple regression analysis with FDI serving as dependent variable and 
frequencies of socio-political unrest serving as the independent variable (Fatehi-
Sedeh and Safizadeh, 1989). The analysis suggested that symptoms of socio-
political instability by and large have lasting negative effects on US FDI inflows. 
Similarly, research has explored the correlation between various country risks 
and inward FDI flow in Latin America using multi linear regressions, highlighting 
that labour risk and exchange fluctuations as key risk types limiting FDI inflow 
(Palacios and Griffin, 2011). A study on FDI inflow in China examined empirically 
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the importance of source country factors in explaining the level of FDI using 
multiple regression and trade data. The study revealed a high level of growth 
when the market exhibited a higher growth rate than the source countries and 
when the source countries had a relative stronger currency, however FDI flow 
was low when China had a relatively less stable political environment and higher 
operational risk (Zhao, 2003). Similarly emerging literature has suggested 
empirical support for the predictions that institutional hazards will reduce the 
likelihood of FDI in-flows; however research has been mainly conceptual with 
limited empirical verification (Feinberg and Gupta, 2009; Jiménez and Durán, 
2011). One study develops a model using a conditional Poisson process for 
measuring the effect of a countable number of mutually dependent political risks 
on the outcome of FDI, establishing the role of political risk, importance of 
institutions and host country economic variables while also confirming that 
regional distinction exists (Clark and Tunaru, 2003). 
Other studies examined the effects of local political traditions on MNE investment 
decisions and concluded that local political tradition is not a significant 
determinant of MNE investment decisions while country risk is highly correlated 
with location factors i.e. high risk locations are likely to have inferior facilities while 
low risk countries have superior facilities (Mudambi and Navarra, 2003). 
Alternatively, conceptual papers have noted a series of non-political risk 
moderators impacting on FDI in-flows, including direct skilled-labour availability 
and the role of country size as potential in-flow constraints (Zhang and Markusen, 
1999). 
The offshore outsourcing risk literature has at large focused on non-political 
dimensions of the location decisions. A comprehensive study analysed the fit 
between destination attributes and the attributes of offshored business activities 
revealing a multi-faceted location pattern in which firm strategies to some degree 
follow a logic where manufacturing is relocated to low-cost destinations and R&D 
is relocated to high-cost destinations (Pedersen and Ørberg Jensen, 2011). 
Similarly, qualitative research based on interviews with senior executives has 
sought to develop a generalizable outsourcing typology classification system 
 79 
 
encompassing the full range of outsourcing options including; out-tasking; co-
managed services; managed services and full outsourcing differentiates between 
different levels of criticality linking the framework to client-supplier relationships 
(Sanders, Locke, Moore and Autry, 2007). While the conceptual frameworks are 
useful in terms of differentiating outsourcing operations in terms of scope and 
criticality and their respective risks, there is no inclusion of political risk 
considerations or potential impact. Finally, a study by Hahn, Doh, and 
Bunyaratave (2009) examined determinants of firm offshoring behaviour with 
respect to firm offshoring location risk within the information system industry 
finding that firm-specific experience and the core "risk-gap" between home and 
host country are predictive of companies pursuing progressively riskier locations, 
but that their effects dissipate as environment-wide experience is incorporated 
(Hahn, Doh, and Bunyaratave, 2009). 
Other outsourcing oriented studies have nevertheless highlighted the intrinsic 
consideration of political risk in offshore outsourcing operations. A KPO industry 
specific study address the trend of increasing R&D outsourcing and the 
corresponding location choice considerations, noting that there has been limited 
previous literature in regards to country risk analysis for KPO. At the regional level 
the study findings indicate that the R&D wage difference and knowledge 
infrastructure difference between home and host countries, the science and 
engineering talent pool size, and the political risk level of host countries are 
important determining factors. At the firm level, experience of overseas R&D 
projects and prior experience with research in the host country are also found to 
be important location determinants (Demirbag and Glaister, 2010). Other ITO 
specific industry studies have focused on risk factors important to IT managers in 
outsourcing, ranking categories and criteria, highlighting including financial risk, 
technical risk, hardware risk, software risk, managerial risk and legal and political 
risk as important concerns (Gholami, 2012). Similarly, risk analysis for domestic 
and outsourced software development projects found political instability at 
offshore destinations and currency fluctuations as considerable challenges 
(Nakatsu and Iacovou, 2009).  
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2.6 Findings of the Systematic Literature Review  
The following section will outline the main findings of the literature review and 
discus implications for design of the research agenda on political risk in 
international offshore outsourcing strategies.  
2.6.1 Overview of entry mode literature domain 
The descriptive review of the entry mode literature identified a vast literature 
domain dominated by three theoretical paradigms of the firm, namely the market 
imperfection paradigm, the behavioural paradigm and the market failure 
paradigm (Sharma and Erramilli, 2004). The paradigms embody at least six key 
entry mode choice theories including Product Life Cycle, Internationalization, 
Internalization, Eclectic and the Transaction Cost Theory that provide theoretical 
explanations of foreign entry mode choice. The approaches provide the main 
insights into what may be considered the key academic conversations on the 
topic providing a framework for understanding key drivers and motivations behind 
firm’s international engagement and predicting firm behaviour when confronted 
with entry choice considerations. The market imperfection paradigm focuses on 
explaining Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) modes based on the degree of market 
imperfection i.e. when the firm can benefit from monopolistic advantages. 
Similarly, Life Cycle Stage theory states that export is the preferred mode in the 
early stage of a product life time and FDI is chosen at the later stage. The key 
contribution is the notion of exploitation of a firm’s monopolistic entry advantage 
as the primary motive for foreign market entry.   
The behavioural paradigm tends to explain the internationalization process of 
firms over time by applying the concept of psychic distance and experimental 
knowledge. The paradigm applies the concept of market commitment and market 
uncertainty to explain an establishment chain comprising of four modes starting 
at indirect export to wholly owned subsidiary. This approach is built on the 
evolutionary logic applied in internationalization theory (Johanson and Vahlne,  
1990) highlighting the importance of learning experience and cultural familiarity 
as determinants of entry mode choice. The process of internationalization can be 
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defined as “the process of adapting a firms operation (strategy, structure, 
resource etc.) to international environments” (Calof and Beamish 1995, p.116). 
In accordance with Johanson and Valne’s theory of internationalization, firms are 
predicted to move sequentially through different stages as they develop their 
international experience and learn to deal with uncertainty by developing firm 
specific skills (Agarwal and Feils, 2007). Whereas the paradigm considers 
uncertainty in its determination of entry mode migration from export to subsidiary, 
the theory does not cover contractual and joint venture modes. 
The market failure paradigm is grounded on a market versus hierarchies 
understanding, as the two alternative modes of performing an economic function. 
Under perfect competition, the market mode is the more efficient, however if the 
market fails the firm is better off internalizing the function. The Internalization, 
Eclectic Paradigm and Transaction Cost theories are based on the market versus 
hierarchies understanding and have been the dominant paradigm for the past 
decades. The OLI framework illustrates that multinational activities are driven by 
ownership, location and internalization advantages (OLI) and it is the 
configuration of this set of advantages that either encourages or discourages a 
firm from undertaking foreign activities (Dunning, 1980)4. The eclectic theory is 
based on various theories, and it is argued that the strength of OLI is that it 
provides a framework for theories to interact and together provide comprehensive 
explanatory insight (Dunning, 1980, Dunning, 2000). The OLI framework only 
offers general hypothesis about the nature of the relationship between the O, L 
and I variables, as the paradigm itself is not context specific.  
In addition to the three main mentioned paradigms, attempts have also been 
made to apply the Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm and explain entry 
mode choices from the perspective of a firm’s resource endowment and 
                                            
4  The OLI framework was re-evaluated and made more dynamic by extending the framework to 
embrace both asset augmenting and alliance related cross-border ventures, in recognition of the growing 
importance of inter-firm alliances for competitive advantage making it more up-to-date in scope 
(Dunning, 2000). 
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deployment (Brouthers et al., 2008; Frynas, Mellahi and Pigman, 2006; Madhok, 
2002). According to RBV offshoring would be motivated by the need to fill 
resources gabs or to pursue a longer term strategy i.e. entry to foreign market or 
access to strategic resources. Whereas the main focus of the RBV approach is 
concerned with competitive positioning, it provides limited ability to explore firm 
behaviour under uncertainty and therefore not pursued as a platform for 
conceptualization for this research. However, the RBV approach underlines the 
potential importance of risk management capacities of firms in the sense that a 
"first mover" strategy may create a competitive advantage due to its unique 
historical and social complexity propelling firms on a risk management learning 
path which is difficult for other firms to imitate. The importance of firm learning 
and experience either as per the migration path in Internationalization Theory or 
through a unique historical or social process as per the RBV approach, indicates 
that risk management capacity should be considered an important determinant in 
entry mode decisions.  
2.6.2 Application of transaction cost theory in offshore research 
As the main concern of this study is the impact of the external environmental 
uncertainty, the paradigm with the most explanatory strength is considered the 
market failure paradigm and the Transaction Cost Theory framework. Previous 
literature has ascertained that TCE has served as the overriding perspective for 
theorizing entry mode choice, and accordingly transaction-cost related covariates 
have been recognized as major determinants of entry mode decision (Zhao, Luo 
and Suh, 2004; Ellram, Tate and Billington, 2008; Lopez-Duarte and Vidal-
Suarez, 2010; Martinez-Noya and Garcia-Canal, 2011). While other perspectives 
supplement the entry mode choice discussion, the basis for this research is that 
entry mode choice is an economic decision, and the firm is expected to choose 
the entry mode that offers the highest risk-adjusted return on investment 
(Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). On this basis the assessment of TCE 
determinants remains important as the alignment between entry mode and 
transaction properties has subsequent performance consequences for the firm 
and the offshoring operation (Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004). In this context political 
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risk is addressed by transaction cost analysis in which a firm weighs in the costs 
and benefits of political governance structures, polices and likely political hazards 
in the host country. The following section will highlight the key premises of TCE 
explanations of foreign entry mode choice in light of uncertainty in environmental 
conditions. 
From the review it is suggested that Transaction Cost Theory (TCE) remains the 
main basis for the academic conversation on political risk and implications on 
offshoring strategies, mainly in the form of analysing determinants of firm entry 
modes. The TCE framework has mainly lent conceptual support to the linkage 
between uncertainty and offshore strategy decisions, however firm specific 
considerations such as firm experience and cultural distance has also been 
researched under the framework of Internationalization and Motivational Theory. 
The review also indicates that the research on political risk has been mostly 
unspecific in terms of differentiating various dimensions of political risk that may 
impact on business operations and mostly been operationalized through the 
application of composite risk indexes provided by ICRG, PRS or similar risks 
analysis providers. 
While the domain has been dominated by research on political risk considerations 
focused on ownership-based offshoring, there has been a recent surge of focus 
on broader risk management issues relating to offshore outsourcing, especially 
within the ITO and later the KPO sector. While the literature base on political risks 
in contract-based outsourcing is relatively limited, the emerging research 
underlines the relevance of the subject both within the theoretical and practitioner 
domain.   
2.6.3 Empirical findings on offshoring and political risk correlations 
The empirical findings are generally consistent in determining a negative 
correlation between FDI inflow activities and higher levels of uncertainty 
underlining the correlation between perception of high political risk and 
investment activity. However prevailing research has been unable distinguish 
between the relative importance of various political risk variables for a given 
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economic activity and hence associated risk mitigation options. Also research 
applying quantitative correlations between general variables has shown limited 
ability to provide guidance on offshore strategy choice and industry specific risk 
exposures. The analysis of location determinants for FDI remains a static 
assessment of the current environmental factors in a given country setting, 
without the dynamic ability to predict the outputs or risks to the industry specific 
activity.  
2.6.4 Concluding comments 
The descriptive review of the political risk literature on offshoring suggests that 
the domain is rooted in a vast volume of mostly conceptual contributions with a 
primary focus on ownership-based offshoring (OBO). The research focus has 
been on identifying FDI location determinants. 
The literature presents an overweight of quantitative research, with only a few 
qualitative semi-structured interviews and case studies undertaken. In most of 
the analysis the notion of political risk has been applied in generic forms with an 
either unspecific form or mainly government centric. The empirical findings are 
generally found to be consistent in determining a negative correlation between 
FDI inflow activities and relative higher levels of generically defined political risk. 
However, there has been limited attempts to conduct any deeper analysis on the 
nature of political risk constructs and their implications across a wider segment 
of engagement types. 
The review shows evidence of an increased interest in broader risk management 
issues relating to offshore outsourcing, underlining the relevance of the subject 
both within the theoretical and practitioner domain. The offshore outsourcing risk 
literature has at large focused on non-political dimensions of the location 
decisions and from the literature review there is no evidence of any previous 
research undertaken to explicitly explore the political risk constructs and impact 
on offshore outsourcing operations.  
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In the context of offshoring, disruptions can be caused irrespective of the 
offshoring modality applied i.e. ownership or contract-based entry modes, 
however the trade-offs and interrelationships between risks have not been clearly 
established between the use of various entry modalities. The existing research 
on political risk within the domain of international business has mainly focused on 
ownership based outsourcing leaning on theory from FDI, and there has been no 
attempts to determine whether the same political typologies would apply equally 
to contract-based ownership outsourcing. The literature therefore seems unable 
to analytically disentangle offshoring activities and demonstrate causality 
between political risks and their impact on various entry mode strategies.  
The review affirms the need to expand the analysis of political risk against a 
broader spectrum of entry modes extending from fully controlled subsidiaries, to 
the more flexible offshore outsourcing modalities. The growing importance of 
offshore outsourcing as a business activity confirms the need for a realignment 
of political risk and offshoring entry mode research. On this note it is important to 
establish a better understanding and conceptual clarity of the political risk factors 
that impact on various offshoring modes by developing differentiated political risk 
typologies capable of measuring business impacts on various industry types. 
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3 (Project 2): Exploring Political Risk in the Offshore 
Service Industry 
3.1 Objectives of Research 
The following section will identify and categorize political risk experience in offshore 
outsourcing engagements and determine the level of functional impact on business 
activities. The research will identify both political risk manifestations and the perceived 
impact on business activities to provide a deeper and more diversified understanding 
of political risk dynamics in offshore outsourcing operations.  
As originally emphasized by Kobrin (1979); “we need to be concerned not with political 
events but their potential manifestations as constraints upon foreign investors” (Kobrin, 
1979, p. 77). From this notion follows that changes in the political environment that do 
not change the business environment do not represent political risk, nor is political risk 
for one firm necessarily a risk for another firm, meaning that political risk is firm specific 
(Robock, 1971). Or as stated, in assessing political risks one is not concerned with the 
likelihood of change itself, but rather with the criteria that the “rules of the game” 
change under which the firms made its calculations of risk and return (Micallef, 1981, 
p.47).  
It is the need to understand the critical interface between the outputs of the external 
political environment and the corresponding implications on business operations that 
this research addresses by providing a detailed classification of political risks facing 
various offshoring strategies across industry and entry mode typologies.  
The following research component will: 
 Identify political risk manifestations experienced by offshoring practitioners 
implementing contract-based or captive offshoring engagements across 
BPO/ITO/KPO activities.  
 Explore the perceived significance of political risk manifestations across risk 
typologies, business activity and entry mode.  
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3.2 Research Design and Data Collection 
The previous chapters have introduced the research problem concerning political risk 
in offshore outsourcing business activities, and have highlighted the key findings of 
the systematic literature review. The aim of this section is to present a methodological 
foundation for the research component and discuss methodological and research 
design considerations.  
3.2.1 Unit of analysis 
The risk management literature reveals a range of risk definitions which emphasize 
the subjective nature of risk perception, including definitions like “risk is inherently 
subjective construct that deals with the possibility of loss” (Yates and Stone, 1992, 
cited in Zsidisin (2003). This notion suggests that risk and subsequent risk 
management is a combination of risk identification and subjective interpretation and 
prioritization.  
From this perspective risk is experienced as a matter of subjective assessment as 
represented in the individual perception, as the detection and assessment of risk still 
requires thinking, judgment and decision-making by individual (Zuckerman, 2007). In 
a managerial context, it is further suggested that it is the aggregation and interaction 
of these individual assessments, in relatively small organizational groupings, that drive 
business strategies (Smith, 2008). 
On this basis the research design will focus on the risk perceptions of offshoring 
practitioner’s, as these perceptions are assumed to form the basis for managerial 
decision-making on entry mode considerations. The key informant is therefore the 
practitioner, either at the level of offshoring manager or advisor, as he/she would be 
aware of political risk manifestations across outsourcing activities. The study follows 
the line of previous research of supply chain risk by focusing on reviewing managerial 
perceptions in an attempt to assess and manage corresponding risks (Zsidisin and 
Ellram, 2003).  
It is acknowledged that the risk perception of company “management” does not 
necessarily constitute objective reality due to various human heuristics and the ways 
in which risk is perceived and translated (Smith, 2008). To limit this challenge the 
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research applies an evidence-based approach by eliciting political risk manifestations 
that have had a direct impact on the offshoring operations by focusing on actual 
offshore engagement cases.  
By focusing on engagement specific political risk events, which the practitioner was 
directly involved in, the research limits eliciting generic perceptions of risk that the 
individual manager may have solicited from the general environment. This approach 
is designed to limit heuristic bias in terms of identifying the actual political risk 
manifestations experienced. In terms of rating the impact of risk manifestations, the 
assumption is that whether or not the risk perceptions of the individual sourcing 
managers are accurate, they remain relevant as they become true in their 
consequence, as they ultimately inform and guide entry mode decisions. 
3.2.2 Methodological fit 
To support methodologically consistent management research, Edmonson and 
McManus (2007), introduced a framework for assessing and promoting 
“methodological fit” as an overarching criterion for informing field research design. 
Within this framework methodological fit is defined as “internal consistency among 
elements of a research project”, and field research as “systematic studies that rely on 
the collection of original data – qualitative or quantitative – in real organizations” 
(Edmonson and McManus 2007, p. 1155). The framework argues that the state of prior 
knowledge and theory is a key determinant of appropriate research methodology, and 
suggests that theory in management research falls along a continuum from mature to 
nascent.  
In this context mature theory presents a framework with well-developed constructs and 
models that have been studied over time with increasing precision and presents a 
body of consistent work representing the cumulative knowledge gained. Nascent 
theory on the other hand only proposes tentative answers to novel questions 
suggesting new connections between phenomena. An intermediate theory is in-
between, representing provisional explanations, often introducing a new construct or 
new relationships between existing constructs (Edmonson and McManus 2007).  
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This continuum is understood as a social construction that allows the development of 
archetypes, where the state of prior theory in the field would then drive a range of 
methodological choices. The archetypes of methodological fit are summarized in the 
table below: 
Table 23: Archetypes of methodological fit in management research 
State of prior 
theory and 
research 
Nascent Intermediate Mature 
Research 
questions 
Open-ended inquiry 
about a phenomenon of 
interest 
Proposed relationships 
between new and 
established constructs 
Focused questions and/or 
hypotheses relating 
existing constructs 
Type of data 
collected 
Qualitative, initially 
open-ended data that 
need to be interpreted 
for meaning 
Hybrid (both qualitative 
and quantitative) 
Quantitative data; focused 
measures where extent or 
amount is meaningful 
Illustrative 
methods for 
collecting data 
Interviews; observations; 
obtaining documents or 
other material from field 
sites relevant to the 
phenomena of interest 
Interviews; observations; 
surveys; obtaining 
material from field sites 
relevant to the 
phenomena of interest 
Surveys; interviews or 
observations designed to 
be coded and quantified; 
obtaining data that 
measure the extent or 
amount of salient 
constructs 
Constructs and 
measures 
Typically new 
constructs, few formal 
measures 
Typically one or more 
new constructs and/or 
new measures 
Typically relying heavily 
on existing constructs and 
measures 
Goal of data 
analysis 
Pattern identification Preliminary or 
exploratory testing of 
new propositions and/or 
new constructs 
Formal hypothesis testing 
Data analysis 
methods 
Thematic content 
analysis coding for 
evidence of constructs 
Content analysis, 
exploratory statistics, 
and preliminary tests 
Statistical inference, 
standard statistical 
analyses 
Theoretical 
contributions 
A suggestive theory, 
often an invitation for 
further work on the issue 
or set of issues opened 
up by the study 
A provisional theory, 
often one that integrates 
previously separate 
bodies of work 
A supported theory that 
may add specificity, new 
mechanisms, or new 
boundaries to existing 
theories 
Source: Edmondson and McManus (2007) 
The Edmondson and McManus (2007) continuum highlights that the research 
question, the literature review, the research design and the contribution to literature, 
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should be influenced by the stage of the development of the current literature at the 
time of the research. On this basis, if less is known about the research topic the more 
open-ended the research question and more exploratory the research method should 
be. If on the other hand the phenomenon of interest has been researched extensively, 
the researcher can rely on prior literature to identify critical variables to explain 
relations underlying the phenomenon. 
For the purpose of this study Transaction Cost Economic (TCE) theory has been 
highlighted as the logical entry point for understanding impact of political risk in 
offshore outsourcing and firm entry mode decisions. While TCE theory can be 
considered a mature theoretical framework in accordance with the Edmondson and 
McManus (2007) classification, it is suggested to consider the phenomenon under 
research as the basis for judging maturity and not the theories used to explain it.  
Following this line of argument, the literature review suggested that while the 
phenomenon of political risk has been extensively researched in light of offshore 
captive investments, there remains limited or no research involving offshore 
outsourcing activities. Hence the phenomenon under research is considered at an 
intermediate stage, with a range of existing knowledge generated from the FDI 
domain, which can be tested and verified in the new context of offshore outsourcing. 
3.2.3 Research method for exploratory empirical component 
As the research will identify the political risk experience and impact perceptions of 
significance among individual outsourcing practitioners regarding various forms of 
outsourcing, a qualitative interview approach was selected as the most appropriate 
research method based on the methodological fit discussion. The interviews are 
conducted with individual offshoring practitioners and selected as the primary tool for 
examining their risk experience and perception of impact on offshoring operations. 
3.2.4 Semi-structured interviews and Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) 
As a basis for exploring the underlying constructs of risk perceptions the qualitative 
method of Repertory Grid Technic (RGT) was applied as a useful framework for data 
extraction and analysis. Similar, qualitative approaches have been used in 
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management research to uncover interviewees understanding of complex issues 
(Edmondson and McManus, 2007). 
The Repertory Grid analysis method, stems from Personal Construct Theory (PCT) 
introduced by George Kelly (1955) as a form of structured interviewing, enabling the 
respondents to articulate their views on complex issues (Goffin et al., 2012). The PCT 
framework is based on the notion that in order to make sense of the world people 
develop rules by which they view and categorize situations, people, relationships and 
objects, and almost any phenomenon with which they are confronted. The approach 
assumes that all individuals develop and test constructs as a way of explaining and 
anticipating events and that these constructs will be constantly updated, as they prove 
useful or less useful in interpreting events (Goffin, 2009). 
3.2.5 Implementation of the Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) 
The main decisions in the design of the repertory grid interview process were; the 
selection and presentation of the elements; construct elicitation; the rating of the 
elements against the constructs and the interview administration. The following section 
outlines the design of the RGT approach as applied for this study. 
3.2.5.1 Eliciting elements 
Following an introduction to the research objective and methodology, the interviewees 
were asked to identify up to six offshore outsourcing engagements that they were 
involved in where their firm or client firm experienced political risk exposure that 
affected the company’s operation. These cases where then classified in terms of 
activity type, host location, buyer location, industry and entry mode type, and written 
on random pre-numbered cards (I.e. 5; 1; 4; 3; 2; 6).  
3.2.5.2 Eliciting constructs 
For the purpose of eliciting risk constructs, groups of three cards (triads) were selected 
and presented to the interviewee who is asked to compare them. The elements were 
presented using the dyadic method where two elements are changed for every 
presentation (Goffin, 2009).  
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A key component of construct elicitation is the question posed with each triad. The 
interviewer asked “please think about how two of these cases are similar or different 
from the 3rd in terms of impact on your offshore outsourcing operation. The use of the 
qualifying phrase of “in terms of impact on your outsourcing operation” is applied to 
ensure focus on risk that actually impacted on their firm operations. The interviewee 
explanations of why the two of the elements are similar and different from the third 
constitute the interviewees risk constructs or the attributes on which the interviewee 
differentiates between the risks. The interviewee is not allowed to repeat constructs 
and so each new triad elicits at least one new construct. 
3.2.5.3 Rating elements 
Following the extraction of the risk constructs, the interviewee was asked to rate the 
triad elements on a pre-decided scale against each specific risk construct, including 
all other elements (outsourcing engagements) and enter on the pre-prepared grid 
against a 1-5 scale. Previous studies have highlighted that while various scales have 
been used in repertory grid testing, the choice of number of points on the scale is 
situational i.e. if the respondents are sophisticated they can deal with more 
complicated scales (Goffin, 1994). While the 1 to 5 scale is most common, previous 
research has applied both seven or nine-point scales to present greater opportunity 
for discriminatory judgment (Hudson, 1974, cited in Goffin, 1994). On this note the 
pilot phase concluded that the 5 point-scale was best understood by respondents and 
therefore determined the best fit for the proposed study.  
3.2.6 Method of data collection 
For the purpose of establishing accessing interviewees involved in managing 
extended global operations, contact was established with the International Association 
of Outsourcing Practitioners (IAOP). Given the position of IAOP as the leading 
professional association for organizations and individuals involved in outsourcing and 
offshoring, and with a community of more than 120,000 IAOP members worldwide, 
support was sought to access outsourcing companies and key practitioners for the 
purpose of conducting the empirical research. The identification of interviewees 
through IAOP supports the notion of systematic sampling and verifiable data 
collection, reinforcing credibility of the research project. Furthermore, the cross-
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industry and geographical scope of IAOP membership allows for sample 
diversification, minimizing country bias and further enhancing generalizability of the 
findings.  
3.2.7 Interview administration 
The three most common methods of data collection are mail surveys, face-to-face 
interviews and telephone interviews, each with strength and weaknesses (Walton, 
1997). For the purpose of this study the interviews were conducted through the use of 
telephone, considering that the geographical spread of interviewees, face-to-face 
interviews would be too restrictive in terms of practical application. While the use of 
telephone interviews is less applied than surveys and face-to-face interviews, Walton 
(1997) establishes that structured telephone surveys tend to provide more control over 
data quality, collection speed and cost efficiencies, and can meet the Seven R’s of 
challenges in research.  
The Seven R’s are defined as “the challenge of contacting the right person with the 
right information at the right time in order to ask the right questions using the right 
instrument for the collection of the right data at the right cost” (Walton 1997, p. 221). 
Based on a comparison between surveys, telephone interviews and face-to-face, 
Walton (1997) rated telephone survey highest and states that the implementation of 
the telephone survey method can make dramatic contributions to the field by enabling 
researchers to meet the challenges of the Seven R’s and collect more complete and 
less biased data (Walton, 1997). However a major limitation with telephone interviews 
remain the limited ability to use visual aids, and hence the pilot study explored the 
possible use of repertory grid web applications to bridging this gap. The pilot explored 
the use of the applications like http://www.enquirewithin.co.nz, http://flexigrid.info and 
http://gigi.cpsc.ucalgary.ca, and determined that neither were suitable, and in fact the 
interviewee’s easily understood the process of the RGA methodology without visual 
aids. 
In addition to the administrative format, two essential tools for interviewing were 
developed, namely the interview script and pre-prepared blank grid. The script 
includes the introductory explanation for the interviewee and the question to be asked 
as each triad is presented. The blank grid is annotated with constructs and respective 
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ratings during the interview accordingly. The research protocol, including the interview 
script and pre-prepared blank grid, is a means of increasing the reliability of the semi-
structured interview process. The interview script and pre-prepared blank grid are 
attached as Appendix B1 and B2. The interviews were scheduled for 60 minutes each. 
3.2.8 Piloting the research design 
In order to ensure the appropriateness of the selected research methodology, both in 
terms of the data yielded from the use of the RGT and the practicality of the process, 
a pilot was conducted before the commencement of the primary data collection 
exercise. The objective of the pilot was to evaluate: 
 The feasibility of applying RGT effectively through the use of a telephone 
interview technique. 
 If the 5 or 7-point scale was most appropriate for ensuring better discriminatory 
judgment in the determination of perceived impact. 
At an administrative level the pilot confirmed that the RGT interviews could be 
effectively conducted via phone with no visual aid requirements and the process was 
understood by the interviewees. The interviews were recorded via a digital recorder 
and the RGT extraction matrix was completed with notes during the interview process. 
The pilot further highlighted that the use of a 7-point scale was not intuitive for the 
interviewees and the 5-point scale was adopted for the remaining interviews. 
On a conceptual level the pilot interviews further confirmed that eliciting of political risk 
concerns and implications would need to be case-specific due to i) the outsourcing 
industry is generally organized in a manner where individual companies are managing 
a portfolio of diverse kinds of outsourcing i.e. ITO, BPO and even KPO ii) the non-case 
specific political risks concerns appeared generic and not evidence-based, iii) the 
attempt to elicit impact constructs only yielded standard sourcing risks relating to 
disruption and cost implications. Furthermore the pilot revealed that there was a 
general confusion with the use of outsourcing terminology and therefore each case 
engagement would need to be clearly classified according to the following criteria: 
 Outsourcing business activity (BPO, ITO and KPO) 
 Outsourcing  proximity (Offshore, Near shore and Onshore) 
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 Entry Mode (Contract-based or Captive) 
 Location (Origin of outsourcing firm and host location) 
 Industry type (Utilities, Pharmaceuticals, Health etc.) 
 A brief description of the outsourced activity for cross-verification. 
3.2.9 Validity and reliability considerations 
It is understood that high quality research must apply the most rigorous methods 
possible, evaluated on construct validity, internal validity, external validity and 
reliability. The use of qualitative methods has often been criticized for lack of rigor and 
not adequately explaining how data were analysed (Goffin et al., 2012). In this regard 
it has been argued that RGT brings a quantitative angle to qualitative data and hence 
enhances the ability of demonstrating methodological rigor in the use of the qualitative 
method.  
Previous studies have shown that the use of RGT has enabled managers to more fully 
articulate views on the phenomenon of research, identify the most important risk 
constructs through the scoring and weighting process inherent in the RGT method. 
The technique has been utilized at least 78 times in management studies in the period 
2002-2012, including as a means of exploring relationships between manufacturers 
and suppliers, and perceptions of customer support (Goffin et al., 2012). These 
previous applications of RGT in management research has shown its utility in 
providing clarity when extant literature fails to define unambiguous constructs and can 
uncover when frequently mentioned constructs are not the most important ones (Goffin 
et al., 2012). On this basis, and with an appreciation of the inherent limitations, the 
following study will apply RGT in order to identify political risk experience and impact 
perceptions in the context of offshore outsourcing operations. 
3.2.10 Limitations of repertory grid testing 
With reference to the key components of Principle Component Analysis (PCA) it 
should be considered that repertory grid analysis will elicit risk constructs and 
perceived impact that are specific to the individual, and therefore it may not be possible 
to derive results that are representative of a population. Similarly, while the study will 
include 25 interviewees, the number of samples remains a limitation. For these 
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reasons the study will be viewed as exploratory work that elicit risk constructs for 
further validation using larger quantitative survey techniques. 
3.2.11 Data collection process 
As per the research protocol the International Association of Outsourcing Practitioners 
(IAOP) provided a list of 40 members who had responded positively to the IAOP 
invitation to participate in the research project. The listed IAOP members where 
contacted directly with an invitation letter indicating the scope of the survey and 
methodology to be applied, including a copy of the political risk definition developed 
for the research. Data collection took place via phone using a digital recorder with an 
earpiece for documenting the content. In total 25 additional Repgrid interviews were 
conducted plus five additional non-Repgrid interviews, all lasting between 45-70 
minutes.  
The 25 Repgrid interviews followed a standard triadic elicitation process. Each 
respondent was asked to name six offshoring engagements which, in their opinion, 
experienced some level of political risk exposure. Based on these six pre-identified 
cases, triads were formulated and presented to the respondent. With each triad 
presented to the respondent, the following question was posed: “Can you think of any 
ways in which two of these cases are similar to each other and yet different from the 
third in terms of the political risk experienced?” This stimulated respondents to discuss 
how they perceived political risk exposure and manifestations in the given 
engagement.  
Triads composed of a different subset of the cases were then presented to the 
interviewee with the same question asked each time until the interviewee could no 
longer identify any new political risk experiences. With each successive triad 
presented, respondents were reminded that they had to formulate new political risk 
types than the ones previously identified. This was done because often the first 
constraints mentioned are the most obvious and once a respondent moves past those, 
the risks that are more subtle, yet with a large amount of significance, come through 
(Raja et al., 2013). The respondents were then asked to take the risks identified in the 
triadic elicitation process and rate the cases on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 was 
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indicative of the political risk having no impact on the outsourcing activity and 5 was 
indicative of the political risk having a large impact on the outsourcing activity.  
3.2.12 Sample distribution 
A total of twenty-five (25) outsourcing practitioners were interviewed and included in 
the Repgrid analysis, during the period between April 2013 and August 2014. Of the 
25 interviewees, 14 represented US-based companies (56%), three Canadian or 
Australian firms (12%), 7 European (28%) and only one non-Western (4%).  
Table 24: Regional distribution of sample cases 
Region No. cases (%) Host countries 
South Asia 28 30.8 India, Bangladesh 
East Asia 17 18.7 China, Philippines, Vietnam 
Europe (EU) 16 17.6 
Latvia, Estonia Croatia, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania, UK, France, Germany 
South & Central America  9 9.9 Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and Mexico 
Europe (Non-EU) 8 8.8 Belarus, Russia and Ukraine 
North America 7 7.7 USA (1), Canada 
Middle East and North Africa 3 3.3 Egypt, Oman 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2 2.2 Kenya, South Africa 
Australia 1 1.0 Australia 
Total 91 100  
 
All the participants were in senior positions and involved in outsourcing for minimum 
10 years. In addition 5 interviews were conducted, which did not yield a Repgrid matrix 
and therefore not included in the analysis, however included as a source of 
background information. The below table provides an overview of the participants. 
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Table 25: Survey interview details 
No. Outsourcing role Firm country 
of origin 
No. of cases 
1 Director USA 5 
2 Outsourcing Advisor UK 4 
3 Partner USA 4 
4 Director USA 6 
5 Chairman & CEO Malaysia 2 
6 Operations PM Manager USA 5 
7 Vice President USA 4 
8 Senior Vice President USA 1 
9 Founder & Managing Director Denmark 7 
10 Senior Consultant USA 3 
11 Vice President, Business Engineering Canada 5 
12 Senior Offshore Vendor Manager USA 6 
13 Vice President,  Service Delivery Canada 4 
14 Outsourcing Manager USA 1 
15 Outsourcing Manager USA 3 
16 Outsourcing Manager Denmark 3 
17 Advisor Australia 3 
18 Advisor USA 2 
19 Outsourcing Manager Denmark 5 
20 CEO – Outsourcing Advisory Company USA 3 
21 Head of Technology Scouting/Outsourcing Denmark 1 
22 Senior Manager/Global Strategic Outsourcing Denmark 2 
23 Outsourcing Manager USA 5 
24 Head of Partnership Management & Research  Denmark 4 
25 Senior Director of Quality Assurance USA 3 
Sub-Total   91 
26 Director USA Pilot 
27 Director USA Pilot 
28 Principle USA Discussion 
29 SVP and Head of Group IT Denmark Discussion 
30 Vice President, Strategic Integration USA Discussion 
 
The interviews yielded a total of 91 offshore outsourcing engagements or cases with 
32 BPO engagements, 33 ITO engagements, 26 KPO engagements and one 
manufacturing engagement. In addition to the 91 offshore cases, an additional 6 cases 
were considered onshore engagements, meaning that they are based within the same 
country as the service buyer and hence removed from the sample pool.  
From the portfolio of 91 offshore cases forty-seven (72) were contract-based 
(outsourced) engagements and seventeen (19) ownership-based engagements 
(captives). 
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Table 26: Portfolio overview  
No. 
Interviewees 
Number of 
Political Risks 
manifestations 
Offshoring activity 
Total Offshore 
Engagements 
Offshore entry mode 
BPO ITO KPO 
Insourcing 
(Captive) 
Contract-
based 
25 116 32 33 26 91 19 72 
The samples were diversified across industries with the main industry segment being 
pharmaceuticals (19.7%), banking and financial services (14.3%), health care 
industry, software development industry (13.2%), web based consumer industry 
(6.6%), telecoms (5.5%), public utilities (5.5%), insurance & re-insurance (4.4%) and 
the gaming industry (4.4%). The sample portfolio also included cases from academia, 
engineering and manufacturing industries. In terms of geographical distribution the 
samples are diverse and maintain a spread indicative of the industry sourcing trends. 
The offshoring engagements also covered a wide scope of business processes 
including clinical testing, data entry, processing of insurance claims and various back 
offices services and appliances management. (For a full overview of industry and 
business process distribution see Annex B. 3). 
3.3 Descriptive Data Analysis and Findings 
The following chapter outlines the process of data analysis and presents key findings.  
3.3.1 Descriptive data analysis 
In order to present a consolidated overview of the key findings the 25 repertory grid 
interviews where inserted into an overall matrix presenting the political risk categories 
with category details, the highlighted operational implications associated with the risk 
type, and the overall frequency of mention and perceived impact.  
Firstly, the findings were categorised in accordance with the overall parent political risk 
classification established in the literature review. The 70 risk constructs were then 
defined according to sub-political categories with risk description and associated 
operational risk implications to enhance the understanding of the risk nature. The 
frequency of mention was then calculated based on the risk sub-groupings across the 
91 offshoring cases by summing the number of times the sub-risk category had been 
specifically mentioned in an interview grid. 
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The second step of the analysis was to determine the average risk impact ratings that 
interviewees assigned to each risk construct category. For this step, the risk impact 
ratings were summed for the individual risks comprising a construct category. This 
number was then divided by the number of times the individual risks comprising the 
category were mentioned.  
While frequency of mention is often used as a measure of importance this 
interpretation has been criticized as frequently mentioned constructs can be “obvious, 
easily articulated, and of low importance” (Griffin and Hauser, 1993). A more reliable 
approach to determine key construct categories is to complement frequency of 
mention with a second criterion, namely average normalized variability (ANV). When 
a construct category has an ANV that is greater than the variability of constructs, this 
indicates that the interviewees differentiate more strongly between the different 
constraints. If the construct category has an ANV that is lower than the variability of 
constructs, then this indicates that interviewees rated the outsourcing cases similarly 
on a constraint (Goffin et al., 2012). Calculating the ANV requires the variability figures 
from different grids to be normalized to make them comparable. The average number 
of risk constructs per grid was 2.8 ~3 (70 constructs/25 grids = 2.8), which resulted in 
an average variability of constructs at 20 (100 / 2.8 = 33.3). This method has been 
used in Repgrid to suggest that a construct category with an ANV higher than the 
average ANV, in this case 33.3, indicates that the construct differentiates more 
strongly between the different respondents (Goffin, 2012). 
The below matrix provides a complete overview of the categories of Risk Constructs 
from the Repertory Grid Interviews, highlighting risk categories mentioned by >20% of 
respondents, with a variability greater than average and corresponding classification 
of key risk construct categories. The matrix provides direct quotations on the perceived 
operational implications to provide a more in-depth understanding of the business 
impact.  
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5  Number of grids/Number of risk mention = % Frequency 
Table 27: Risk constructs classified in terms of frequency of mention 
 
No. 
Parent Political Risk 
Category 
 
Sub –Political Risk 
Category 
Category details 
 
Highlighted operational  implications 
Overall 
Frequency of 
mention5 
(%) 
Overall 
Perceived 
Impact on 
Offshore 
Engagement 
(1-5 scale) 
 (ANV) 
Key Risk 
Construct 
Category 
(Y/N) 
1 
Policy Predictability 
 
Home-Country 
Risk 
 Home Country Risk 
 Client Country - Change in 
Audit regulations 
 Restrictive immigration 
laws 
 Client Country - Evolving 
Privacy Rules 
 Client Country changes in 
security requirements 
 Client Country - Work visa 
processing 
When client countries put a cap on volumes to be 
outsourced “the price difference between domestic 
and offshore location, impacts the clients pricing, 
which impacts the clients budget. Second the 
business disruption that happens when you now 
suddenly have to change location of delivery”. 
 
“There is certainly a cost implication – but also a time 
implication because now it takes us longer to acquire 
the knowledge [due to visa regulations]. Then there 
is the quality implication too because now that I 
have all these rules that I have to abide with I have 
to change my approach on how a transmission the 
knowledge and because I am doing it over a longer 
timeframe and with people coming and in and out I 
properly don’t have the same quality of the 
information that I received, which manifests itself 
into service risks”. 
 
0.48 3.21 12 Y 
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“In France and Germany they are terrified having 
their names and photographs show up in the 
newspapers as they would be targeted by political 
groups and that effects decisions on whether or not 
to take certain kind of actions is based on the 
possibility that they might be in the newspaper 
tomorrow. 
 
2 
Institutional 
Capacity 
Host country 
bureaucracy 
 Processing of visa 
applications 
 License Regime 
 Institutional bureaucracy 
 Bureaucratic rigidness 
 Delay in visa applications 
 Import/export clearance 
(for hardware testing) (4) 
 Under resourced 
institutions 
 Delayed approval 
processes 
 
0.48 3.06 12 N 
3 
Policy Predictability 
 
Change of industry 
and data 
management 
regulatory 
framework 
 Change of regulations on 
data storage 
 Change in regulatory 
environment (Compliance 
risks) 
 Changing rules and 
regulations 
 Policy predictability - Data 
security 
 Change in regulatory 
Framework 
 Change in regulative 
requirements  (Data     
access/retention cost) 
 Unpredictable Regulatory 
Changes 
“As new regulations emerge the pricing structure 
changes due to the new data retention and licenses 
requirements”. 
 
“So political risk is sought of the stability of the 
society and so forth, but there is an increasing 
concern with data security and data protection that 
comes along with that – it is part of that 
consideration”. 
 
0.40 2.9 10 Y 
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 Industry Policy Changes 
4 Legal Predictability Loss of IP 
 Loss of intellectual 
property, breach of 
confidentiality) 
 Loss of Intellectual 
Property Rights 
 Changing IP policy 
framework 
 Loss of IP - Reverse 
Engineering (hardware 
testing) 
 IP Legal Enforcement 
“Loss of competitive advantage and the burden of 
[extensive] contract development to mitigate the 
risk”. 
 
 0.40 2.21 10 Y 
5 
Institutional 
Capacity 
Corruption 
 Corruption 
 Corruption (risk of 
management exposure) 
 Business ethics 
“We wish to avoid the exposure of management 
staff to unethical practices with possible 
reputational and legal implications, and seek to train 
managers in handling these situations”. 
 
“Corruption is a reflection of different ground rules 
and detracts from the outsourcing activity being a 
success”. 
 
0.40 2.7 10 Y 
6 Legal Predictability 
Contract 
enforcement & 
Legal 
Transparency risks 
 Enforcement of contracts 
 Lack of institutional 
capacity to enforce 
contracts 
 Lack of political will or 
culture  to enforce 
contracts 
 Sovereign immunities 
 Legal laws and regulations 
(legislation) 
 Legal Risk Liabilities 
 Transparency in legal 
framework 
 
0.36 2.54 9 Y 
7 
Policy 
Predictability 
Predictability of 
labor regulations 
 Changing restrictive labour 
laws 
Cost and pricing implications 
Possible reputational implications 
0.32 3.03 8 Y 
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  Changes in country Specific 
HR regulations 
 Changing min wages 
 Regulatory changes on HR 
 Unstable Labour 
Law/Practices 
 Changing safety rules 
 
8 Macro-economic 
Currency 
Fluctuations 
 Currency fluctuations 
 Exchange rate fluctuations 
Change in pricing structure and models 
0.28 2.19 7 Y 
9 Socio-economic 
Organized Labor 
Strike 
 Organized National/state-
wide Labour strike 
 National/state-wide 
transportation strikes 
 On-site labour strikes 
Disruption of service supply 
0.24 3.17 6 Y 
10 
Political Instability 
 
Host Government 
Stability 
 Regime shift (Party change) 
 Regime shift (Systemic 
Change) 
 Political/parliamentary 
unrest 
 Government Level 
instability 
“We want to spread the risk a little bit to avoid being 
in difficulties that may be down the road. Not in 
terms of political risk like a new Mao rising in China, 
but at the same time in a semi-command economy 
government actions can have a rapid and profound 
effect on business practices so we like to have some 
options”. 
0.20 2.42 5 Y 
11 
Political Instability 
 
Social unrest 
 Political instability (social 
unrest) 
 Social Unrest 
 Election upheaval 
“That could be a protest or not being able to go to 
work for a time. Basically be able to operate locally. 
It could also be power outages which is not 
necessarily political, but could be politically 
motivated. Like hostilities between different groups 
suddenly impacting power supply or telephone 
networks and therefore services not provided. It is 
difficult to ring fence. 
 
There is the monitoring and oversight - and there is 
the potential for interruption of production. Those 
are the two big concerns. “It restricts deployment 
0.20 2.23 5 Y 
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and limits ability to provide support and oversight 
(Travel restrictions and Staff Security implications). 
 
“There is a cost implication of having these things in 
place but the other aspect is the on-going 
monitoring of these kind of risks b both the service 
provider and the client”. 
 
12 Socio-economic Wage Inflation 
 Wage Inflation 
 Inflation of Cost of Living 
Price insurance and service quality implications if 
cost increase needs to be absorbed by supplier 0.20 3.12 5 Y 
13 
Policy 
Predictability 
 
Predictability & 
transparency of 
tax regime 
 Changes in Business 
revenue taxes 
 Lack of transparency of 
taxes systems 
 Predictability of taxes 
“Some locations have a value adding tax on the 
services that we contract for so we have a 10% 
premium that we pay for the work in one place 
compared to another” 
0.12 1.43 3 Y 
14 
Political Instability 
 
Geo-political Risk 
 Geo-political Risk 
 Geo-political instability 
 
0.12 3.33 3 N 
16 
Political Instability 
 
Terrorism 
 
 Terrorism (Hostage) 
 Terrorism (targeting 
affiliated suppliers) 
 
0.12 2.25 3 N 
17 
Socio-economic 
 
Organized Crime 
 Organized Crime 
 Gang violence 
 
0.12 2.40 3 N 
18 
Policy Predictability 
 
Audit regulations 
 External Audit 
requirements 
Regulators asking more and more information on 
operations, including security measure in place – not 
just physical but also logical security segregation of 
duties. 
0.04 3.33 1 N 
19 Policy Predictability Revoked subsidies 
 Revoked government 
subsidies 
 
0.04 2.75 1 N 
20 Legal Predictability 
Policy Change on 
foreign ownership 
 Unpredictability of foreign 
ownership 
 
0.04 3.43 1 N 
21 Policy Predictability 
Limitations to 
revenue 
repatriation 
 Repatriation of Revenues  
0.04 4 1 N 
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To further supplement the descriptive presentation of the findings the following charts 
outlines the distribution of total frequency of mention and perceived impact levels for 
the political risk sub-categories that scored > 20% and with an Average Normalized 
Variability (ANV). 
Figure 4: Distribution of Frequency of Mention  
 
Figure 5: Distribution of Perceived Impact 
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3.3.2 Impact of political risk categories on offshoring engagements 
Using the software Idiogrid, a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was run to see 
which of the political risk categories were most closely associated with the various 
offshoring typologies i.e. ITO, BPO and KPO. Firstly, the average risk ratings were 
determined for each risk category, stratified by outsourcing type. This was done by 
isolating the grids by outsourcing type and then within those graphs, identifying the 
risks mentioned that are part of a given construct category, extracting the risk rating 
assigned by the interviewee, summing up the total number and then finally, dividing 
the summed number by the total number of times the constraint was mentioned. This 
process was repeated for the three outsourcing types and across all constructs 
categories (see Table 28). The information was then entered into the Idiogrid software 
to capture which construct categories are associated most strongly with the 
outsourcing activities. The information in the grid is condensed and summarized in the 
below two-dimensional plot illustrating how well the various activity types are defined 
by the political risk constructs elicited from the interview process.  
Figure 6: Principal Components Analysis (PCA) Plot – Offshoring activity type 
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From the analysis it is noted that all the vectors have a reasonable length and relatively 
of same magnitude, indicating that they are well defined within the space of the two 
components. Secondly, same reasoning applies regarding the distance between the 
origin and the activity type (elements). If the activity type had been close to the origin 
it may be better defined by another component, however as this is not the case it is 
assumed that the activity type is well defined in the given space. Finally, the distance 
from the activity type to the given constructs indicates how defined the type is by the 
given political risk. 
3.3.2.1 Entry modes (contract-based versus captive) 
Secondly, the average risk ratings were determined for each risk category stratified by 
outsourcing entry mode. This was done, as before, by isolating the grids from each 
mode and then within those graphs, identifying the constraints mentioned that are part 
of a given construct category, extracting the risk rating assigned by the interviewee, 
summing up the total number and then finally, dividing the summed number by the 
total number of times the constraint was mentioned.  
The information was then entered into the Idiogrid software however there was not 
enough variability between the two groups to create the graph. This indicates that 
construct categories are similarly associated strongly with the respective entry modes 
with no major differentiation.  
3.3.2.2 Stratification of political risk across offshoring typologies 
 
Following the presentation in the Idiogrid, the survey results were stratified in 
accordance with frequency of mention and associated perceived impact on the 
offshoring engagement. The following tables capture the stratification of survey results 
across activity type (ITO, BPO and KPO) and entry modes. 
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Table 28: Stratification across offshoring typologies 
 (BPO) Cases  
(N=32, 12 Grids) 
 (ITO) – Cases 
 (N=33, 13 Grids) 
 (KPO) - Cases  
(N=26, 9 Grids) 
Offshoring (Total) -Frequency and significance of political risk manifestations 
Freq.  ASR* (1-5) Freq.  ASR(1-5) Freq. ASR(1-5) 
Political Risk Family Political Risk Event 
Client Country Political Risk Home-Country Risk 33.3% 2.9 38.5% 3.1 22.2% 2.6 
Policy Predictability Change of data management regulatory framework 41.7% 2.7 23.1% 3.3 44.4% 1.9 
Institutional Capacity Corruption 41.7% 2.4 23.1% 3.4 55.6% 2.7 
Legal Predictability Loss of IP 25.0% 2.6 38.5% 2.4 44.4% 2.9 
Political Instability Host Government Stability 33.3% 1.2 23.1% 3.75 11.1% 3.0 
Political Instability Social unrest 33.3% 2.1 23.1% 2.3 11.1% 3.0 
Policy Predictability Predictability of labor regulations 58.3% 3.4 23.1% 2.5 0 0 
Macro-economic Currency Fluctuations 41.7% 2.3 23.1% 1.5 11.1% 1.0 
Legal Predictability Legal Transparency & Contract enforcement 16.7% 1.8 15.1% 2.0 22.2% 2.9 
Policy Predictability Predictability & transparency of tax regime 16.7% 1.4 15.1% 1.4 0 0 
Socio-economic Wage Inflation 33.3% 3.0 23.1% 3.3 0 0 
Socio-economic Organized labor Strike 41.7% 2.9 38.5% 2.9 0 0 
Socio-economic Organized Crime 16.7% 2.5 23.1% 2.0 0 0 
Political Instability Terrorism 25.0% 2.5 23.1% 2.0 11.1% 2.0 
Institutional Capacity Host country bureaucracy 0 0 38.5% 2.3 55.6% 3.4 
Political Instability Geo-political Risk 25.0% 2.7 15.1% 3.7 0 0 
Policy Predictability Local Audit regulations 8.3% 3.3 23.1% 2.5 0 0 
 Average Significance Rating 
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Table 29: Stratification across entry modes 
 
Offshoring (Contract-based) 
(Cases N=72, Grid=23) 
 
Offshoring (Captive) - 
(N=19), Grid = 9) 
Offshoring (Total) -Frequency and significance of political risk manifestations 
Freq. ASR (1-5)* Freq. ASR(1-5) 
Political Risk Category Political Risk manifestations 
Client Country Political Risk Home-Country Risk 26.0% 3.2 33.3% 3.3 
Policy Predictability Change of data management regulatory framework 30.4% 3.8 22.2% 2.7 
Institutional Capacity Corruption 34.8% 2.4 66.6% 2.5 
Legal Predictability Loss of IP 39.1% 2.6 33.3% 3.0 
Political Instability Host Government Stability 17.4% 2.8 22.2% 1.5 
Political Instability Social unrest 21.7% 2.3 22.2% 1.6 
Policy Predictability Predictability of labour regulations 17.4% 2.4 55.5% 2.9 
Macro-economic Currency Fluctuations 21.7% 2.1 17.4% 2.2 
Legal Predictability Legal Transparency & Contract enforcement 17.4% 2.6 17.4% 1.9 
Policy Predictability Predictability & transparency of tax regime 13.0% 1.3 22.2% 2.5 
Socio-economic Wage Inflation 13.0% 2.6 33.3% 3.2 
Socio-economic Organized labour Strike 21.7% 3.3 11.1% 1.4 
Socio-economic Organized Crime 4.3% 2.8 11.1% 2 
Political Instability Terrorism 8.7% 2.25 0 0 
Institutional Capacity Host country bureaucracy 34.8% 3.0 22.2% 2.5 
Political Instability Geo-political Risk 8.7% 3.4 11.1% 1.5 
Policy Predictability Local Audit regulations 4.3% 1 11.1% 3.8 
• Average Significance Rating 
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3.3.3 Descriptive findings  
The aim of the empirical research component is to identify political risk manifestations 
in the offshore service industry and verify the risk types against the general political 
risk manifestations indicated in the extant literature. An analysis of the findings informs 
the development of an expanded operationalization of the external uncertainty concept 
as it is applied in TCE theory. 
3.3.3.1 Political risk manifestations in the offshoring industry 
From the analysis it is clear that the single largest political risk concern for offshoring 
companies surprisingly pertain to home/client-country political fall-out or change of 
home country regulatory frameworks with implications for the offshoring business 
model. The home-risk category received the highest frequency score at 0.48 and the 
highest impact score to match at 3.21 (on a scale from 1-5). This places home-country 
risk as the single most dominating political risk concern for the offshore industry. The 
risk manifestations elicited from the interviews highlighted negative media or clashes 
with powerful workers unions with potential for reputational damage, as the main 
concern. While home-country risk has the highest frequency of mention, the potential 
reputational impact appears to differentiate between the US and EU, as expressed 
“There is a lot of rhetoric in the US but I think the threats don’t have much teeth behind 
it – but in the EU the labour laws are real and have real consequences” 
(Interviewee#10).  
On the other hand the stricter interpretations of security related requirements i.e. 
profiling of staff and work locations by home-country regulators, seem to become more 
apparent in North America, especially within highly regulated sectors like the utility 
industry, or privacy regulations relating to the banking and health industry. The 
interviewees expressed less concern with the policies themselves, but more the 
unpredictability of application and constant changes, making it difficult to develop and 
maintain realistic costing models. On a similar note the risk of changes of data 
management regulatory frameworks received a frequency score at 0.40 highlighting 
the impact on business “as new regulations emerge the pricing structure changes due 
to the new data retention and licenses requirements” (Interviewee#8). Again the risk 
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for business was the perceived unpredictability of regulations on data security 
compliance which makes it difficult for businesses to maintain price structures.  
Furthermore, the notion of data security was not only a regulatory exposure but also 
a concern expressed by companies regarding their own proprietary information. As 
stated, “there is an increasing concern with data security and data protection – it is 
part of that consideration” (Interviewee#16). This concern related mainly to the location 
of server equipment and the policies or lack of protection surrounding that location. As 
stated “if you place your information within their reach [private or government hackers], 
meaning within an infrastructure – you don’t know who enters the data centres with 
which cables and with which capabilities. Therefore data protection and security is 
increasingly a political risk because one may judge China as a political stable country, 
but not necessarily friendly. And you can argue that for the same reason some 
European countries are concerned with hosting their data with US based 
organizations, simply because the US legislation is such that the American 
government is allowed to access data” (Interviewee#16). 
In addition host country bureaucracy received the highest frequency score at 0.48 and 
an impact score at 3.06 (on a scale from 1-5). This finding implies that political risk 
emanating from local institutions is one of the single highest concern in the host 
country environment. The other second highest frequency score pertains to Loss of 
Intellectual Property (IP) at 0.40 frequency of mention level. The notion of IP loss was 
often mentioned in terms of a general breach of confidentiality through the use of 
external suppliers. However, some interviewees express that “In fact IP [is less a 
concern] because the regulations are pretty clear on that and the clients are protected 
upfront. The big area I would say is privacy of the client or the client customers. And 
that is why legislation that exists keeps evolving. I guess the challenging part of that, 
as regulations evolve; the service provider has to evolve their practice to be compliant 
with those legislations” (Interviewee#18). Other practitioners stressed that loss of IP 
was a major consideration leading to the necessity of tactics such as product or service 
dissection i.e. parts being produced at various independent sites, suggesting that 
concern relating to IP loss be product and outsourcing type specific.  
      
 
113 
 
The IP loss or infringement issue is linked to legal predictability and particularly 
contract enforcement abilities in a given offshore setting. With a frequency rating of 
0.36 the potential lack of ability to enforce contracts through local institutions, either 
due to lack of institutional capacity and pro-longed processes or simply due to lack of 
political will, the notion that “your contract is only as good as your ability to enforce it” 
is apparent.  
Similarly, the notion of corruption was mentioned frequently at 0.40 however mainly 
attributed to low-level operations at destination, rather than perceived as a strategic 
concern. In fact, one interviewee stated that corruption did not tend to emerge as an 
issue “because these clients come from North America and the suppliers know it is 
just not the business culture here” (Interviewee#18). The main concern with corruption 
appeared to revolve more around management exposure and potential reputational 
risk. Finally, the political instability risk categories, traditionally associated with political 
risk analysis, were rated at 0.20 in terms of Host Government Stability and Social 
Unrest respectively. While both were frequently mentioned a review of the perceived 
impact positions the category below the 2.5 average score threshold. 
The overall distribution across overall risk classifications are captured in Table 30, 
indicating that concerns mainly focus on predictability of policy regimes, institutional 
capacity at host country level and transparency of the legal systems.   
Table 30: Distribution of events across typology dimensions  
 
Risk category family Freq. of Mention (%) 
Policy predictability 25* 21.6 
Institutional capacity limitations 22 19.0 
Legal unpredictability 19 16.4 
Political instability 16 13.8 
Instability of socio-economic environment 15 13.0 
Macro-economic instability 7 6.0 
Total 116 Mentions 100% 
*(Excl. 12 Home country Risk) 
The frequency and impact perceptions are captured in Figure 7, as a matrix illustrating 
the combined frequency and impact scoring for the key identified political risk 
constructs across BPO/ITO/KPO interventions.
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Figure 7: Distribution of political risk stratification across key categories 
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3.3.3.2 The offshore typology specific political risks 
The following section further stratifies the findings across the three offshoring activity 
types i.e. IPO, BPO and KPO, with the intention of highlighting the typology specific 
risk categories with high frequency and high perceived impact on business operations. 
As the 91 sample offshoring engagements are stratified across the sectors, the sample 
distribution is comprised of 33 ITO related offshoring engagements, 32 offshoring 
cases and 26 KPO cases representing a fairly equal distribution across the spectrum. 
The distribution of political risk stratified across the offshoring activities are captured 
compiled in (Figure 8). 
The first observation is that the frequency scores are relatively similar between BPO 
and ITO engagements. Both BPO and ITO have high frequency and impact ratings on 
risk relating to labour force liabilities including Predictability of labour regulations, 
Wage inflation and Organized Labour strike. Similar, Home Country Risk appears 
more prevalent for both typologies. Furthermore, ITO engagements appears slightly 
more concerned with Loss of IP and Bureaucracy. Based on the sample size of 32 
BPO and 33 ITO engagement cases the findings do not suggest major discrepancies 
between BPO and ITO engagements in terms of frequency ratings.  
In terms of comparing the ITO and BPO findings on perceived impact of political risk 
the findings indicate a higher level of discrepancy. While both categories rate 
Organized Labour Strike as the main impact category, BPO is perceived to generally 
be more impacted by Predictability of labour regulations, Legal Transparency and 
Local Audit regulations, while ITO is perceived to be impacted more strongly by Geo-
political Risk, Home-Country Risk, Host Government Stability and Wage Inflation.  
The second observation is that KPO engagements are more associated with host 
country bureaucracy, IP Loss, change of data management frameworks and 
corruption. This observation confirms the findings of the Principal Components 
Analysis (PCA) in (Figure 6) highlighting a stronger association with IP loss and legal 
transparency and contract enforcement concerns. The findings suggest that political 
risk exposure is closely linked with the business activity and the associated exposure 
to specific risk manifestations.
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Figure 8: Distribution of Political Risk stratification across offshoring types 
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3.3.4 Political risk manifestations across entry mode constellations 
In order to address the second research question on varied political rise exposure 
subject to entry mode constellation, a comparison was generated between the 
frequency and perceived impact of the various political risk categories across captive 
and contract-based offshore activities (Figure 9).  
The key political risk typologies (Frequency >20%, Impact >2) across entry mode 
forms are further summarised as follows, indicating a high level of similarity of 
exposure and perceived impact across the entry modes. The findings confirm the 
result of the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) in section 3.3.2.1., highlighting that 
the variability between the two groups were too insignificant to generate a PCA plot.  
Offshore Outsourcing (Contract-based) Captive Offshoring 
Corruption 
Home country risk 
Loss of IP 
Host country bureaucracy  
Data management regulatory framework 
 
Organized labour strike 
Currency fluctuations 
 
Corruption 
Home country risk 
Loss if IP 
Host country bureaucracy 
Data management regulatory framework 
 
Predictability of labor regulations 
Wage inflation 
The first observation is that the key risks evolving from corruption, home-country risk, 
loss of IP, host country bureaucracy and changing data management regulatory 
framework are considered key risk typologies across the entry modes. The risks 
emanating from currency fluctuations, predictability of labour regulations are 
furthermore borderline. The only significant difference across the entry modes is the 
impact of organized labour strike, which seems to impact substantially higher on 
contract-based engagements and with a perceived higher impact on operations.  
The second observation is that within the identified constraints category, the captive 
offshoring seem more exposed to concerns with corruption and predictability of labour 
regulations, which could be associated with the local level management requirements 
in the host country.  
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Figure 9: Distribution of Political Risk stratification across Entry Modes 
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3.4 Interpretation of Findings 
The purpose of this empirical study was to establish an evidence-based 
understanding of the meaning of political risk within the offshore service industry 
and elicit the main risk factors and relative perceived impact on operations. The 
research was guided by the following research questions. 
 What are the key contingent political risk types impacting on offshore 
outsourcing activities? 
 How do these key political risk types differ in importance depending on entry 
mode? 
3.4.1 The diversification of political risk factors 
The first research question was addressed through a RGT analysis of 91 
offshoring engagements, eliciting 21 industry specific political risk constructs of 
which 12 risk constructs are considered key categories (high ANV and >20% 
frequency).  
The Venn diagram in Figure 10, captures the new political risk factors identified 
by the empirical work, the political risks from the extant literature which are not 
verified by the empirical findings, and the risks common for both the literature 
review and the research findings. The risks identified in the overall literature 
review only, are classified as (L), and the findings on specific political risk 
constructs within the offshore service industry that are new, are classified as (E). 
The common and overlapping risk categories are labelled (EL). The 12 key risk 
categories are furthermore circled, highlighting that 6 of the risk findings from the 
exploratory research are confirmed within the extant literature and 6 risk 
categories are new constructs.  
As per the descriptive analysis, the key addition to the existing risk typologies is 
the concept of home country risk and a series of risks relates to regulatory 
predictability, like change of data management regulations and predictability of 
labour regulations, both at the home country level and at the host location. The 
findings further highlight key risks associated with institutional capacity of host 
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countries, including Contract enforcement & legal transparency, IP protection, 
bureaucracy and corruption. 
The findings suggest that discussions on external uncertainty based on a narrow 
concept of political risk is insufficient to capture the perceived exposure of the 
offshore service industry and need to be extended with more granularity on the 
types and nature of risk exposure.  
Figure 10: Comparison of findings with the extant literature 
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3.4.2 The impact of industry type on political risk perceptions 
In regards to risk types and perceived impact on offshore outsourcing activities it 
was surprising to note that the political risk concerns most mentioned related to 
home/client-country political fall-out or change of regulatory frameworks with 
implications for the outsourcing business model. This observation highlights that 
political risk exposure has a dual nature with potential impact on both the location 
decisions and the manner in which the outsourcing activity is executed.  
The impact of the home political risk was further determined to be sector specific 
i.e. the highly regularized utility industry would be more exposed to policy 
changes pertaining to data access and security profiling. Similarly, offshoring 
from highly unionised regions like Europe appear to have much greater potential 
impact than from the US, due to more defined legislation. The significance of the 
featured risks pertaining to home country repercussions or change of regulatory 
requirements, and the strong emphasis on labour related vulnerabilities highlight 
that a broader conceptualization of political risk considerations is valid and not 
currently defined in a manner that allows for unambiguous classification of 
relevant political risk events allow for an understanding of which risks are of 
concern for the offshoring service industry. A changing regulatory regime has the 
potential to significantly alter the costing model underlying the offshoring 
activities, posing a substantial risk for companies’ committing into contracts with 
external service suppliers or establishing extensive captive capacities abroad. 
The risk of changes in data management regulatory frameworks, closely followed 
by loss of intellectual property (IP) and corruption, were also among the top risk 
considerations suggesting that the nature of offshore outsourcing political risk 
exposure revolves more around the key categories of policy and legal 
predictability and institutional capacity, confirming the relevance of integrating 
mechanisms to capture institutional differentiations as a means of expanded 
conceptualization of external uncertainty beyond the reliance on composite 
political risk indicators as suggested in Slangen and Tulder (2009) and Busse 
and Hefecker (2006). The findings support the critic contending that external 
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uncertainty needs to be conceptualized more broadly and proposes the concept 
of governance infrastructure of host countries covering “public institutions and 
policies created by governments as a framework for economic, legal and social 
relations” (Slangen and Tulder, 2009, p. 279). The research therefore highlights 
the need to expand the conceptualization and operationalization of formal 
external uncertainty, and encourage entry modes research to measure external 
uncertainty by other political dimensions such as government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, control of corruption (Slangen and Tulder, 2009) and 
corruption and bureaucracy (Busse and Hefecker, 2006). On a similar note the 
findings support the possible integration of constructs from institutional 
economics (North, 1990) to better ascertain risk exposure pertaining from both 
host and home institutions.  
Surprisingly, the notion of political instability relating to government stability and 
social unrest, featured less frequently despite traditional focus within the 
literature. One explanation is that due to the evidence-based methodology 
looking at actual exposure in existing cases, the study only captures post-contract 
political risk incidents. As highlighted by one interviewee “we would not locate to 
Syria under the current circumstances, even if labour cost is substantially cheaper 
(Interviewee 16)”, the industry is not keen on exposing service chains to 
predictably unstable countries, especially with the availability of more stable 
alternative candidate locations for outsourcing. The findings are therefore a 
reflection of the inherent bias in the focus of the research, as most companies 
have already integrated these risk considerations into their initial location 
decisions. However, the findings also suggest that even in the event that political 
instability or social unrest occurs, the inherent risk management mechanisms 
such as diversification of the suppliers and ability to scale-up operations in 
alternative locations, support companies in minimizing impact substantially. The 
real concern appears to be felt when the political risk impacts on costing and 
business competitiveness, like through organized labour strikes or policy 
changes with implications for the underlying costing model.  
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As highlighted the findings also suggest that there are limited discrepancies on 
political risk experiences in terms of frequency ratings between BPO and ITO 
engagements, both highlighting organized labour strike as one of the main 
impacts categories. Even though more discrepancy emerged through the impact 
perceptions there is limited evidence that ITO and BPO engagements are 
detrimentally different in terms of political risk exposure. However, compared with 
the KPO findings it was possible to observe a scope shift towards concerns 
relating to regulatory frameworks and contract enforcement, and more impacted 
by potential IP loss, contract enforcement limitations and legal predictability. The 
association of Knowledge-based Outsourcing (KPO) with loss of IP, policy 
change on foreign ownership and contract enforcement risks, suggests that 
institutional capacity i.e. legal enforcement of IP rights and contracts becomes 
increasingly important as the value of product or service is enhanced. As stated, 
“most of the high-end R&D or IP type development or intellectual property type 
development happens at in-house locations. So most of the high-end work is 
done internally with their own employees their own buildings – everything is their 
own – only thing is that it may happen to be in an offshore location”. The reason 
they do that is they don’t trust others to do it, I don’t think it is a scare issue, it is 
about whether they can expose that and still have the right control (Interviewee 
#17).  
Hence the findings suggest that for purely transactional work most firms are 
comfortable outsourcing to third-party companies, while for high-end activities 
they prefer to keep the process internal, supporting the TCE premise of 
internalization to avoid supplier opportunistic behaviour and minimization of 
associated transaction costs. Overall, the findings suggest that political risk 
exposure is specific to the nature of the offshored business activity and what risk 
management steps have already been taken to address the exposure. The 
findings further suggest that these specific risk exposures be considered in the 
context of low versus high value service delivery as a key distinction for political 
risk exposure. 
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3.4.3 The impact of entry mode on risk perceptions and vulnerability 
In terms of addressing the second research question relating to political risk 
perceptions and adoption of either captive or contract-based entry mode, the 
study compared 19 captive cases and 72 contract-based cases to review any 
significant differences in actual risk manifestations or perceived impact.  
The first observation is that the key risks evolving from corruption, home-country 
risk, loss of IP, host country bureaucracy and changing data management 
regulatory framework are considered key risk typologies across both the entry 
modes and the remaining risks closely similar. The only significant difference 
across the entry modes is the impact of organized labour strike, which seems to 
impact substantially higher on contract-based engagements and with a perceived 
higher impact on operations. The captive offshoring engagement in turn seem 
relatively more exposed to concerns with corruption and predictability of labour 
regulations, which could be associated with the local level management 
requirements in the host country. The latter confirms that exposure to on-the-
ground realities has implications, once a captive engagement form is undertaken. 
Previous work has established that uncertainty in the international environment 
effect the choice of the international entry mode (Miller, 1992; Brouthers, 1995; 
Demirbag and McGuinness, 2010; Werner, Brouthers and Brouthers, 1996). This 
research has suggested that international risk plays a critical role in entry strategy 
formation, emphasizing an increased importance of control for higher value 
productions. On one side it can therefore be expected that when the formal 
sources of external uncertainty increase, firms prefer investing through entry 
modes which guarantee a higher level of control i.e. through captives. However, 
on review of the findings there is surprisingly little difference, for example in the 
perceived impact of IP loss between the entry modes. While the absence of a 
marked difference between risks perceptions vis-à-vis captive versus contract-
based engagements can be explained by the inherent bias of the limited number 
of a qualitative interview process, it is noteworthy in its absence and warrants 
further research in Chapter 3. 
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3.4.4 The impact of risk management experience 
On a final note, the qualitative components of the study highlight an apparent 
contradiction in the sense that political risk within the offshore outsourcing 
industry remains a relevant concern and is perceived as something that should 
and can be managed, while there is limited evidence of actual proactive risk 
management taking place.  
For the industry the concept of political risk and the implications for operations 
appear to remain elusive and difficult to narrow down. As expressed by one 
interviewee, the implications of political risk “could be a protest, or not being able 
to go to work for a time, or basically not be able to operate locally. It could also 
be power outages which is not necessarily political, but could be politically 
motivated. Like hostilities between different groups suddenly impacting power 
supply or telephone networks and therefore services not being provided to 
clients” (Interviewee #16).  From these various perceptions the concept of political 
risk and the associated operational implications are difficult to ring fence. The 
main focus seems to be on the monitoring of potential risk, mostly political stability 
and social unrest indicators, rather than factors like home-country risk pertaining 
to policy changes, institutional capacity assessments of host government 
bureaucracies and integrity of legal frameworks.  
In terms of active risk management consideration to political exposure the 
interview portfolio yielded a high level of variability in the degree that political risk 
was considered in the offshoring process. Some companies are rather 
disengaged, as stated: “…once the relationship is established we don’t monitor. 
Unless there is something in the press, like some major uprising, otherwise we 
won’t notice (Interviewee #16). On the other hand, some companies stated that 
“…it is actually a big piece of our activities in terms of monitoring these things and 
developing the risk management plans and implementing those plans. It’s very 
high on the operational and executives oversight” (Interviewee#11). And finally, 
as stated by an experienced outsourcing advisor, “Ultimately my sense is that 
politics does matter and it is something they are cognizant of, something they 
 126 
 
work on and actively try to manage. However, I have rarely seen any decision 
ultimately reversed due to political risk – they slow down but they don’t get 
reversed (Interviewee#19). This notion is supported by, “I think it is something 
that people are looking to manage, I don’t think it will fundamentally alter what 
people are doing because the economics of this change is very powerful 
(Strategic Outsourcing Advisor) (Interviewee #17). Some of the most informing 
insights on the industry’s perception and understanding of the political risk 
concept is captured in in Table 31.  
 
Table 31: Industry responds to political risk exposure. 
“An awful lot of decisions are being taken with no understanding of the political risk 
including where to outsource” (Interviewee#15). 
“There is no follow-up on monitoring on original location indicators through focused 
measurement and evaluation” (Interviewee #11). 
Companies think they can contract risk to nothing, however this is only to make them 
feel better (Interviewee #15). 
Companies need to be prepared to operate with higher risk and live with the ambiguity 
of less transparency (Interviewee#15). 
Companies routinely underestimate the time needed to make offshore outsourcing 
successful in terms of people-time the more so if to Bangladesh than the country next 
door. (Interviewee#15). 
No I don’t think [political risk] is taken seriously. I don’t think it was taken seriously 
before it became an issue – it wasn’t planned for. The Executives did not plan for it 
and take preventive measures – they reacted when it occurred (Interviewee #11). 
Companies are not making informed decisions about destinations – unable to monitor 
rapid economic and political developments in the host countries and the implications. 
(Interviewee#15). 
The cost of contract management so much more than anticipated – an awful lot of 
costs which were not included in the business case (Interviewee#15). 
Another challenge is ignorance on how political issues or social issues or bad press – 
ignorance of how these issues affect the outsourcing deal and result. People simply 
don’t take the time to take the advice and understand it. (Interviewee #10). 
Success is almost accidental – and dependent on an individual/organic way sparked 
by individuals – not institutionalized. (Interviewee #15). 
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The discrepancy in application of risk management approaches could be 
attributed to firm specific moderators that determine the risk management 
capacity and risk appetite of the individual firm. The risk appetite, or rather the 
perceived ability to manage the associated risks, appears to be linked to the 
experience of the given firm. As stated, the understanding of risk management 
varies “by and large the large the clients that already have done outsourcing and 
have been exposed 5-10 years, they have a sense of maturity on this. For a new 
client it is an uphill task and a new thing – and marked by lack of rigor and clarity 
of how to deal with this (Interviewee#17). The qualitative findings suggest that 
previous experience and exposure to political risk has a significant impact on the 
risk appetite of the executives and the firm’s capacity to manage risks. This 
supports the notion presented by Johansson and Valne’s theory of 
internationalization that firms are predicted to move sequentially through different 
stages as they develop their international experience and learn to deal with 
uncertainty by developing firm specific skills.  
3.5 Concluding Comments 
The exploratory empirical research offers several contributions to both theoretical 
and practical knowledge. First, it supports the call for re-conceptualizing the 
political risk definition in the context of entry mode theory application to include a 
broader operationalization of government characteristics, like institutional 
capacity, policy predictability and legal enforcement capacities, rather than 
maintaining a narrow focus on political stability indexes. From a practical 
perspective a re-conceptualization of political risk will require a broader scope of 
monitoring in order to remain relevant for the industry, including an engagement 
with potential homeland specific political fall-out or policy changes. From a 
theoretical perspective the re-operationalization of the external environmental 
risks, from being limited to political risk indexes, will allow a more diversified 
analysis of firm’s entry mode choice. As indicated, the research highlights the 
need to expand the conceptualization and operationalization of formal external 
uncertainty, and encourage entry modes research to measure external 
uncertainty by other political dimensions such as government effectiveness, 
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regulatory quality and control of corruption in line with (Slangen and Tulder, 
2009). 
A second contribution concerns the highlighting of the moderating effect of 
specific outsourcing activity i.e. BPO/ITO or KPO, noting that firms tend to ensure 
more internal control for high value processing through captive engagement 
modes, rather than outsourcing to a third party supplier. These findings support 
the TCE notion that cases where the market is imperfect due to bounded 
rationality and opportunism leading to increased transaction costs, an internal 
governance structure will be considered more attractive (Anderson and Gatignon, 
1986). For example, in host countries with limited governance infrastructure or 
institutional capacity local suppliers may use loopholes in the legal system or 
bureaucracy to act opportunistically (Slangen and Tulder, 2009), hence 
constituting a risk of opportunistic behavior. The findings seem to suggest that 
companies will seek to leverage labor arbitrage through outsourcing but choose 
an entry mode that ensures higher control when engaged in high-value services, 
in an exposed external environment with for example potential for IP loss, 
contractual liabilities and Policy Change on Foreign ownership. 
Finally, the findings suggest that the offshoring industry generally adopts an 
avoidance strategy in regards to traditional political risk pertaining to political 
instability and social unrest, while expecting to manage other non-traditional 
risks. The notion that political risk can be managed suggests that the firm’s risk 
adaptive behaviour, through active risk management should be explored, as the 
firms perception of its ability to manage certain risk, will impact on the perception 
of overall uncertainty related to the given engagement.  
The following Chapter will leverage the findings from the literature review and the 
exploratory research component to further explore political risk implications on 
offshore service industry location decisions. The Chapter will formulate a series 
of hypothesises based on the theoretical review and exploratory research 
findings, and conduct hypothesis testing by means of a broader quantitative 
survey methodology.   
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4 (Project 3) – A Comparative Analysis of Political Risk 
and Offshoring Flows 
Based on the literature review and the findings of the exploratory study on post-
contract political risk exposure among offshoring practitioners, a series of 
suggested correlations between offshore outsourcing flows and contract-based 
relationships are hypothesized.  
4.1 Hypothesis Formulation 
As a main premise of the research, it is acknowledged that business cost and 
efficiency fundamentals are the driving factors for firms to seek offshore 
outsourcing solutions. In this context it is further proposed that country political 
risk exposure influences the location choices and the entry mode designs used 
for engaging in the offshoring activity.  
A comprehensive review of the literature suggested that previous research have 
generally delimited political risk research to ownership-based entry modes, or 
captive offshoring, on the notion that this entry mode represent a more complex 
investment form than contract-based entry modes like offshore outsourcing. The 
perception has been that since non-equity offshoring modalities have less capital 
at stake and no physical facilities at risk on the ground, political risk consideration 
should be a less significant concern (see section 2.4.2 in the literature review).  
According to the exploratory research findings the distribution and attributes of 
political risk in the context of contract-based offshoring engagements, or offshore 
outsourcing, were however very similar to those of captive engagements. As the 
exploratory research identified a series of new risk typologies impacting the 
industry, the research further explores the relationship between offshore 
outsourcing and political risk factors with a higher level of granularity in the 
analysis.  
On this basis the research will firstly explore the impact of political risk 
characteristics on offshore outsourcing activities, and analyse the effect of 
political risk on predicting offshore outsourcing flows. Secondly, the research will 
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compare the extent to which offshore outsourcing and captive offshoring differ in 
sensitivity to political risk in their offshore engagements. The research will be 
guided by the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Offshore outsourcing activities, as a non-equity and contract-based 
modality, are less sensitive to political risk considerations than general inward 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the choice of offshore locations. 
Secondly, the findings of the exploratory research suggest that the nature of 
offshore political risk exposure revolves increasingly around policy and legal 
predictability, including institutional capacity, confirming the relevance of 
incorporating institutional factors in the determination of external uncertainty. The 
findings supplement emerging research suggesting that determinants of foreign 
investment flows should be extended beyond the traditional factors like 
government stability, internal/external conflict and ethnic tensions, to also include 
aspects of local corruption, quality of bureaucracy and law and order (Busse and 
Hefeker, 2008). Other research as similarly argued that using a narrow political 
risk definition in exploring uncertainty in the formal external environment is 
suboptimal, contending that government quality is a better proxy for determining 
external uncertainty (Slangen and Tulder, 2009).  
This research has extended the political risk definition, and through the 
exploratory research defined the 12 key political risk determinants proposed to 
affect the offshore service industry, allowing for a high level of granularity in the 
analysis of formal external uncertainty in the context of TCE theory. On this basis 
it is anticipated that the stronger the institutional and regulatory factors in the host 
country is perceived to be, the higher the inflow of contract-based offshore 
outsourcing. 
Hypothesis 2: When the institutional and regulatory factors in the host country are 
strengthened, the volume of overall (ITO/BPO/KPO) contract-based offshore 
outsourcing will increase.  
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Thirdly, the exploratory research further highlighted a direct association of 
Knowledge-based Outsourcing (KPO) with loss of IP, policy change on foreign 
ownership and contract enforcement risks. The findings suggests that institutional 
capacity i.e. legal enforcement of IP rights and contracts becomes increasingly 
important as the knowledge content and value of services are enhanced.  
On this basis it is hypothesized that specific risk exposure is subject to the level 
of service value or knowledge level involved in the offshoring engagement, and 
that risk should be considered in the context of the knowledge content as a 
determination of exposure. As stated “most of the high-end R&D or IP type 
development or intellectual property type development happens in in-house 
locations. So most of the high-end work is done internally with their own 
employees their own buildings – everything is their own – only thing is that it may 
happen to be in an offshore location” (Interviewee #17). Hence for low-end work 
most firms appear comfortable outsourcing to third-party, while for high-end 
activities companies prefer to keep the process internal through a captive entry 
mode or under strong IP regulation regime. This notion highlights the moderating 
effect of the specific outsourcing activity i.e. BPO/ITO or KPO, noting that firms 
tend to ensure more internal control for high value processing through captive 
engagement modes, rather than exposure to a third party supplier through 
outsourcing.  
These findings support the TCE notion that cases where the market is imperfect 
due to bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior leading to increased 
transaction costs due to uncertainty, an internal governance structure will be 
considered more attractive (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). For example, in host 
countries with limited governance infrastructure or institutional capacity local 
suppliers may use loopholes in the legal system or bureaucracy to act in self-
interest, hence constituting a risk of opportunistic behavior. Similarly, the findings 
touch upon the notion of asset specificity, which is another principle factor by 
which TCE explain vertical integration (Williamson, 1985). TCE has distinguished 
asset specificity as either site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset 
specificity and dedicated specificity with the main premise suggesting that when 
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asset specificity increases, the “balance shifts in the favor of internal organization” 
(Williamson, 1985, p.90). In the context of offshoring of services, the research 
proposes to introduce the additional concept of knowledge specificity to be 
considered as a determining aspect of vertical integration decision.  
Consistent with the TCE perspective, the research suggests that companies 
engaging in offshoring will ensure higher control or avoid locations, when 
engaged in service offshoring of a high-knowledge-content in environment of high 
institutional and legal uncertainty. Therefore as the institutional and legal 
uncertainty decreases at an offshoring location the level of offshoring activity with 
a higher knowledge-content is likely to increase.  
Hypothesis 3: When the institutional and regulatory factors in the host country are 
strengthened, the offshore outsourcing volumes of business activities with a 
higher knowledge content (KPO) is likely to increase.  
4.2 Research Methodology  
4.2.1 Selection of the multivariate technique 
As the proposed research is focused on analysing dependence relationships 
between the dependent variable(s) i.e. contract-based outsourcing or captive 
(FDI) flows and the identified independent political risk variables, the research will 
apply a dependence technique. The dependence techniques are “based on the 
use of independent variables to predict and explain one or more dependent 
variables” (Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2011, p.12). The appropriate 
Multivariate Analysis dependence techniques considered for this research 
includes: 
Option 1 - Multiple Regression: As the analysis involves a single metric 
dependent variable, the first option is to apply a multiple regression analysis 
technique. Multiple Regression can be appropriate for conducting two rounds of 
analysis i) Multiple regression with Contract-based outsourcing flows as the first 
dependent variable, ii) Multiple regression with captive (FDI) flows as second 
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dependent variable. With the overall objective of comparing findings between the 
two separate rounds of analysis.  
Option 2 - Canonical correlation: When the research problem involves several 
metric-based dependent variables (Contract-based outsourcing flows + FDI 
flows), it is also possible to use a canonical correlation. With canonical analysis 
the objective is to correlate simultaneously several metric dependent variables 
and several metric independent variables. The result would be “a set of weights 
for the dependent and independent variables that provides the maximum simple 
correlation between the set of dependent and independent variables” (Hair, 
Black, Babin and Anderson, 2011, p. 17). This result will however not serve the 
purpose of this research, as the objective is to ascertain the difference in 
correlation between contract-based flows (Dependent variable 1) and the 
identified political risk indicators (independent variables), versus the degree of 
correlation between captive (FDI) based flows (Dependent variable 2) against the 
same set of independent variables.  
As the choice of technique depends on the classification of variables, the number 
of dependent variables and how they are measured, the research proposes to 
use a multiple regression analysis for the purpose of exploring the dependencies 
between the offshore outsourcing flows and the pre-identified political risk 
indicators. The selection of the multiple regression technique was determined by 
the classification of multivariate methods technique (Hair, Black, Babin and 
Anderson, 2011).  
Table 32: Classification of multivariate methods 
Can the Variables be divided into independent/dependent 
classifications based on theory? 
 
Yes 
How many variables are treated as dependent in a single 
analysis? 
 
One 
 
How are the variables, both dependent and independent 
measured? 
 
Metric 
 
Multivariate Technique options 
 
Multiple regression (or 
Conjoint Analysis) 
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4.2.2 A six-stage model for multiple regression analysis 
 
The following research protocol will use the six-stage model building process 
introduced by (Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2011), as the framework for 
addressing the components that constitute the regression analysis process. The 
framework provides a logical and structured approach to regression model 
building, including specifying the objectives of the regression analysis, selection 
of variables, addressing research design issues and testing of assumptions, 
before interpreting and validating the results.  
Table 33: A six-stage model building process 
Stage 1: Confirming that Multiple Regression is appropriate for the Research Problem 
Stage 2: Addressing Research Design Issues 
Stage 3: Testing Assumptions in Multiple Regression 
Stage 4: Selection of Estimation Technique 
Stage 5: Interpreting the Regression Variate 
Stage 6: Validating the Results 
 
4.2.2.1 Aligning multiple regression with the research problem 
As indicated multiple regression provides a means for objectively assessing the 
degree and character of the relationship between dependent and independent 
variables and can be interpreted from three main perspectives (Hair, Black, Babin 
and Anderson, 2011, p. 170): 
 As a determination of the relative importance of each independent variable 
in the prediction of the dependent variable measure.  
 As a means of assessing the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables 
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 And lastly, multiple regression can assess the internal relationship 
between the independent variables in the prediction of the dependent 
variable measure.  
For the purpose of this research the main application of the regression variate will 
be to interpret the relative importance of the pre-identified political risk indicators 
on the offshore outsourcing flows across locations. The objective(s) of conducting 
the regression analysis is therefore to: 
 Determine the relative importance of each of the identified political risk 
indicators in offshore outsourcing location choices, if any, and compare 
relative importance of each of the political risk indicators for offshore 
outsourcing inflows. 
 Provide insight into the relationship among the political risk indicators in 
their prediction of offshore outsourcing location flows with the objective of 
developing a specific weighted index for political risk rating of contract-
based offshore outsourcing activities. 
The selection of the political risk variables is based on the empirical findings of 
the qualitative research conducted under P2, covering 25 interviews and 
analysing political risk exposure experienced during 91 outsourcing 
engagements. The exploratory empirical research mapped political risk types in 
accordance with frequency and perceived impact on offshore outsourcing 
engagements. The identified political risks were further mapped against political 
risk indicators identified in the systematic literature review, suggesting that the 
political risk exposure and concerns within the offshore outsourcing industry was 
different than the exposure of traditional Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  
The findings further suggested that the choice of entry mode, contract-based 
versus captive engagements, affect the political risk exposure of the offshore 
engagement. The choice of variables is therefore firmly based on previous 
research within the field and the exploratory research project identifying the most 
relevant political risk manifestations within the offshore outsourcing industry.  
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The application of quantitative methods and regression analysis to political risk 
research is a common approach within the FDI research domain. The attached 
review of methodology and data sources applied in comparable political risk 
research, provides an overview of 23 previous studies applying a form of 
quantitative analysis by use of country risk indicators (See Annex C.2). For 
example, Jun and Singh (1996), in identifying determinants of foreign direct 
investment in developing countries, regressed an aggregated indicator for 
political risk based on a number of sub-components and several control variables 
on the value of foreign direct investment flows, (Jun and Singh, 1996). In another 
study, (Fatehi-Sedeh, Safizadeh 1989), applied regression analysis to explore 
the potential impact of socio-political instability on the US manufacturing FDI. 
Using multiple regression analysis, the US FDI data served as the dependent 
variable and the frequencies of socio-political instability as independent variables.  
4.2.2.2 Selection of independent variables 
In the following sections the 12 political risk categories identified in the exploratory 
research component will be applied as independent variables with the objective 
of developing political risk profile for offshoring outsourcing locations. The 
analysis includes all political risk indicators identified by the empirical research 
with a frequency score >10% only.  
4.2.2.3 Sources and scope of data for independent variables 
For the purpose of identifying appropriate data sources to compile the 
independent variable datasets, a comprehensive review of existing governance 
and country indicators was conducted (See Annex C.1). The review findings are 
compiled in matrix form and provide an overview of data sources, methodology, 
measures and scope of coverage. Based on the analysis of available data (See 
Annex C.3) the independent variables are drawn from a combination of data from 
the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) developed by the Global Economic 
Forum (WEF, 2014), combined with data purchased from the PRS Group Political 
Risk Index (PRSG 2014). Ratings on political risk factors and institutions are 
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extracted from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) provided by the 
Political Risk Services (PRS) Group.  
4.2.2.4 Overview of independent variables 
The following matrix provides an overview of the political risk indicators applied, 
plus the time series available, data source and description of measure: 
Table 34: Description of independent variables 
No. Independent Variables   
 Risk Indicator Categories Time Series Sample Data 
Source 
Definition 
1 Host country bureaucracy A 2006-2014 PRS Group Quality of Bureaucracy 
2 Host country bureaucracy B 2006-2014 World Economic 
Forum (GCI) 
Burden of customs 
procedures 
3 Loss of IP 2006-2014 World Economic 
Forum (GCI) 
Level of IP protection 
4 Corruption 2006-2014 World Economic 
Forum (GCI) 
Corruption levels at host 
location 
5 Contract enforcement 2006-2014 World Economic 
Forum (GCI) 
Local legal systems ability to 
enforce legal contracts 
6 Currency Fluctuations 2006-2014 PRS Group Stability of local currency 
7 Organized Labour Strike 2006-2014 World Economic 
Forum (GCI) 
Disruption through local 
strikes (internal or external) 
8 Host Government Stability 2006-2014 PRS Group Changes in Government 
policies 
9 Social unrest 2006-2014 World Economic 
Forum (GCI) 
Local instability that may 
affect business continuity 
10 Internal Conflict 2006-2014 PRS Group Risk of internal conflict and 
violence 
11 Geo-political Risk 2006-2014 PRS Group Regional instability that may 
affect business continuity 
12 
Human Security 
2006-2014 World Economic 
Forum (GCI) 
Perceived risk and costs in 
securing staff security  
 
 138 
 
4.2.2.4.1 Use of Summated Scales 
For the purpose of the research the concept of Bureaucracy has been divided 
into two distinct variables, one representing the overall perception of institutional 
bureaucracy and the second representing the specific challenges with navigating 
customs procedures in the host country. The challenge of customs procedures 
was mentioned specifically during the exploratory interviews in relation to sending 
prototypes and supporting materials to suppliers, including survey samples in 
medical R&D. The intention is to make a differentiation between bureaucracy 
indicators in the initial regression analysis and determine which is most relevant 
for inclusion in the final model.  
In turn, for the purpose of limiting the number of independent variables to ensure 
statistical cohesion and power, the research design has applied a summated 
scale for the two indicators on terrorism and organized crime, and consolidated 
them under the notion of human security. The human security indicator 
encompasses i) business costs of terrorism, ii) business costs of crime and 
violence, III) levels of organized crime and Iv) reliability of police services. The 
use of a summated scale is applied as indicators are considered uni-dimensional 
around the same concept, and through the empirical research findings 
understood as the security concerns with sending staff from the buying company 
to perform monitoring activities or knowledge transfer, hence limiting access to 
the offshoring partner.  
4.2.2.5 Normalization of independent variable scales  
As the research will be using independent variables with varying scales (See 
Annex C.3), the data will be normalized for statistical comparability. The common 
approach to normalization includes either generating z-values using the formula 
(z = (x-mean)/std. dev.) or rescaling. For the purpose of this research the data 
scales will be normalized using z-values as this feature can be processed in the 
SPSS application with limited risk of error. As the PRSG  indicator is assessed 
on a scale from 0 to 12 (with higher values indicating less risk) and the GCI 
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indictors are assess on a scale from 1-7 (with higher values indicating less risk) 
no inverse normalization is required. 
4.2.3 Selection of dependent variables 
The research will focus on the effect of the external uncertainties (independent 
variables) on the location decisions within the service offshoring industry. For this 
purpose the research will apply contract-based outsourcing and captive 
offshoring flows as the dependent variable. 
Unlike previous studies on political risk and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), one 
of the challenges with researching political risk in the context of the outsourcing 
service industry is the general absence of available economic data sets that 
matches the applied definition of offshore outsourcing. According to the WTO 
(2005), the existing sources on trade statistics are not targeted to record the 
phenomenon of offshore outsourcing and hence most data has been based on 
private sector surveys like McKinsey or Gartner reports (WTO, 2005, p.274).  
4.2.4 Developing a measure for offshore outsourcing activities 
While several approaches have been used to gauge the size of the offshore 
services activities, the WTO (2005), used the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
developed Balance of Payment (BoP) statistics as a means to gauge overall 
offshore services trade in an attempt to discuss the potential employment impact 
in offshoring economies. The BoP is “a statement that summarizes economic 
transactions between residents and non-residents during a specific time period”, 
and “the international accounts provide an integrated framework for the analysis 
of an economy’s international relationships.” (IMF, 2007, p.9). The BoP statement 
thereby provides a net position of any national economy in terms of trade with the 
external world, allowing for a determination of a country’s contribution to the trade 
in services. The BoP records the net position of the economy in terms of debits 
and credits of individual transactions, reflecting the inflow and outflow element to 
each exchange. Each transaction is recorded as either Credit (CR) – exports of 
goods and services, income receivable, reduction in assets, or increase in 
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liabilities; or Debit (DR) – imports of goods and services, income payable, 
increase in assets, or reduction in liabilities. (IMF, 2007, p. 10).  
The BoP statistics further reflect inflow and outflow of transactions in an economy 
consisting of “the institutional units that are resident in the economic territory of 
that economy” and “has the dimension of legal jurisdiction as well as physical 
location” (IMF, p 50). The BoP of Goods and Services account shows 
transactions in items that are outcomes of production activities, defining services 
as “the result of a production activity that changes the conditions of the 
consuming units, or facilitates the exchange of products or financial assets” (IMF, 
2007, p.149). On this basis the research will apply the BoP Services account 
data, exports of services (CR), as the determinant of the volume of offshore 
outsourcing activities being exported from the top offshore locations. 
4.2.4.1 Contract-based offshoring data 
In order to identify the segments of service’s trade that traditionally constitute the 
offshore outsourcing industry, the WTO (2005) focused on the trade in firstly; 
Computer and Information Services (CIS) and secondly; Other Professional 
Services (OBS), as a proxy for the offshore outsourcing trade (WTO, 2005, p. 
276).  
4.2.4.2 Computer and information services (CIS) 
The CIS data is included within the BoP6 (IMF, 2007) component of 
Telecommunications, Computer, and Information services, but can be isolated 
from the other components through a filtering mechanism in the IMF data base. 
The (CIS) segment of the BoP6 includes computer services consisting of 
hardware-and software related services and data-processing services, including 
typical offshore outsourcing services (IMF, 2007, p. 176) such as: 
 The development, production, supply and documentation of customized 
software, including operating systems, made to order for specific users; 
 Hardware and software consultancy and implementation services, 
including the management of subcontracted computer services; 
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 Data recovery services, including provision of advice and assistance; 
 Analysis, design and programming of systems ready to use (including 
webpage development and design), and technical consultancy related 
software; 
 Data processing and hosting services, such as data entry, tabulation and 
processing; 
 Web-page hosting services and; 
 Provision of applications, hosting client’s applications and computer 
facilities management. 
The Information Services component includes news agency services, like the 
provision of news, photographs, and feature articles to the media, while Other 
Information Provision include database services like database conception, data 
storage, and the dissemination of data and databases. As both are not 
considered common candidates for offshore service outsourcing, the CIS data 
segment is limited to Computer Services only (IMF, 2007, p. 176). The CIS data 
will therefore be applied for the purpose of this research as a proxy for Information 
Technology Outsourcing (ITO). 
4.2.4.3 Other business services (OBS) 
The OBS account includes Research and Development services associated with 
basic research, applied research and experimental development of new products 
and processes. The section further includes “service merchanting”, which 
includes services not classified to specific service classifications, such as for 
example transport, construction, or computing above. This section, in accordance 
with the WTO (2005), is suggested to provide the best available proxy for 
business process outsourcing flows. However, it should be noted that the Other 
Business Services (OBS) also include services which are not generally 
associated with offshore outsourcing including Waste Treatment and depollution, 
agricultural and mining services. Also the segment includes Operating Leasing 
activities, and Trade-related services covering commissions on goods and 
services transactions.  
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Through the IMF database filtering mechanism in BoP6, it is possible to break 
down the OBS data into the two following categories relevant for offshore 
outsourcing research: 
4.2.4.4 Research and development (R&D)  
The Research and Development services data component consist of services 
that are associated with basic research, applied research, and experimental 
development of new products and processes. In principle, such activities in the 
physical sciences, social sciences, and humanities are covered, including the 
development of operating systems that represent technological advances. Also 
included is commercial research related to electronics, pharmaceuticals, and 
biotechnology (IMF, 2007, p. 177). The data component will for the purpose of 
this research be applied as a proxy for Knowledge-based Outsourcing (KPO), as 
it captures well the component of offshore outsourcing that is considered “high-
value” with a substantial knowledge content. 
4.2.4.5 Other business services (OBS) 
The Other Business Services (OBS) component is nested within the overall 
category also called Other Business Services (OBS), the BoP6 states that 
“Business and other services, such as transport, construction, and computing, 
may be subcontracted. This arrangement may also be called “outsourcing.” For 
example, a specialist service arranger may be paid to provide back-office 
functions for a customer, which the service arranger subcontracts to another 
contractor. These services are classified to the appropriate specific service 
classification, such as transport, construction, computing, or other business 
services” (IMF, 2007, p. 177).  
As the transport and construction services can then be excluded, and the 
computer and R&D services are included in above segments, the residual flows 
in the OBS segment can be considered similar to the Business Process 
Outsourcing (BPO) which is otherwise not classified as ITO or KPO above. The 
following research will therefore use Computer Information Services (CIS) as a 
proxy for Information Technology Outsourcing (ITO), the R&D component of 
 143 
 
Other Business Services (OBS) as a proxy for Knowledge-based Outsourcing 
(KPO) and the Other Business Services (OBS) component of Other Business 
Services (OBS) as a proxy for Business Process Outsourcing (BPO). 
4.2.5 Aggregate offshore outsourcing of services flows 
With the absence of tailor-made and industry specific data on offshore 
outsourcing activities the use of proxy data from the BoP database, and the 
related concerns with accuracy of reporting at national level, the research is 
cognizant of the potential for measurement error. To overcome the potential 
weakness of reporting accuracy against either CIS or OBS portfolios, the 
research will also apply a summated scale consisting of an aggregated sum of 
the identified CIS and OBS services. According to WTO (2005) it is suggested to 
use aggregate data sets of the two service classifications provides the most 
reliable indicator for service outsourcing flows. For the purpose of this research 
an aggregate sum of the three BoP segments will be applied as the consolidated 
service offshoring export (credit) of the individual country.  
4.2.5.1 Validation of ITO/KPO and BPO data assumptions  
While the use of BoP data has been established as a valid method for determining 
offshore outsourcing flows by (WTO, 2005) it is acknowledged to be an estimate 
with potential inconsistencies due to national level reporting and classification 
variance. As research within the area of offshore outsourcing services has 
generally been hampered by lack of access to agreed datasets and 
inconsistencies (Bardhan, Jaffe and Kroll, 2013), a process of pre-validation is 
required.  
For the purpose of validating the data proxy sets for this research a descriptive 
analysis of consolidated offshore outsourcing flows has been conducted across 
the BoP generated datasets for ITO, BPO, KPO and aggregate values for 2010 
(See Annex C.4 7).  It should be noted that 2010 provides complete data for all 
sample countries however some of the main outsourcing destinations are not 
included in the dataset due to absence of data components, either among the 
independent variables or from the BoP data, including Mexico, Indonesia and 
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Malaysia. To confirm validity of the data the BoP data sets were compared to the 
A.T. Kearney Global Services Location Index 2014 (Kearney, 2014), providing a 
ranking of the 50 most attractive offshore outsourcing locations in the world (See 
Annex C.8). While the ranking does not indicate the actual volumes for 
comparison, it confirms mainstream offshore outsourcing locations. The direct 
comparison of the low cost destinations is provided in the table below, indicating 
a convincing match between the A.T. Kearney industry data on most attractive 
locations and the BOP6 generated data. 
The descriptive data across the BoP generated datasets for ITO, BPO, KPO and 
aggregate values for 2010 in (See Annex C.4 - C.7) validates the BoP data by 
confirming the industry position of India as the lead location on ITO and 
China/Brazil/Philippines as the main host locations for BPO. In (Annex C.8) a 
further comparison between the A.T. Kearny rankings of the Top 50 offshore 
outsourcing locations, with the ranking of country service export based on the 
BoP data is provided, further validating the use of BoP data as measure of 
offshore outsourcing activities. 
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Table 35: Balance of Payment (BoP) data comparison 
BoP data comparison with A.T. Kearney Global Services Location Index 2014 
BoP data ranking  Country name Included in A.T. Kearny Index  2014 
1. India Yes 
2. China Yes 
3. Brazil Yes 
4. Philippines Yes 
5. Russia Yes 
6. Thailand Yes 
7. Hungary Yes 
8. Argentina Yes 
9. Ukraine Yes 
10. Romania Yes 
11. Morocco Yes 
12. Costa Rica Yes 
13. South Africa Yes 
14. Serbia * No 
15. Bulgaria Yes 
16. Pakistan Yes 
17. Egypt Yes 
18. Bangladesh Yes 
19. Jordan Yes 
20. Sri Lanka Yes 
21. Colombia Yes 
22. Uruguay Yes 
23. Latvia Yes 
24. Oman** No 
25. Azerbaijan* No 
*These two locations are considered outliers as not confirmed as mainstream outsourcing 
locations. 
**Location not confirmed in A.T. Kearney Index, but a sample location identified through the 
practitioner interviews (Outsourcing of BPO within Telecommunications Industry). 
 
4.2.6 Identifying proxy data for captive outsourcing  
According to WTO (2005), few national statistics allow for identification of cross-
border transactions between affiliate and non-affiliate firms. However, for the 
case of US BoP statistics this data is available and can also be viewed “as a 
proxy for captive offshoring for companies resident in the USA” (WTO, 2005, p. 
277). However, on review it appears that the data is not location-specific and 
there are a series of limitations to the use of affiliated trade as a proxy for captive 
offshoring activities, including: 
 146 
 
 The data does not provide a distinction between goods and services, and 
while international trade among affiliates firms include offshoring activities, 
some of the imported goods may not have been produced internally in the 
first place and hence not indicative of offshoring activities. 
 The affiliate trade data will also include mergers and acquisitions, and 
hence the BOP data on affiliate trade may be overstated in terms of 
offshoring activities. 
 Finally, the trade with affiliates also poses a sectoral classification 
problem, as the transactions will be classified in accordance with the 
primary industry classification of the affiliate i.e. “an IT offshore activity for 
an insurance company would be classified as an insurance service flow 
and not as a supply of IT service” (WTO, 2005, p. 277). 
Table 36: Description of dependent variables 
No. Dependent Variable(s)    
 Variable Name Time Series Definition of Data Source  
1. 
Aggregated Service 
Offshore Outsourcing 
per national economy 
2006-2013  Export (Credit) of Aggregate BoP Services Credit; 
Computer and Information Services (CIS), Research 
& Development Services and Other Business 
Services as per annual BOP6 
2. 
 
BPO export per national 
economy 
2006-2013 Export (Credit) of Services,  Other Business Services,  
Technical,  trade-related,  and other business services 
as per annual BOP6 
3. ITO export per national 
economy 
2006-2013 Export (Credit) of Services,  Computer and 
Information Services (CIS)as per annual BOP6 
4. KPO (R&D) export per 
national economy 
2006-2013 Export (Credit) of Services,  Other Business Services,  
Research and Development Services) as per annual 
BOP6 
5. Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) inflow 
per national economy 
2006-2013 UNCTAD FDI database (2014) - Net FDI inflows  
 
On this background it was decided not to use the BoP datasets for developing a 
proxy dataset for captive outsourcing and instead use overall Foreign Direct 
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Investment (FDI) inflow per national economy as a comparison. On this basis the 
data for the dependent variable for captive outsourcing will be substituted with 
overall FDI inflows drawn from the UNCTAD FDI statistics database (UNCTAD, 
2014) in line with traditional political risk research (Busse and Hefeker, 2007). 
4.2.7 Non-political location variables  
The findings of the exploratory research also suggested a series of factors that 
can moderate the location choice or alter entry mode choice in addition to external 
uncertainty variables. The moderators include considerations to available support 
infrastructure, educated workforce and research talent for upstream knowledge-
based outsourcing and are incorporated into the analysis as non-political 
indicator variables accordingly. 
Table 37: Description of external business variables 
No. External Business Variables   
 Variable Name Time 
Series 
Data Source – Global Competiveness Index 
(GCI) 2005- 2014, 1-7 (best) 
1. Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony 
infrastructure 
2006-2013 2nd pillar 2.B.: Electricity and telephony 
infrastructure, 2.07 
2. Pillar 3 - Macro Environment 2006-2013 3rd pillar: Macroeconomic environment 
3. Pillar 4 - Primary Education 2006-2013 4th pillar 4..B.: Primary education, 4.09-10, 1-
7  
4. Pillar 5 - Higher education and 
training 
2006-2013 5th  pillar: Higher education and training, 1-7  
5. Pillar 7 - Labour market efficiency 2006-2013 7th pillar: Labour market efficiency, 1-7  
6. Pillar 9 - Technological readiness 2006-2013 9th pillar: Technological readiness 
7. Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size 2006-2013 10th pillar - Domestic Market Size, 10.01  
8. Pillar 12 - Innovation 2006-2013 12th pillar: Innovation 
9. GDP per Capita 2006-2013 GDP per capita (US$), 0.03 
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It should be noted that the literature review and exploratory research also 
highlighted firm specific moderators potentially impacting on location choices, 
including offshoring experience levels, firm origin, the business activity (high or 
low-end value), the level of industry regulation and the volumes of the 
engagement. However, as firm level data is unavailable these moderators will not 
be included in this stage of the research. 
4.2.8 Country samples 
The Global Competitiveness Report 2013–2014 (WEF, 2014) covers 148 
economies, containing a detailed profile section with data tables covering over 
100 indicators. The main limitation with using the Global Competitiveness Report 
data is that most data is only available since 2005, meaning that timesheet 
analysis will be limited to a duration of 2006-2013 only. Similarly, the PRS Group 
Political Risk Index (PRSG, 2014) covers political, economic, financial, and social 
data for 140 countries, in most cases back to 1984, however several offshore 
location destinations are missing from the index like Mauritius for example. Hence 
generating a complete dataset for the Independent Variables was partly limited 
to availability of country specific data. 
Similarly, the varied methods of collecting BOP data across national economies 
does not yield a comprehensive set of country BOP data, with key offshoring 
destinations like Mexico, Indonesia and Malaysia missing. Similarly, some of the 
variables do not provide complete datasets for the time period 2006-2014. 
Overall, the research project has been able to compile complete datasets from 
92 countries, including most of the main offshore outsourcing destinations as per 
the below matrix. 
 
 
 
 149 
 
Table 38: Overview of country samples 
BOP Classification Outsourcing 
Type 
N size Country Samples 
Aggregate BOP Services 
Credit; Computer and 
Information Services 
(CIS), Research & 
Development Services 
and Other Business 
Services 
Offshore 
Outsourcing 
(Aggregate 
ITO, BPO and 
R&D) 
92 Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Dominican Rep., Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta. Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, 
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, 
Serbia, Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Republic, Zambia6. 
Services,  Other Business 
Services,  Technical,  
trade-related,  and other 
business services 
BPO 92  
(same as above) 
Computer and 
Information Services 
(CIS) 
ITO 61 Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Rep., El 
Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Korea 
(Republic), Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Ukraine, United States, Uruguay. 
Services,  Other Business 
Services,  Research and 
Development Services 
KPO (R&D) 43 Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Korea (Republic), Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malawi, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Serbia 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Ukraine, United States7. 
                                            
6 Note that complete datasets were not available for typical offshore outsourcing destinations like 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Mexico hence not included in the analysis. 
 
7 Note that R&D data was not available for large economies like United Kingdom, France and Japan. 
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4.3 Addressing Research Design Issues 
Multiple regression accommodates multiple metric independent variables and the 
research will use the pre-identified political risk indicators, including the additional 
business environment variables. The analysis will form a set of independent 
variables that forms the regression variate, a linear combination of the 
independent variables that best predicts the dependent variable. Based on the 
concept of minimizing the sum of squared errors of prediction, the analysis will 
be able to identify the “best” independent variables based on the correlation 
coefficient. The higher the correlation coefficient the greater the predictive 
accuracy. The amount of change in the dependent variable due to the 
independent variable is known as the regression coefficient. The regression 
coefficient will identify if the dependency for the various independent variables 
are statistically significant, which in turn will highlight which of the political risk 
indicators are most significant in predicting offshore outsourcing flows (Hair, 
Black, Babin and Anderson, 2011, p. 163). 
In addition, the research will determine the prediction accuracy of the indicators 
on Offshore Outsourcing flows by using the coefficient of determination (R2). The 
power of the multiple regression is referred to as the “probability of detecting a 
statistically significant level of R2 or a regression coefficient at a specified level 
for a specific sample size” (Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2011, p. 174).  The 
R2 represents the combined effects of the variate (all variables) ranging from 1.0 
(perfect prediction) to 0.0 (no prediction). The R2 measure will support the 
research in determining to what extent the individual identified Political Risk 
Indicators impact on the offshore outsourcing location decisions for contract-
based outsourcing. Through the process of analysing the R2 the research will 
further seek to develop the regression equation with the highest predictive 
capability by employing the number of independent variables that optimizes the 
predictive capability.  
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4.3.1 Testing assumptions in multiple regression 
4.3.1.1 Missing data 
As indicated in the section on Country Samples (see Section 4.2.8) there are 
some data completeness constraints with using the Global Competitiveness 
Report and the PRS Group Political Risk Index. Due to the data structure and 
scope not all countries are represented with complete data sets, and the scope 
for GCR limited to the period 2005-2014. Similarly, the varied methods of 
collecting BoP data across national economies does not yield a comprehensive 
set of country BoP data for all countries, with key offshoring destinations not 
having available data. Similarly, some of the variables do not provide complete 
datasets for the time period 2006-2014, with missing data mainly for the periods 
2012-14 and/or 2006-2009. For the purpose of this research the missing data for 
specific years was inserted into SPSS and coded as system-missing data values 
(or blanks), allowing the research to run the regression analysis excluding data 
either list-wise or pair-wise.  
As it is preferred to exclude incomplete data samples list-wise, the first round of 
analysis used the list-wise exclusion methodology, resulting in the availability of 
only 265 cases across the data sets. During the second round of analysis a pair-
wise methodology was applied allowing a sample size ranging from 458 – 828 
cases. As the missing data sets across specific years are considered non-
substantive, it was decided to maintain the pair-wise exclusion approach for this 
research to benefit from the larger number of sample cases to be included in the 
analysis. As the literature highlights potential problems with using the pair-wise 
exclusion approach versus the list-wise exclusion on the basis that, at times, the 
correlations are difficult to compare (Schlomer, Bauman and Card, 2010)  or 
yielding correlations outside the ranges of -1.0 to 1.0 (Pigott, 2001) a full 
comparison of the beta coefficients using both approaches was conducted. As 
per the comparison provided in (Annex C. 9 and10) a linear regression analysis 
was conducted for aggregated offshore outsourcing across the 12 political risk 
variables and the 9 external business variables using both the list-wise and pair-
wise exclusion approach.  
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The comparison yielded no variance in the overall positive or negative 
relationships across the variables, except a marginal variance of for Exchange 
Rate Stability and GDP per Capita which are borderline and both considered 
insignificant in the later analysis. In terms of the impact on relative ranking, a 
second comparison of list-wise versus pair-wise exclusion of political risk 
variables confirmed that the 5 highest and 2 lowest (the most significant findings) 
yielded the same relative ranking outcome, and only marginal ranking differences 
across the four less significant variables. Similarly, the comparison of the external 
business variables confirmed that the two approaches yielded the same outcome 
across the two highest and two lowest ranked variables, while there were minor 
ranking variance across the less significant variables.  
Table 39: Independent variable sample size 
Variable description N 
External Conflict 828 
Corruption 819 
Government Stability 828 
Internal Conflict 828 
Staff Security 814 
Quality of Bureaucracy 828 
Cooperation in labor-employer relations 814 
Intellectual property protection 723 
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes 549 
Burden of customs procedures 729 
Judicial independence 814 
Exchange Rate Stability 827 
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony infrastructure 458 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment 814 
Pillar 4 - Primary Education 814 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training 814 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency 814 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness 819 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size 814 
Pillar 12 - Innovation 814 
GDP per Capita 552 
Overall the comparison provided confirmation that the use of list-wise versus pair-
wise exclusion had no impact on the key outcome of the analysis with only minor 
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ranking variance across the less significant findings. In order to benefit from the 
larger sample size the research therefore is based on the pair-wise approach 
yielding a higher level of generalizability and statistical power through the higher 
sample size.  
4.3.2 Sample size considerations 
In order for the research to have appropriate statistical power at (0.80), the 
sample size would need to be approximately 100 to accommodate 10 
independent variables (Field, 2009). The level of generalizability of the research 
results is also affected by the sample size. A general rule states that the ratio 
should never fall below 5:1, meaning five observations should be made for each 
independent variable applied in the variate, however with a stepwise approach 
this ratio is at times increased up to 50:1 (Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2011, 
p. 175). As the number of observations available in the dependent variable is 
limited by the number of relevant outsourcing economies in the world and annual 
datasets, the research use summated scales for certain independent variables to 
reduce the number of independent variables. The research approach of using a 
backward stepwise method will further reduce the number of independent 
variables in the final model and hence enhance generalizability. With the overall 
sample sizes per independent variable indicated above, the research sample is 
in the range of 40:1 with only three variables in the range of 22:1 – 26:1. For the 
purpose of this research the sample size is considered sufficient as all variables 
represent a ratio > 10:1 to have appropriate statistical power at (0.80). In terms 
of generalizability the 17 out of 21 variables yields a ratio of 40:1 which is within 
range of the conservative target ratio of 50:1 set in the literature (Hair, Black, 
Babin and Anderson, 2011, p. 175).  
4.3.3 Selection of estimation technique 
In selecting the estimation technique, the research considered confirmatory 
specification and sequential specification. As confirmatory specification requires 
an exact set of independent variables to be included, the specification technique 
will not allow for individual assessment of explanatory power. The sequential 
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search methods are comparable in the sense that each variable is individually 
assessed for its contribution to prediction of the dependent variable and added to 
or deleted from the regression model based on relative contribution. The 
sequential methods include Stepwise Elimination; Forward addition and Back 
ward elimination (Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2011, p. 186). 
According to (Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2011), “the primary distinction of 
the stepwise approach from the forward addition and backward elimination 
procedures is its ability to add or delete variables at each stage. In the latter, once 
a variable is added or deleted the action cannot be reversed at a later stage” 
(Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2011, p. 189). The stepwise sequential 
technique will allow the research to identify the independent variables with the 
greatest incremental predictive power among the independent variables already 
in the regression model (Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2011, p. 161), and 
provides the ability to delete and add variables during the process. For the 
stepwise regression conducted in this research the backward method was 
applied, as the forward method runs a higher risk of making Type II error (Hair, 
Black, Babin and Anderson, 2011) and thereby potentially missing important 
predictors that impact on offshore outsourcing decisions. The regression analysis 
is conducted in three stages, providing 3 regression models for each of the 
offshore outsourcing types/FDI flow addressed in the research and used as 
individual dependent variables, including: 
___________________ 
 Consolidated Service Offshore Outsourcing per national economies  
 Consolidated Service Offshore Outsourcing (non-high income countries)  
 BPO export per national economy 
 ITO export per national economy 
 KPO (R&D) export per national economy 
___________________ 
 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflow per national economy 
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Figure 11: Multiple regression flow chart 
Model 1A: Offshore/FDI flow with 
Political Risk Variables
(Forced Entry)
Model 1B: Offshore/FDI flow with External 
Business Variables 
(Forced Entry)
Ranking of relative impact of 
political risk variables
Model 2A: Offshore/FDI with 
political risk variables 
(Backward Stepwise)
Ranking of relative impact of 
External business variables
Model 2B: Offshore/FDI flows with 
external business variables
(Backward Stepwise)
Model 3: Offshore/FDI Complete Model
(Hierarchical Approach Block 1: Key political Risk variables 
& Block 2: Key External Business Variables)
Key risk variables Key risk variables 
 
In Model 1 the political risk and external business variables are inserted into the 
regression analysis in random order using a forced entry approach. The method 
allows for a classification of the individual risk indicators impact on the type of 
offshore outsourcing export flow, providing an indication of relative importance 
across the spectrum of political risks (independent variables). The outcome of 
Model 1 is further matrixed in order of highest to lowest level of impact (+/-) 
providing a clear overview of the relative political risk impacts. 
In Model 2, the research applies a backward stepwise method, inserting the 
political risk indicators in the order of the Model 1 findings, with the highest impact 
risk inserted first, with the objective of isolating the key sets of political risks 
relevant for each segment of Offshore Outsourcing variables. The stage 2 
analysis allows for a systematic reduction of variables using the backward 
stepwise method calculating and comparing the contribution of all the predictors 
using the significance value of the t-test.  
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The significance value is compared to the removal value, and each predictor that 
does not contribute significantly to the outcome is removed and the model 
recalculated accordingly. The Stage 2 regression analysis concludes various 
levels of removal stages for each outsourcing variable, identifying the primary set 
of political risks most relevant for each dependent variable. 
In Model 3, the external business variables are inserted into the regression 
analysis together with the key political risks identified in Model 2 using a 
hierarchical approach. The key Political Risk identified in Model 2 are inserted as 
Block 1 and the external business variables inserted as Block 2. The findings of 
Model 3 consolidates the findings of Model 1 & 2 providing an overview of the 
key political risk indicators relevant for each type of offshore outsourcing activities 
(i.e. ITO, KPO, BPO or aggregate volume of services trade), combined with the 
key external non-political risk control variables relevant for offshore outsourcing 
variable.  
4.4 Validating the Regression Results 
4.4.1 Analysis of aggregate offshore outsourcing flows 
The following section provides an overview of the key findings of Model 1-3 
generated in accordance with the regression model design presented above for 
the aggregated offshore outsourcing service volumes as the Dependent Variable. 
4.4.1.1 Model 1A: Aggregate offshore outsourcing with political risk 
variables 
In Model 1A the political risk variables are inserted into the regression in random 
order using a forced entry approach, allowing for a classification of relative impact 
of the political risks indicators on aggregated offshore outsourcing flows 
(Independent variables). The N-sample size across the 12 indicators were 
between 458 - 828 cases using the pair-wise inclusion approach to manage 
missing data segments in the time sheet data.  
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Table 40: Model 1A - Descriptive statistics  
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Services, Aggregate 7740957284.30 16089295639.18 725 
External Conflict .00 1.00 828 
Corruption .00 1.00 819 
Government Stability .00 1.00 828 
Internal Conflict .00 1.00 828 
Staff Security .00 1.00 814 
Quality of Bureaucracy .00 1.00 828 
Cooperation in labor-employer relations .00 1.00 814 
Intellectual property protection .00 1.00 723 
Efficiency of legal framework  .00 1.00 549 
Burden of customs procedures .00 1.00 729 
Judicial independence .00 1.00 814 
Exchange Rate Stability .00 1.00 827 
As captured in the 1A Model Summary matrix, the analysis yielded an R value of 
.616 indicating the values of the multiple correlation coefficient between the 12 
Political Risk Indicators and the aggregated Offshore Outsourcing export flows 
(dependent variable). The value of the R2, measuring how much of the variability 
in the offshoring outsourcing flows is accounted for by the 12 indicators, is stated 
as .380. This indicates that the 12 political risk indicators account for a total of 
38.0% of the variation in offshore outsourcing flows. The adjusted R2 provides an 
indication of the generalizability of the model and should ideally be very close to 
the R2 value. In this model the difference is small at .38.0 -.36.3-= 0.017 (or 1.7%), 
indicating that if the model was derived from the full population rather than the 
given sample it would account for 1.7% less variance in the outcome.  
Table 41: Model 1A - Summary matrix  
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 
1 .616a .380 .363 12844416079.70 .380 22.151 12 
The F-ratio, measuring the overall significance of the regression model value of 
the model, is indicated at 22.151, which is considered significant at (p<.001). The 
significance level suggests that the regression equation does have validity in 
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fitting the offshore outsourcing data i.e. the independent variables are not purely 
random with respect offshore outsourcing exports.  
The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates the degree to which the assumption of 
independent errors is tenable, or that there should be no autocorrelation between 
observations in the model (Field, 2009, p. 220), meaning relationships between 
values separated from each other by a given time lag in the residuals (prediction 
errors). The statistic indicator ranges in value from 0 to 4. A value near 2 indicates 
non-autocorrelation; a value toward 0 indicates positive autocorrelation; a value 
toward 4 indicates negative autocorrelation. A conservative rule indicates that the 
value should be between 1 and 3, and preferably as close to 2 as possible (Field, 
2009). The Durbin-Watson value for model 1 is indicated at .411, suggesting a 
level of positive correlation between adjacent residuals in the model (Field, 2009). 
The ANOVA provides an overview of the significance of Model 1 containing the 
12 pre-identified political risk predictors of offshore outsourcing export flows of 
services.  
Table 42: Model 1A - ANOVA  
ANOVA Model 1A 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 43853087035531165000000.00 12 3654423919627597000000.00 22.151 .000b 
Overall the current Model 1 containing the pre-identified Political Risk indicators 
can be considered able to explain 38.0% of the offshore outsourcing export flows 
of services, with a significant F-ratio suggesting that the regression equation has 
validity in fitting the offshore outsourcing data flows.  
4.4.1.2 Model 1A: Parameters and coefficients 
The next step of the analysis is to determine the relationship between the 
individual political risk indicators and the offshore outsourcing flows through a 
review of the Beta-values. The Beta values indicates to what degree each of the 
political risk indicators affects the offshoring outsourcing flows, if the effects of all 
other predictors are held constant. As captured in the 1A Coefficients Matrix the 
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beta coefficient can indicate a negative or positive relationship. The standardized 
beta values are measured in standard deviation units and are directly 
comparable, and provides an insight into the importance of the individual 
predictor.  
In addition the matrix captures the t-test values, indicating to what extent the 
political risk indicator is making a significant contribution to the model. The larger 
the value of the t-value the greater the contribution of the political risk as a 
predictor of offshore outsourcing flows. The combined standardized beta value 
and t-test values will form the basis for comparison of the relative significance of 
the individual political risk indicators in the model.  
Table 43: Model 1A - Coefficients matrix  
Model 1A: Coefficients Matrix 
 
Standardized 
Coefficients t 
Beta 
1 
(Constant)  12.742 
External Conflict -.094 -2.075 
Corruption .148 1.869 
Government Stability -.068 -1.567 
Internal Conflict -.167 -3.158 
Staff Security -.065 -1.102 
Quality of Bureaucracy .305 4.260 
Cooperation in labor-employer relations .076 1.391 
Intellectual property protection .692 5.789 
Efficiency of legal frameworks -.096 -.895 
Burden of customs procedures -.379 -4.783 
Judicial independence -.053 -.518 
Exchange Rate Stability .003 .085 
4.4.1.3 Model A: Collinearity levels 
The following section reviews the measures determining whether there is 
collinearity in the data set applied for Model 1. The main guidelines for detecting 
Collinearity includes (Field, 2009): 
 VIF is greater than 10 then there is cause for concern 
 VIF substantially greater than 1 then the regression may be biased  
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 Tolerance below 0.1 indicates a serious problem 
 Tolerance below 0.2 indicates a potential problem 
For the given model the VIF values are below 10 and all tolerance indicators are 
above 1, and most above 2, except Intellectual property protection, Efficiency of 
legal frameworks, Judicial Independence all ranging from 1-2 and hence 
indicating potential collinearity problem. 
As the guidelines for detecting Collinearity indicate a potential problem the data 
sets were reviewed for consistency across Eigen values and any indication of 
Collinearity at the variance proportions. As per the Collinearity Diagnostics matrix 
the Eigen values in the table are much larger than others indicating a potential 
issue with the cross matrix. A further look at the variance proportions highlight 
that the indicators for i) efficiency of legal frameworks; ii) judicial independence 
and iii) irregular payments and bribes have high Variance Proportion values 
between 54 to 63 with small Eigen values. The result of this analysis indicates 
that there is potential Collinearity between the three indicators and this 
dependency results in some level of bias in the model.  
Table 44: Model 1A - Collinearity statistics  
Model 
Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)    
External Conflict -.078 .691 1.447 
Corruption .071 .229 4.361 
Government Stability -.059 .758 1.318 
Internal Conflict -.119 .509 1.963 
Staff Security -.042 .409 2.447 
Quality of Bureaucracy .161 .279 3.581 
Labor-employer relations .053 .483 2.071 
Intellectual property protection .219 .100 9.988 
Efficiency of legal framework  -.034 .125 8.008 
Burden of customs procedures -.181 .228 4.390 
Judicial independence -.020 .137 7.280 
Exchange Rate Stability .003 .949 1.054 
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4.4.1.4 Model 1A: Summary 
In Model 1A the political risk variables were inserted into the regression analysis 
in random order using a forced entry approach. The method allows for a 
classification of the individual risk indicators impact on the type of offshore 
outsourcing export flow, providing an indication of relative importance across the 
spectrum of political risks (independent variables).  
Table 45: Model 1A - Ranking of political risk indicators  
Ranking of Political Risk Indictors in terms of impact on Offshore Outsourcing Flows 
Indicator Description Beta T-value 
Intellectual property protection 0.692 5.789 
Burden of customs procedures -0.379 -4.783 
Quality of Bureaucracy 0.305 4.26 
Internal Conflict -0.167 -3.158 
Corruption 0.148 1.869 
Efficiency of legal frameworks -0.096 -0.895 
External Conflict -0.094 -2.075 
Cooperation in labor-employer relations 0.076 1.391 
Government Stability -0.068 -1.567 
Staff Security -0.065 -1.102 
Judicial independence -0.053 -0.518 
Exchange Rate Stability 0.003 0.085 
The research methodology has provided two main outcomes: Firstly, the 
methodology has allowed for a measure of variability in the offshoring outsourcing 
flows is accounted for by the 12 pre-identified political risk indicators. The findings 
suggest that the 12 political risk indicators combined account for a total of 38.0% 
of the variation in offshore outsourcing flows. With a small difference between R2 
and adjusted R2 value at 1.7% the findings have a high generalizability level and 
an F-ratio of 22.151 suggesting that the regression equation has significant 
validity. Secondly, the methodology has allowed for a measure of the impact of 
each individual Political Risk Indicator as a predictor of offshore outsourcing flows 
allowing for a classification of relative impact. The 12 Political Risk Indicators are 
ranked below in accordance with the standardized Beta coefficients which allows 
for direct comparison. The Beta ranking is further supported by the significance 
value expressed by the corresponding t-values and significance values. 
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Finally, the Durbin-Watson value for model was further reviewed and the analysis 
suggested a positive correlation between adjacent residuals in the model or 
positive autocorrelation, possibly instigated by the use of timesheet data. A 
systematic Collinearity analysis further indicated that there is likely collinearity 
between three indicators namely for i) efficiency of legal frameworks; ii) judicial 
independence and iii) irregular payments and bribes and this dependency results 
in some level of bias in the model. As the next step will include the systematic 
reduction of variables the issue of collinearity will seek to be addressed in the 
later stage of model development. 
4.4.1.5 Model 1B: Aggregate offshore outsourcing with external business 
variables 
Following the same methodology as in Model 1A, the external business variables 
are inserted into the regression in random order using a forced entry approach, 
allowing for a classification of relative impact of the external business variables 
on aggregated offshore outsourcing flows (dependent variable). The N-sample 
size across the 9 external business variables were between 458 - 819 cases 
using the pair-wise inclusion approach to manage missing data segments in the 
time sheet data.  
Table 46: Model 1B - Descriptive statistics for external business variables  
Non-Political location indicators Mean Std. Deviation N 
Services, Aggregate 7740957284.31 16089295639.19 725 
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony infrastructure .00 1.00 458 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment .00 1.00 814 
Pillar 4 - Primary Education .00 1.00 814 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training .00 1.00 814 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency .00 1.00 814 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness .00 1.00 819 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size .00 1.00 814 
Pillar 12 - Innovation .00 1.00 814 
GDP per Capita .00 1.00 552 
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As captured in the 1B summary matrix the analysis yielded an R value of .740 
indicating the values of the multiple correlation coefficient between the 9 external 
business variables and the aggregated Offshore Outsourcing export flows 
(dependent variable). The value of the R2, measuring how much of the variability 
in the offshoring outsourcing flows is accounted for by the 10 indicators, is stated 
as .548. This indicates that the 10 external business variables account for a total 
of 54.8% of the variation in offshore outsourcing flows. The adjusted the R2 
provides an indication of the generalizability of the model and should ideally be 
very close to the R2 value. In this model the difference is small at .548 -.536-= 
0.012 (or 1.2%), indicating that if the model was derived from the full population 
rather than the given sample it would account for 1.2% less variance in the 
outcome.  
Table 47: Model 1B - Summary statistics for external business variables  
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .740a .548 .536 .548 46.558 9 346 .000 .486 
The F-ratio, measuring the overall significance of the regression model value is 
indicated at 46.558, which is considered significant (p<.001). The significance 
level suggests that the regression equation does have validity in fitting the 
offshore outsourcing data i.e. the independent variables are not random with 
respect offshore outsourcing exports.  
The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates the degree to which the assumption of 
independent errors is tenable, or that there should be no autocorrelation between 
observations in the model (Field 2009, p. 220), meaning relationships between 
values separated from each other by a given time lag in the residuals (prediction 
errors). The statistic indicator ranges in value from 0 to 4. A value near 2 indicates 
non-autocorrelation; a value toward 0 indicates positive autocorrelation; a value 
toward 4 indicates negative autocorrelation. A conservative rule indicates that the 
value should be between 1 and 3, and preferably as close to 2 as possible (Field, 
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2009). The Durbin-Watson value for model 1 is indicated at .486, suggesting a 
level of positive correlation between adjacent residuals in the model (Field, 2009). 
The ANOVA provides an overview of the significance of Model 1B containing the 
10 pre-identified external business variables of offshore outsourcing export flows 
of services.  
Table 48: Model 1B - ANOVA for external business variables  
ANOVA Model 1B F Sig. 
1 Regression 46.558 .000b 
 
4.4.1.6 Model 1B: Parameters and coefficients 
As captured in the 1B Coefficients matrix the beta coefficient can indicate a 
negative or positive relationship. The standardized beta values are measured in 
standard deviation units and are directly comparable, and provides an insight into 
the importance of the individual predictor.  
Table 49: Model 1B - Coefficient matrix for external business variables  
1B Coefficients matrix 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant)  13.326 .000   
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony 
infrastructure 
.073 .674 .501 .111 8.972 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment -.221 -5.062 .000 .688 1.453 
Pillar 4 - Primary Education .009 .129 .897 .289 3.457 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training -.244 -2.083 .038 .096 10.466 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency .156 3.094 .002 .511 1.957 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness .131 .955 .340 .069 14.431 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size .491 10.983 .000 .654 1.528 
Pillar 12 - Innovation .312 3.589 .000 .173 5.775 
GDP per Capita .099 1.361 .174 .246 4.069 
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In addition the matrix captures the t-test values, indicating to what extent the 
political risk indicator is making a significant contribution to the model. The larger 
the value of the t-value the greater the contribution of the political risk as a 
predictor of offshore outsourcing flows. The combined standardized beta value 
and t-test values will form the basis for comparison of the relative significance of 
the individual political risk indicators in the model.  
4.4.1.7 Model 1B: Collinearity levels 
For the given model the VIF values are below 10, except for Pillar 5 - Higher 
education and training and Pillar 9 - Technological readiness, which also has 
tolerance values < .1 indicating potential problem with Collinearity between the 
two indicators. 
In Model 1B the external business variables were inserted into the regression 
analysis in random order using a forced entry approach. The method allows for a 
classification of the individual indicators impact on the aggregated offshore 
outsourcing export flow, providing an indication of relative importance across the 
spectrum of external business variables independent variables. The research 
methodology has provided two main outcomes: 
Firstly, the methodology has allowed for a measure of variability in the offshoring 
outsourcing flows as accounted for by the 9 variables. The findings suggest that 
the external business variables combined account for a total of 54.8% of the 
variation in offshore outsourcing flows. With a small difference between R2 and 
adjusted R2 value at 1.2% the findings have a high generalizability level and an 
F-ratio of 46.558 suggesting that the regression equation has significant validity.  
Secondly, the methodology has allowed for a measure of the impact of each 
individual external business variable as a predictor of offshore outsourcing flows 
allowing for a classification of relative impact. The 9 variables are ranked below 
in accordance with the standardized Beta coefficients which allows for direct 
comparison. The Beta ranking is further supported by the significance value 
expressed by the corresponding t-values and significance values.  
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Table 50: Model 1B - Ranking of external business variables  
Ranking of external business variables in terms of impact on Offshore Outsourcing Flows 
Indicator Description Beta T-value Sig. 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size 0.491 10.983 0 
Pillar 12 - Innovation 0.312 3.589 0 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training -0.244 -2.083 0.038 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment -0.221 -5.062 0 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency 0.156 3.094 0.002 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness 0.131 0.955 0.340 
GDP per Capita 0.099 1.361 0.174 
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony infrastructure 0.073 0.674 0.501 
Pillar 4 - Primary Education 0.009 0.129 0.897 
Finally, the Durbin-Watson value for model was further reviewed and the analysis 
suggested a positive correlation between adjacent residuals in the model or 
positive autocorrelation, possibly instigated by the use of timesheet data. A 
systematic Collinearity analysis further indicated that there is likely Collinearity 
between Pillar 5 - Higher education and training and Pillar 9 - Technological 
readiness. 
4.4.1.8 Model 2A: Variables backward stepwise 
In Model 2A, the research applied a backward stepwise method, inserting the 
political risk indicators in the order of the Model 1A findings above, with the 
highest scoring Beta indicator inserted first, with the objective of isolating the key 
sets of political risks relevant for each segment of Offshore Outsourcing types. 
The stage 2 analysis allowed for a systematic reduction of variables using the 
backward stepwise method calculating and comparing the contribution of all the 
predictors using the significance value of the t-test. The Stage 2 regression 
analysis concluded various levels (7 models) of removal stages, identifying the 
primary set of political risk indictors most predictive for the aggregated offshore 
outsourcing data set. 
As captured in the model 2A summary matrix the analysis yielded an R value of 
.609 indicating that values of the multiple correlation coefficient between the now 
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6 key Political Risk Indicators and the aggregated Offshore Outsourcing export 
flows (dependent variable). The value of the R2, measuring how much of the 
variability in the offshoring outsourcing flows is accounted for by the 6 indicators, 
is stated as .370, which is only 0.01 less than for Model 1 with all the 12 indicators. 
This indicates that the key political risk indicators account for a total of 37.0 % of 
the variation in offshore outsourcing flows. The difference between the R2 and 
adjusted R2 is small at .370-.36.2-= 0.008 (or 0.8%), indicating that if the model 
was derived from the full population rather than the given sample it would account 
for less than 1% variance in the outcome.  
Table 51: Model 2A - Summary matrix  
 
Model 2A Summary matrix  – Political Risk in Aggregate Services 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 
1 .616a .380 .363 12844416079.70 .380 22.151 12 
2 .616b .380 .364 12829751012.74 .000 .007 1 
3 .616c .379 .365 12819096151.85 .000 .276 1 
4 .614d .377 .365 12825497250.84 -.002 1.437 1 
5 .612e .375 .364 12834728951.11 -.002 1.631 1 
6 .611f .374 .364 12833234514.51 -.001 .898 1 
7 .609g .370 .362 12853580269.78 -.003 2.396 1 
The F-ratio, measuring the overall significance of the regression model value of 
the model, is indicated at 22.151, which is considered significant (p<.001). The 
significance level suggests that the regression equation does have validity in 
fitting the offshore outsourcing data i.e. the independent variables are not random 
with respect to offshore outsourcing exports.  
The Durbin-Watson statistic has been reduced from at .411 in Model 1 to .363 in 
Model 2A indicating a positive auto correlation has been increased with the 
reduction of predictors. 
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Table 52: Model 2A - Change statistics  
Model 
Change Statistics 
df2 Sig. F Change Durbin-Watson 
1 434 .000  
2 434 .932  
3 435 .600  
4 436 .231  
5 437 .202  
6 438 .344  
7 439 .122 .363 
4.4.1.9 Model 2A: Parameters and coefficients 
A review of the Model 2A Beta-values indicates to what degree each of the 
political risk indicators affects the offshoring outsourcing flows, if the effects of all 
other predictors are held constant. As captured in the matrix below the beta 
coefficient can indicate a negative or positive relationship. The standardized beta 
values are measured in standard deviation units and are directly comparable, and 
provides an insight into the importance of the individual predictor.  
In addition the matrix captures the t-test values, indicating to what extent the 
political risk indicator is making a significant contribution to the model. The larger 
the value of the t-value the greater the contribution of the political risk as a 
predictor of offshore outsourcing flows. The combined standardized beta value 
and t-test values will form the basis for comparison of the relative significance of 
the individual political risk indicators in the model.  
As captured in the model the beta coefficient indicates a very significant positive 
relationship between locations with strong Intellectual Property Protection 
regulations and high Quality of Bureaucracy, and that of offshore outsourcing 
exports of services. Similarly, there is a significant negative relationship between 
the Burden of Customs Procedures and offshore outsourcing exports of services.  
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Table 53: Model 2A - Coefficients and collinearity statistics  
Model 
Std  
Coeff. 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Beta 
Zero-
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
7 (Constant)  12.733 .000      
Intellectual property 
protection 
.618 7.352 .000 .477 .331 .278 .202 4.942 
Burden of customs 
procedures 
-.352 -4.841 .000 .297 -.225 -.183 .270 3.700 
Quality of Bureaucracy .353 5.885 .000 .503 .270 .223 .397 2.519 
Internal Conflict -.153 -3.145 .002 .051 -.148 -.119 .604 1.654 
External Conflict -.100 -2.246 .025 -.012 -.106 -.085 .716 1.397 
Government Stability -.078 -1.950 .052 -.111 -.093 -.074 .892 1.121 
In addition there is indication of a negative relationship between Internal and 
External Conflict, plus Government stability and that of offshore outsourcing 
exports of services. However it should be noted that the Sig. value for specifically 
External Conflict and Government Stability becomes relatively high indicating a 
lesser impact on the predictive ability of the indicator in the model. 
4.4.1.10 Model 2A: Collinearity levels 
 As Model 1A indicated potential concerns with Collinearity a similar review 
of Model 2A is required to measure the impact of reducing the number of 
independent variables in the analysis, as per the guidelines for detecting 
Collinearity including (Field 2009): 
 If the largest VIF is greater than 10 then there is cause for concern 
 If the average VIF is substantially greater than 1 then the regression may 
be biased  
 Tolerance below 0.1 indicates a serious problem 
 Tolerance below 0.2 indicates a potential problem 
On review of Model 2A values it is clear that the potential for Collinearity has been 
substantially reduced as all VIF numbers are <10 and all tolerance levels now 
>0.2. While the average VIF remains greater than 1, it has been substantially 
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reduced from Model 1 and hence lowered the likelihood that the regression may 
be biased. 
4.4.1.11 Model 2B: External business variables backward stepwise 
In Model 2B, the research applied a backward stepwise method, inserting the 
external business variables similarly as in 2A, with the highest scoring Beta 
indicator inserted first, with the objective of isolating the key sets of external 
business variables relevant for the aggregate offshore outsourcing volumes. The 
analysis allowed for a systematic identification of the primary set of non-political 
risk indictors most predictive for the aggregated offshore outsourcing data set. 
As captured in the Model 2B summary matrix, the analysis yielded an R value of 
.738 indicating that values of the multiple correlation coefficient between the 9 
key external business variables and the aggregated Offshore Outsourcing export 
flows (dependent variable). The value of the R2, measuring how much of the 
variability in the offshoring outsourcing flows is accounted for by the reduced 
variables, is stated as .544, which is only 0.004 less than for Model 1B. This 
indicates that the 6 key external business variables account for a total of 53.6 % 
of the variation in offshore outsourcing flows. The difference between the R2 and 
adjusted R2 is small at .544 -.536-= 0.008 (or 0.8%), indicating that if the model 
was derived from the full population rather than the given sample it would account 
for less than 1% variance in the outcome.  
Table 54: Model 2B - Summary matrix for external business variables  
Model 2B summary matrix 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .740a .548 .536 .548 46.558 9 346 .000  
2 .740b .548 .537 .000 .017 1 346 .897  
3 .740c .547 .538 -.001 .579 1 347 .447  
4 .738d .544 .536 -.003 2.072 1 348 .151 .334 
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The F-ratio, measuring the overall significance of the regression model value of 
the model, is indicated at 46.558, which is considered significant (p<.001) with a 
Durbin-Watson statistic at .334 indicating a positive auto correlation among some 
of the variables. 
Table 55: Model 2B - Coefficients and collinearity statistics  
Model 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant)  13.333 .000   
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment -.203 -4.902 .000 .764 1.310 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training -.224 -2.521 .012 .165 6.065 
Pillar 7 - Labour market efficiency .147 2.952 .003 .528 1.895 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness .256 2.668 .008 .142 7.059 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size .485 11.019 .000 .675 1.481 
Pillar 12 - Innovation .327 4.020 .000 .197 5.067 
 
4.4.1.12 Model 2B: Collinearity levels 
On review of Model 2B all VIF numbers are <10 and most tolerance levels now 
>0.2, except Pillar 5 - Higher education and training, Pillar 9 - Technological 
readiness and Pillar 12 – Innovation. It is noted that the average VIF remains 
greater than 1 indicating that the regression may be slightly internally biased. 
 
4.4.1.13 Model 3: Aggregate offshore outsourcing complete model 
In Model 3, the six external business variables identified in Model 2B (Macro 
Environment, Higher education and training, Labour market efficiency, 
Technological readiness, Domestic Market Size and Innovation levels, are added 
into the regression analysis together with the key risks identified in Model 2A 
(Intellectual property protection, Burden of customs procedures, Quality of 
Bureaucracy, Internal Conflict, External Conflict and Government Stability) using 
a hierarchical approach. The findings of Model 3 consolidates the findings of 
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Model 1 & 2 providing an overview of the key political risk indicators relevant for 
offshore outsourcing activities combined with the key external business variables. 
 
4.4.1.14 Model 3: Descriptive statistics 
As captured in the Model 3 Summary matrix, the analysis yielded an R value of 
.749 indicating that values of the multiple correlation coefficient between the 
combined 5 Political Risk Indicators and 6 external business variables, and the 
aggregated Offshore Outsourcing export flows (dependent variable). The value 
of the R2, measuring how much of the variability in the offshoring outsourcing 
flows is accounted for by the 11 indicators, is stated as .561 This indicates that 
the combined 5 Political Risk Indicators and 6 external business variables 
account for a total of 56.1% of the variation in offshore outsourcing flows. The 
adjusted the R2 provides an indication of the generalizability of the model and 
should ideally be very close to the R2 value. In this model the difference is small 
at .561-.553 = 0.008 (or 0.8%), indicating that if the model was derived from the 
full population rather than the given sample it would account for 0.8% less 
variance in the outcome.  
The model further indicates that the identified key political risk account 
independently for 33.7% of the variation of offshore outsourcing flows, however 
with the added external business variables the model account for an additional 
22.4% of the variation, totally at a predicative power of 55.3%.  
Table 56: Model 3 - Summary matrix  
Model 3 Summary matrix 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .580a .337 .331 .337 62.878 5 619 .000  
2 .749b .561 .553 .224 52.257 6 613 .000 .398 
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The change in F-ratio, measuring the overall significance of the regression model 
value of the political risk model, was in Block 1 indicated at 62.878, which is 
considered significant (p<.001). The F-change value for the combined model 
indicates that with the added location variables in Block 2 the model has improved 
with an F-ratio of 52.257. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates the degree to which the assumption of 
independent errors is tenable, meaning that there should be no autocorrelation 
between observations in the model (Field 2009, p. 220), meaning relationships 
between values separated from each other by a given time lag in the residuals 
(prediction errors). The statistic indicator ranges in value from 0 to 4. A value near 
2 indicates non-autocorrelation; a value toward 0 indicates positive 
autocorrelation; a value toward 4 indicates negative autocorrelation. A 
conservative rule indicates that the value should be between 1 and 3, and 
preferably as close to 2 as possible (Field 2009). The Durbin-Watson value for 
model 1 is indicated at .398, suggesting a positive correlation between adjacent 
residuals in the model (Field, 2009). 
Table 57: Model 3 - ANOVA  
ANOVA Model 3 df F Sig. 
1 Regression 5 62.878 .000b 
Residual 619   
Total 624   
2 Regression 11 71.285 .000c 
Residual 613   
Total 624   
The ANOVA provides an overview of the significance of Model 3 containing the 
predictors of offshore outsourcing export flows of services. For the initial model 
the value of F is 62.878 which indicates that the correlation is unlikely to have 
happened by chance and also highly significant (p<0.01). For the second model 
the value of F is higher at 71.285, which can be interpreted as while the initial 
model significantly improved the ability to predict offshore outsourcing flows, the 
second model added some value as the F-ratio is more significant.  
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4.4.1.15 Model 3: Parameters and coefficients 
A review of the Model 3 Beta-values indicates to what degree each of the political 
risk and external business variables affect the offshoring outsourcing flows, if the 
effects of all other predictors are held constant. The below matrix captures the 
positive and negative standardized beta coefficients for the key variables 
identified in the analysis, including the t-value and significance values indicating 
the predictability and strength of the individual indicators.  
Table 58: Model 3 – Coefficients and collinearity statistics 
Model 
Std. 
Coeff. 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)  14.711 .000   
External Conflict -.120 -3.108 .002 .722 1.385 
Government Stability -.064 -1.859 .064 .897 1.115 
Internal Conflict -.175 -4.180 .000 .610 1.640 
Quality of Bureaucracy .353 6.791 .000 .397 2.519 
Intellectual property protection .334 6.411 .000 .394 2.540 
2 (Constant)  17.998 .000   
External Conflict .013 .373 .709 .634 1.577 
Government Stability -.045 -1.434 .152 .723 1.382 
Internal Conflict .025 .638 .524 .454 2.204 
Quality of Bureaucracy .199 4.135 .000 .309 3.237 
Intellectual property protection .022 .347 .729 .182 5.487 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment -.170 -5.222 .000 .676 1.480 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training -.332 -4.569 .000 .136 7.371 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency .152 4.055 .000 .512 1.953 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness .212 2.813 .005 .126 7.917 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size .516 13.862 .000 .516 1.939 
Pillar 12 - Innovation .239 3.193 .001 .128 7.818 
4.4.1.16 Model 3: Collinearity levels 
While the initial models with the full scope of variables had issues with Collinearity 
the final Model 3 presents VIF values well below 10, and all tolerance indicators 
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are above 1, and most above 2, except Intellectual property protection, ICT use, 
Higher Education and training, Technological readiness and Innovation. For the 
political risk indicators alone the VIF values well below 10, and all tolerance 
indicators are above 1, and an average not substantially higher than 1 ( at 1.84 
only), indicating that Collinearity across the political risk indicators has been 
addressed, while some bias may persist among the external business variables.  
4.4.1.17 Model 3: Summary of offshore outsourcing political risk and 
external business variables 
Through the process of linear regression analysis the research has firstly ranked 
the 12 key political risk variables identified in the P2 exploratory research in 
accordance with their ability to predict offshore outsourcing flows across 
approximately 100 sample countries over the time period from 2006-2013. 
Secondly, the research applied backward step-wise linear regression to identify 
the key most predictive political risk variables, limiting the variable set to five 
variables including Quality of Bureaucracy; Intellectual Property Protection; 
Internal Conflict, External Conflict and Government Stability with a combined R2 
value of .331, meaning with a predicative ability of 33.1%.  
As indicated in the matrix and in isolation from the external business variables 
(Model 1), the model indicates a positive correlation between offshore 
outsourcing flows and improved Quality of Bureaucracy (highest t-value and 
significant at <.001) and improved Intellectual Property Protection (Second 
highest t-value and significant at <.001). In turn the model indicates a negative 
correlation between improved conditions of Internal Conflict (third highest t-value 
and significant at <.001), and also External Conflict and level of Government 
Stability (with less significant Beta values, and low T-value and non-significant at 
>.001. 
For the external business variables the model beta coefficients indicates a 
significant positive relationship between locations with high levels of Labour 
market efficiency, capacity for Innovation and presenting a larger Domestic 
Market Size (all with high t-values and significant at <.001). In addition 
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Technological Readiness scores a high Beta and t-value, however the 
significance level is slightly lower at <.005.  There also appears to be a negative 
correlation between offshore outsourcing flows and improved levels of higher 
education and more stable macro environment variables (both with high t-values 
and significant at <.001). 
4.4.2 Part 1B: Political risk variables in low cost countries 
As further to the analysis provided on the overall sample of countries with 
outsourcing activities, the research also explored the particular political risk 
dynamics around offshore outsourcing to low-cost countries. For the purpose of 
making a distinction among the labour cost implications of offshore outsourcing 
location decisions, a set of dummy variables for classification of cost drivers was 
inserted into the data sample. The dummy variable allowed the classification of 
high income countries (High Income OECD and non-OECD countries) and a non-
high income sample including Low, Lower Middle and upper middle income 
country samples. 
Table 59: Selection criteria for low-cost country sample 
No. Distribution of income-based sample  
 Dummy Variable Name Time Series Definition of Data Source  
1. Low Income 2006-2013 As per GCI classification 2013-14 
2. Lower Middle Income 2006-2013 As per GCI classification 2013-14 
3. Upper middle income 2006-2013 As per GCI classification 2013-14 
4. High Income 2006-2013 As per GCI classification 2013-14 
 
For the purpose of comparing risk dynamics across the overall offshore 
outsourcing sample with the non-high income sample, the same methodology 
was applied for the new adjusted sample data. 
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4.4.2.1 Model 1A: Aggregate offshore outsourcing with political risk 
variables in low cost countries 
In Model 1A the political risk variables are again inserted into the regression in 
random order using a forced entry approach, allowing for a reclassification of 
relative impact of the political risks indicators on aggregated offshore outsourcing 
flows for non-high income countries. To reduce the level of collinearity across the 
variables experienced in the previous model, the independent variable for Judicial 
Independence and Burden of Customs were removed from the analysis as they 
appeared too similar to the variables on Efficiency of contract enforcement and 
Bureaucracy respectively. The N-sample size across the now 10 indicators were 
between 314-476 cases using the pair-wise inclusion approach to manage 
missing data segments in the time sheet data.  
4.4.2.2 Model 1A: Descriptive statistics 
The following section reviews the descriptive statistics for political risk in low-cost 
offshore outsourcing. 
Table 60: Model 1A - Descriptive statistics (low-cost) 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Services, Aggregate 2572815539.80 9326034959.99 415 
External Conflict -.1685923 .99369878 476 
Corruption -.5543222 .46234565 476 
Government Stability .0209986 1.02664828 476 
Internal Conflict -.3787688 .98500161 476 
Staff Security -.5511801 .81249117 464 
Quality of Bureaucracy -.6059237 .62287107 476 
Labor-employer relations -.2585089 .77458706 464 
Intellectual property protection -.5885314 .58841941 412 
Efficiency of legal framework  -.3494706 .68824467 314 
Exchange Rate Stability -.0490567 1.11487117 475 
4.4.2.3 Model 1A: Summary matrix 
As captured in the 1A Model Summary matrix, the analysis yielded an R value of 
.440 indicating the values of the multiple correlation coefficient between the 10 
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Political Risk Indicators and the low-cost country Offshore Outsourcing export 
flows (dependent variable). The value of the R2, measuring how much of the 
variability in the offshoring outsourcing flows is accounted for by the 10 indicators, 
is stated as .193, indicates that the 10 political risk indicators account for a total 
of 19.3%, less than the 38.0% for the full sample size. The adjusted the R2 
provides an indication of the generalizability of the model and should ideally be 
very close to the R2 value. In this model the generalizability is stated at .193-
.160= .0033 or 3.3%, which is less than for the full sample model small at .38.0 -
.36.3-= 0.017 (or 1.7%). 
Table 61: Model 1A - Summary matrix (Low-cost) 
R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
.440 .193 .160 .193 5.830 10 243 .000 .545 
The F-ratio, measuring the overall significance of the regression model value of 
the model, is indicated at 5.830 compared the 22.151 for the previous model, 
while still considered significant (p<.001). The significance level suggests that the 
regression equation does have validity in fitting the offshore outsourcing data i.e. 
the independent variables are not purely random with respect offshore 
outsourcing exports. The Durbin-Watson value for model 1 is indicated at .545, 
suggesting a level of positive correlation between adjacent residuals in the model 
(Field 2009). 
The ANOVA provides an overview of the significance of Model 1 containing the 
10 pre-identified political risk predictors of offshore outsourcing export flows of 
services.  
Table 62: Model 1A - ANOVA (low cost) 
Model ANOVA Df F Sig. 
1 
Regression 10 5.830 .000b 
Residual 243   
Total 253   
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Overall the current Model 1 containing the pre-identified Political Risk indicators 
can be considered able to explain 19.3% of the offshore outsourcing export flows 
of services to non-high income countries, with a significant F-ratio suggesting that 
the regression equation has validity in fitting the offshore outsourcing data flows. 
4.4.2.4 Model 1A: Parameters and coefficients 
The next step of the analysis is to determine the relationship between the 
individual political risk indicators and the offshore outsourcing flows to low-
income countries through a review of the Beta-values. In addition the matrix 
captures the t-test values, indicating to what extent the political risk indicator is 
making a significant contribution to the model. The larger the value of the t-value 
the greater the contribution of the political risk as a predictor of offshore 
outsourcing flows. The combined standardized beta value and t-test values will 
form the basis for comparison of the relative significance of the individual political 
risk indicators in the model.  
Table 63: Model 1A - Coefficients and collinearity statistics (Low cost) 
Model 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)  6.348 .000   
External Conflict .046 .657 .512 .679 1.472 
Corruption .023 .356 .722 .766 1.306 
Government Stability -.029 -.466 .641 .831 1.204 
Internal Conflict -.284 -3.985 .000 .654 1.528 
Staff Security .162 2.464 .014 .766 1.306 
Quality of Bureaucracy .283 4.456 .000 .820 1.219 
Labor-employer relations .124 2.049 .042 .904 1.106 
Intellectual property protection .207 1.941 .053 .291 3.434 
Efficiency of legal frameworks -.194 -1.701 .090 .254 3.933 
Exchange Rate Stability -.009 -.156 .877 .951 1.051 
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4.4.2.5 Model 1A: Collinearity levels 
For the given model the VIF values are now well below 10 and all tolerance 
indicators are above 2 indicating that the potential collinearity problem across the 
variables experienced in the full sample model in previous section, has been 
addressed in the revised model.  
4.4.2.6 Model 1A: Summary 
In Model 1A the political risk variables were inserted into the regression analysis 
in random order using a forced entry approach, allowing for classification of the 
individual risk indicators impact across the spectrum of political risks 
(independent variables). The findings suggest a strong and significant 
relationship (positive) with Quality of Bureaucracy and strong and significant 
relationship (negative) with the presence of internal conflict risks in the context of 
non-high income countries. 
Table 64: Model 1A - Ranking of political risk (low cost) 
Ranking of Political Risk impact on Offshore Outsourcing Flows – Low Cost Countries 
Indicator Description Beta T-value Sig. 
Toleranc
e 
VIF 
Internal Conflict -0.284 -3.985 0 0.654 1.528 
Quality of Bureaucracy 0.283 4.456 0 0.82 1.219 
Intellectual property protection 0.207 1.941 0.053 0.291 3.434 
Efficiency of legal frameworks -0.194 -1.701 0.09 0.254 3.933 
Staff Security 0.162 2.464 0.014 0.766 1.306 
Cooperation in labor-employer relations 0.124 2.049 0.042 0.904 1.106 
External Conflict 0.046 0.657 0.512 0.679 1.472 
Government Stability -0.029 -0.466 0.641 0.831 1.204 
Corruption 0.023 0.356 0.722 0.766 1.306 
Exchange Rate Stability -0.009 -0.156 0.877 0.951 1.051 
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4.4.2.7 Model 1B: Aggregate offshore outsourcing with external business 
variables in low cost countries 
Following the same methodology as in Model 1A, the external business variables 
were inserted into the regression in random order using a forced entry approach, 
allowing for a classification of relative impact of the external business variables 
on aggregated offshore outsourcing flows in low cost countries (dependent 
variable). The N-sample size across the 9 non-political indicators were between 
262 - 464 cases using the pair-wise inclusion approach to manage missing data 
segments in the time sheet data.  
Table 65: Model 1B - Descriptive statistics for business variables (low cost) 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Services, Aggregate 2572815539.79 9326034959.99 415 
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony infrastructure -.6768870 .74782762 262 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment -.3392918 .94890551 464 
Pillar 4 - Primary Education -.5623528 .85836653 464 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training -.6615247 .68909872 464 
Pillar 7 - Labour market efficiency -.3883300 .80902884 464 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness -.6658857 .54972926 468 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size -.2008328 .93309187 464 
Pillar 12 - Innovation -.5702882 .45796385 464 
GDP per Capita -.6247402 .15680077 317 
4.4.2.8 Model 1B: Summary matrix 
As captured in the 1B summary matrix the analysis yielded an R value of .650 
indicating the values of the multiple correlation coefficient between the 9 external 
business variables and the aggregated Offshore Outsourcing export flows 
(dependent variable). The value of the R2, is stated as .423, indicating that the 9 
external business variables account for a total of 42.3% of the variation in offshore 
outsourcing flows for low cost countries. The adjusted the R2 provides an 
indication of the generalizability of the model and is stated at .423-.395= 0.027 
(or 2.7%), indicating that if the model was derived from the full population rather 
than the given sample it would account for 2.7% less variance in the outcome.  
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Table 66: Model 1B - Summary Statistics for business variables (low cost) 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Change Statistics Durbin-
Watso
n 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
.650
a 
.423 .395 .423 15.608 9 192 .000 .454 
 
The F-ratio, measuring the overall significance of the regression model value of 
the model, is indicated at 15.608 and considered significant (.000). The Durbin-
Watson statistic value for model 1 is indicated at .454, suggesting a level of 
positive correlation between adjacent residuals in the model (Field, 2009). 
The ANOVA provides an overview of the significance of Model 1B containing the 
9 pre-identified external business variables of offshore outsourcing export flows 
of services.  
Table 67: Model 1B - ANOVA for external business variables (low cost) 
Model df F Sig. 
1 Regression 9 15.608 .000 
Residual 192   
Total 201   
4.4.2.9 Model 1B: Parameters and coefficients 
As captured in 1B Coefficients matrix the beta coefficient can indicate a negative 
or positive relationship. The standardized beta values are measured in standard 
deviation units and are directly comparable, and provides an insight into the 
importance of the individual predictor. In addition the matrix captures the t-test 
values, indicating to what extent the political risk indicator is making a significant 
contribution to the model.  
The larger the t-value the greater the contribution of the political risk as a predictor 
of offshore outsourcing flows. The combined standardized beta value and t-test 
values will form the basis for comparison of the relative significance of the 
individual political risk indicators in the model.  
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Table 68: Model 1B - Coefficients and collinearity statistics  
Model 
Std. Coeff. 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)  -2.627 .009   
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony infrastructure -.486 -3.790 .000 .183 5.471 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment .036 .522 .602 .616 1.622 
Pillar 4 - Primary Education .132 1.760 .080 .534 1.872 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training .280 2.353 .020 .212 4.708 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency .076 1.175 .241 .715 1.399 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness .413 3.259 .001 .187 5.345 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size .536 7.646 .000 .612 1.634 
Pillar 12 - Innovation -.016 -.199 .842 .443 2.258 
GDP per Capita -.417 -4.546 .000 .358 2.793 
4.4.2.10 Model 1B: Collinearity levels 
For the given model the VIF values are below 10 and tolerance levels above 0.2, 
except for Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony infrastructure and Pillar 9 - 
Technological readiness the tolerance levels are slightly lower than 0.2 indicating 
a potential problem with Collinearity between the two indicators. 
4.4.2.10.1 Model 1B: Summary  
Secondly, the methodology has allowed for a measure of the impact of each 
individual external business variable as a predictor of offshore outsourcing flows 
allowing for a classification of relative impact. The 9 variables are ranked below 
in accordance with the standardized Beta coefficients which allows for direct 
comparison.  
The Beta ranking is further supported by the significance value expressed by the 
corresponding t-values and significance values. The ranking suggests a high 
(positive) and significant relationship with Domestic Market size and 
Technological Readiness, plus a significant relationship (negative) with Electricity 
and telephony infrastructure and GDP levels.  
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Table 69: Model 1B - Ranking of business variables (low cost) 
Indicator Description Beta T-value Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size 0.536 7.646 0 0.612 1.634 
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony -0.486 -3.79 0 0.183 5.471 
GDP per Capita -0.417 -4.546 0 0.358 2.793 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness 0.413 3.259 0.001 0.187 5.345 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training 0.280 2.353 0.02 0.212 4.708 
Pillar 4 - Primary Education 0.132 1.76 0.08 0.534 1.872 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency 0.076 1.175 0.241 0.715 1.399 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment 0.036 0.522 0.602 0.616 1.622 
Pillar 12 - Innovation -0.016 -0.199 0.842 0.443 2.258 
4.4.2.11 Model 2A: Variables backward stepwise (low cost) 
In Model 2A, the research applied a backward stepwise method, inserting the 
political risk indicators in the order of the Model 1A findings above, with the 
highest scoring Beta indicator inserted first, with the objective of isolating the key 
sets of political risks relevant for each segment of Offshore Outsourcing types. 
The stage 2 analysis allowed for a systematic reduction of variables using the 
backward stepwise method calculating and comparing the contribution of all the 
predictors using the significance value of the t-test.  
As captured in the model 2A summary matrix the analysis yielded a final R value 
of .437 indicating that values of the multiple correlation coefficient between the 
now 6 key Political Risk Indicators and the aggregated Offshore Outsourcing 
export flows (dependent variable). The value of the R2, measuring how much of 
the variability in the offshoring outsourcing flows is accounted for by the remaining 
6 indicators, is stated as .191, which is only 0.02 less than for Model 1 with all the 
initial 10 indicators. This indicates that the key political risk indicators account for 
a total of 19.1% of the variation in offshore outsourcing flows. The difference 
between the R2 and adjusted R2 is .191-.171= 0.020 (or 2.0%), indicating that if 
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the model was derived from the full population rather than the given sample it 
would account for less than 2% variance in the outcome.  
Table 70: Model 2A - Summary statistics (low cost) 
Mode
l 
R R 
Squar
e 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Change Statistics Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 .440 .193 .160 .193 5.830 10 243 .000  
2 .440 .193 .164 .000 .024 1 243 .877  
3 .439 .193 .167 .000 .134 1 244 .715  
4 .438 .192 .169 -.001 .220 1 245 .639  
5 .437 .191 .171 -.001 .454 1 246 .501 .539 
The Durbin-Watson statistic is stated at .539 indicating a positive auto correlation 
has been increased with the reduction of predictors. 
4.4.2.12 Model 2A: Parameters and coefficients 
A review of the Model 2A Beta-values indicates to what degree each of the 
political risk indicators affects the offshoring outsourcing flows in the context of 
low-cost countries, if the effects of all other predictors are held constant.  
As captured in the model the beta coefficient indicates a very significant positive 
relationship between locations with high Quality of Bureaucracy and a significant 
negative relationship between Internal Conflict and non-high-cost locations for 
offshore outsourcing exports of services.  
Table 71: Model 2A - Coefficients & Collinearity statistics (low cost) 
Model Std. Coeff. t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)  7.112 .000   
 
Internal Conflict -.264 -4.386 .000 .904 1.106 
Quality of Bureaucracy .302 5.084 .000 .926 1.080 
Intellectual property protection .211 2.017 .045 .299 3.341 
Efficiency of legal frameworks -.189 -1.795 .074 .296 3.383 
Staff Security .162 2.541 .012 .808 1.237 
Labour-employer relations .119 1.998 .047 .930 1.076 
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4.4.2.13 Model 2A: Collinearity levels 
On review of Model 2A values it is clear that the potential for Collinearity has been 
substantially reduced as all VIF numbers are <10 and all tolerance levels now 
>0.2. While the average VIF remains greater than 1, it has been substantially 
reduced from Model 1 and hence lowered the likelihood that the regression may 
be biased. 
4.4.2.14 Model 2B: Aggregate offshore outsourcing with external business 
variables backward stepwise in low cost countries 
In Model 2B, the research applied the similar backward stepwise method, for 
external business variables similarly as in 2A, with the highest scoring Beta 
indicator inserted first, with the objective of isolating the key sets of external 
business variables relevant for the non-high income offshore outsourcing 
volumes.  
As captured in the Model 2B summary matrix, the analysis yielded an R value of 
.644 indicating that values of the multiple correlation coefficient between the 9 
key external business variables and the aggregated Offshore Outsourcing export 
flows (dependent variable). The final value of the R2 is stated as .415, which is 
only 0.009 less than for Model 1. This indicates that the 6 key external business 
variables account for a total of 41.5 % of the variation in offshore outsourcing 
flows in low cost contexts.  
Table 72: Model 2B - Summary statistics for business variables (low cost) 
Mode
l 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Change Statistics Durbin-
Watson 
R 
Square 
Change 
F Change df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 .650a .423 .395 .423 15.608 9 192 .000  
2 .650b .422 .398 .000 .040 1 192 .842  
3 .649c .422 .401 -.001 .261 1 193 .610  
4 .644d .415 .397 -.006 2.164 1 194 .143 .460 
The difference between the R2 and adjusted R2 is small at .415 -.397-= 0.018 (or 
1.8%), indicating that if the model was derived from the full population rather than 
the given sample it would account for less than 1.8% variance in the outcome.  
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Table 73: Model 2B – Coefficient and collinearity statistics  
Model Std. Coeff. t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)  -3.042 .003   
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size .524 8.727 .000 .831 1.204 
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony  -.460 -4.190 .000 .248 4.027 
GDP per Capita -.420 -4.932 .000 .413 2.419 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness .413 3.824 .000 .257 3.890 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training .279 2.477 .014 .236 4.231 
Pillar 4 - Primary Education .124 1.702 .090 .565 1.771 
4.4.2.15 Model 2B: Collinearity levels 
On review of Model 2B all VIF numbers are <10 and tolerance levels now >0.2 
suggesting that the initial collinearity concerns have been addressed in the model 
for external business variables. 
 
4.4.2.16 Model 3: Aggregate offshore outsourcing complete model in low 
cost countries 
In Model 3, the six external business variables identified in Model 2B were added 
into the regression analysis together with the key risks identified in Model 2A 
using a hierarchical approach. The key Political Risk identified in Model 2A are 
inserted as Block 1 and the key external business variables inserted as Block 2. 
The findings of Model 3 consolidates the findings of Model 1 & 2 providing an 
overview of the key political risk indicators relevant for offshore outsourcing 
activities, combined with the most key relevant external business variables in the 
context of non-high income countries.  
4.4.2.17 Model 3: Overview 
As captured in the Model 3 Summary matrix, the analysis yielded an R value of 
.734 indicating that values of the multiple correlation coefficient between the 
combined 6 Political Risk Indicators and 6 external business variables, and the 
aggregated Offshore Outsourcing export flows (dependent variable) in non-
income countries. The value of the R2, measuring how much of the variability in 
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the offshoring outsourcing flows is accounted for by the 12 indicators, is stated 
as .539 indicating that the combined 6 Political Risk Indicators and 6 external 
business variables account for a total of 53.9% of the variation in offshore 
outsourcing flows in this context. The adjusted the R2 provides an indication of 
the generalizability of the model and should ideally be very close to the R2 value. 
In this model the difference is small at .539-.509 = 0.030 (or 3.0%), indicating that 
if the model was derived from the full population rather than the given sample it 
would account for 3.0% less variance in the outcome. The model further indicates 
that the identified key political risk account independently for 19.1% of the 
variation of offshore outsourcing flows, however with the added external business 
variables the model account for an additional 34.3% of the variation, totally at a 
predicative power of 50.9%.  
Table 74: Model 3 - Summary statistics (Low cost) 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Change Statistics Durbin-
Watson 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 .437 .191 .166 .191 7.660 6 195 .000  
2 .734 .539 .509 .348 23.747 6 189 .000 .727 
The change in F-ratio, measuring the overall significance of the regression model 
value of the political risk model, was in Block 1 indicated at 7.660, which is 
considered significant (p<.001). The F-change value for the combined model 
indicates that with the added location variables in Block 2 the model has improved 
with an F-ratio of 23.747. The Durbin-Watson value for model 1 is indicated at 
.727, suggesting a positive correlation between adjacent residuals in the model 
(Field 2009). 
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Table 75: Model 3 - ANOVA (low cost) 
Model - ANOVA df F Sig. 
1 Regression 6 7.660 .000b 
Residual 195   
Total 201   
2 Regression 12 18.384 .000c 
Residual 189   
Total 201   
4.4.2.18 Model 3: Parameters and coefficients 
A review of the Model 3 Beta-values indicates to what degree each of the political 
risk and external business variables affect the offshoring outsourcing flows, if the 
effects of all other predictors are held constant. The below matrix captures the 
positive and negative standardized beta coefficients for the key variables 
identified in the analysis, including the t-value and significance values indicating 
the predictability and strength of the individual indicators.  
Table 76: Model 3 – Coefficient and collinearity statistics  
Model Std. 
Coeff. 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
Internal Conflict -.264 -3.897 .000 .904 1.106 
Quality of Bureaucracy .302 4.518 .000 .926 1.080 
Intellectual property protection .211 1.792 .075 .299 3.341 
Efficiency of legal  -.189 -1.595 .112 .296 3.383 
Staff Security .162 2.258 .025 .808 1.237 
Labor-employer relations .119 1.775 .077 .930 1.076 
Internal Conflict .268 3.784 .000 .486 2.060 
Quality of Bureaucracy .325 5.702 .000 .750 1.334 
Intellectual property protection -.137 -1.130 .260 .167 6.000 
Efficiency of legal framework -.051 -.454 .650 .194 5.153 
Staff Security .184 3.212 .002 .742 1.348 
Labor-employer relations .093 1.679 .095 .801 1.249 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size .684 10.371 .000 .562 1.780 
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony  -.562 -5.381 .000 .224 4.460 
GDP per Capita -.516 -5.581 .000 .286 3.495 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness .603 5.284 .000 .187 5.343 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training .114 1.013 .312 .192 5.207 
Pillar 4 - Primary Education .021 .303 .763 .506 1.977 
Pillar 12 - Innovation .239 3.193 .001 .128 7.818 
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4.4.2.19 Model 3: Collinearity levels 
While the initial models with the full scope of variables had issues with Collinearity 
the final Model 3 presents VIF values well below 10, and all tolerance indicators 
are above 1, and most above 2, except Intellectual property protection, ICT use, 
Higher Education and training, Technological readiness and Innovation. For the 
political risk indicators alone the VIF values well below 10, and all tolerance 
indicators are above 2, and the average VIF value not substantially higher than 1 
( at 1.87 only), indicating that Collinearity across the political risk indicators has 
been addressed, while some bias may persist among the external business 
variables.  
4.4.2.20 Model 3: Summary of offshore outsourcing political risk and 
external business variables 
Through the process of linear regression analysis the research has firstly ranked 
the 12 key political risk variables identified in the P2 exploratory research in 
accordance with their ability to predict offshore outsourcing flows across 
approximately 100 sample countries over the time period from 2006-2013. 
Secondly, the research applied backward step-wise linear regression to identify 
the key most predictive political risk variables, limiting the variable set to five 
variables including Quality of Bureaucracy; Intellectual Property Protection; 
Internal Conflict, External Conflict and Government Stability with a combined R2 
value of .331, meaning with a predicative ability of 33.1%.  
As indicated in the matrix and in isolation from the external business variables 
(Model 1), the model indicates a positive correlation between offshore 
outsourcing flows and improved Quality of Bureaucracy (highest t-value and 
significant at <.001) and improved Intellectual Property Protection (Second 
highest t-value and significant at <.001). In turn the model indicates a negative 
correlation between improved conditions of Internal Conflict (third highest t-value 
and significant at <.001), and also External Conflict and level of Government 
Stability (with less significant Beta values, and low T-value and non-significant at 
>.001. 
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For the external business variables the model beta coefficients indicates a 
significant positive relationship between locations with high levels of Labour 
market efficiency, capacity for Innovation and presenting a larger Domestic 
Market Size (all with high t-values and significant at <.001). In addition 
Technological Readiness scores a high Beta and t-value, however the 
significance level is slightly lower at <.005.  There also appears to be a negative 
correlation between offshore outsourcing flows and improved levels of higher 
education and more stable macro environment variables (both with high t-values 
and significant at <.001). 
4.4.2.21 Model 3: Summary of offshore outsourcing political risk and 
external business variables 
Through the process of linear regression analysis the research has firstly ranked 
the 10 key political risk variables identified in the exploratory research, in 
accordance with their ability to predict offshore outsourcing flows in the context 
of non-high income countries over the time period from 2006-2013. The research 
applied backward step-wise linear regression to identify the key most predictive 
political risk variables, limiting the variable set to six key variables including 
Internal Conflict; Quality of Bureaucracy; Intellectual Property Protection; 
Efficiency of legal frameworks, Staff Security and Cooperation in labour-
employee relations with a combined R2 value of .191, meaning with a predicative 
ability of 19.1%.  
On review of the findings in isolation from the external business variables (Model 
1A/2a only), the model indicates a positive correlation between non-high income 
countries offshore outsourcing flows and improved Quality of Bureaucracy 
(highest t-value and significant at <.001) confirming the finding from the all-
inclusive sample. However, notably the Intellectual Property Protection variable 
which was the highest in the all-inclusive sample is non-significant at >.001 in the 
context of non-high-income countries. Secondly, the model further confirms the 
finding of a negative correlation between improved conditions of Internal Conflict 
(second highest t-value and significant at <.001) confirming that offshore 
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outsourcing in non-high-income countries is operating in potential unstable and 
vulnerable contexts. 
For the external business variables the model beta coefficients indicates a 
significant positive relationship between locations with larger Domestic Market 
Size (highest t-values and significant at <.001) and Technological Readiness 
(high t-values and significant at <.001). There also appears to be a negative 
correlation between offshore outsourcing flows and variables for Electricity and 
telephony infrastructure and GDP per Capita (both with high t-values and 
significant at <.001). The negative correlation confirms that offshore outsourcing 
takes place to developing and low income economies with infrastructure gaps, 
despite the potential operational challenges.  
Overall, the findings for non-high income countries confirm the importance of 
institutional capacity through the positive relationship with the variable on quality 
of bureaucracy in the host location for both high and non-high income countries 
and reconfirms that the bulk of offshore outsourcing takes place in locations with 
a potential instability reflected in the negative relationship with Internal Conflict 
variables. However, that the capacity for Innovation as a predictor for offshore 
outsourcing flows is predominant in the all-inclusive sample, but not significant in 
the context of non-high income countries. This suggests that while companies 
use offshore outsourcing as a means to access talent and innovation, this 
outreach is mainly targeting high-income locations. This similarly, explains the 
non-significant relationship with intellectual property protection legislation in the 
context of non-high-income countries, as less high-end KPO activities will be 
directed to these locations as captured in Annex C.7. 
4.4.3 Political risk across offshore outsourcing typologies 
Following the same methodology of determining the ranking of political risk and 
external business variables as with the aggregated Offshore Outsourcing data in 
the previous chapter, the political and external business variables were inserted 
into the regression analysis in random order using a forced entry approach. The 
methodology was applied to each of the offshore outsourcing typology specific 
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datasets i.e. ITO, KPO and BPO. As captured in the descriptive overview below 
the N-sample size varies across the offshore outsourcing typologies due to 
availability of data ranging from N=333 for KPO, N=484 for ITO to N=722 for BPO. 
4.4.3.1 Model 1A: Cross-industry offshore outsourcing with political risk 
variables  
The following section presents the cross offshore outsourcing analysis of activity 
specific political risk exposure i.e. across ITO, BPO and KPO engagements. 
Table 77: Model 1A - Descriptive statistics (cross industry) 
Variable Description Mean Std. Deviation N 
KPO 1374136198.19 4062126854.24 333 
ITO 2476603803.55 7988717458.36 484 
BPO 5479340785.34 11901448748.88 722 
External Conflict .00 1.00 828 
Corruption .00 1.00 819 
Government Stability .00 1.00 828 
Internal Conflict .00 1.00 828 
Staff Security .00 1.00 814 
Quality of Bureaucracy .00 1.00 828 
Labor-employer relations .00 1.00 814 
Intellectual property protection .00 1.00 723 
Efficiency of legal framework  .00 1.00 549 
Burden of customs procedures .00 1.00 729 
Judicial independence .00 1.00 814 
Exchange Rate Stability .00 1.00 827 
As captured in the Model Summary matrixes, the analysis yielded R values 
between 0.517 up to 0.606 indicating the values of the multiple correlation 
coefficient between the 12 Political Risk Indicators and the offshore outsourcing 
flows for ITO/KPO/BPO (dependent variables). The value of the R2, measuring 
how much of the variability in the offshore outsourcing flows is accounted for by 
the 12 indicators, is stated as (ITO - 0.267, KPO - 0.277 and BPO - 0.368). This 
indicates that the 12 political risk indicators account for a total of 26.7 to 27.7% 
of the variation in offshore outsourcing flows for ITO and KPO segments, and 
36.8% of the BPO segment. The adjusted R2 provides an indication of the 
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generalizability of the model and should ideally be very close to the R2 value. 
From the summary below it is clear that the difference is small for BPO at .368-
.350 = 0.018 (or 1.8%), indicating that if the model was derived from the full 
population of BPO engagements rather than the given sample it would account 
for 1.8% less variance in the outcome. However, for ITO and KPO, the 
generalizability seems less, at 3.0% for ITO and 4.3% for KPO, which is likely 
linked to the reduced N-sample size. 
4.4.3.2  Model 1A: Political risk variables - summary  
Table 78: Model 1A - Summary for political risk (cross industry) 
Model Summary matrixes 
Model 
1A 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Change Statistics Durbin 
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 
ITO .517 .267 .237 .267 8.782 12 .401 
Model 
1A 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Change Statistics Durbin 
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 
KPO .527 .277 .234 .277 6.429 12 .293 
Model 
1A 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Change Statistics Durbin 
Watson R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 
BPO .606 .368 .350 .368 20.980 12 .501 
The F-ratio, measuring the overall significance of the regression model value, is 
indicated at 8.782 for ITO and 6.429 for the KPO segment, which is considered 
significant (p<.001). However, the F-ratio for the BPO segment is stated at 
20.980, suggesting a stronger explanatory power for the BPO dataset with a 
higher N-sample size. The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates the degree to which 
the assumption of independent errors is tenable and, as mentioned in previous 
sections, should ideally indicate a value between 1 and 3, and preferably as close 
to 2 as possible (Field 2009). The Durbin-Watson value for these models are 
again below 1, with BPO indicating the highest value if .501, ITO at .401 and KPO 
as low as .293, suggesting a level of positive correlation between adjacent 
residuals in the models (Field 2009). 
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4.4.3.3 Model 1A: Collinearity levels 
For the given models the VIF values are all below 10 and all tolerance indicators 
are above 1. However, there remains a number of variables with high VIF values 
and tolerance levels below 2, including Intellectual property protection, Efficiency 
of legal frameworks, Judicial Independence all ranging amongst 1-2 and hence 
indicating potential bias problem of Collinearity between these variables. As the 
models will be further refined and several variables excluded through stage 2 and 
3, this problem will be addressed in the final model. 
4.4.3.4 Model 1A: Parameters and coefficients 
A review of the Beta-values indicates to what degree each of the political risk 
indicators affects the offshoring outsourcing flows, if the effects of all other 
predictors are held constant. As captured in the matrix below the beta coefficient 
can indicate a negative or positive relationship. The standardized beta values are 
measured in standard deviation units and are directly comparable, and provides 
an insight into the importance of the individual predictor in the context of each 
offshore outsourcing activity. In addition the matrix captures the t-test values and 
significance levels, indicating to what extent the political risk indicator is making 
a significant contribution to the model. The larger the value of the t-value the 
greater the contribution of the political risk as a predictor of offshore outsourcing 
flows, while a significance value of 0.00 indicates highest level of significance of 
the model. The combined standardized beta value, t-test values and significance 
levels will form the basis for comparison of the relative significance of the 
individual political risk indicators.  
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Table 79: Model 1A - Ranking of political risk (cross industry) 
Ranking of political risk in terms of impact on offshore outsourcing flows – ITO  
 
Indicator Description Beta T-value Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Internal Conflict -0.416 -5.890 .000 .509 1.963 
Judicial independence 0.292 2.152 .032 .137 7.280 
Intellectual property protection 0.291 1.828 .069 .100 9.988 
Quality of Bureaucracy 0.265 2.782 .006 .279 3.581 
Burden of customs procedures -0.260 -2.462 .014 .228 4.390 
Efficiency of legal framework  -0.183 -1.284 .200 .125 8.008 
Cooperation in labor-employer relations 0.177 2.448 .015 .483 2.071 
Corruption -0.150 -1.425 .155 .229 4.361 
Staff Security 0.133 1.693 .091 .409 2.447 
External Conflict 0.108 1.780 .076 .691 1.447 
Government Stability -0.047 -0.807 .421 .758 1.318 
Exchange Rate Stability -0.022 -0.435 .664 .949 1.054 
 
 
 
Ranking of political risk in terms of impact on offshore outsourcing flows – BPO 
 
Indicator Description Beta T-value Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intellectual property protection 0.744 6.157 .000 .100 9.988 
Burden of customs procedures -0.329 -4.103 .000 .228 4.390 
Judicial independence -0.245 -2.377 .018 .137 7.280 
Quality of Bureaucracy 0.241 3.336 .001 .279 3.581 
Corruption 0.200 2.500 .013 .229 4.361 
External Conflict -0.154 -3.361 .001 .691 1.447 
Staff Security -0.116 -1.947 .052 .409 2.447 
Government Stability -0.084 -1.910 .057 .758 1.318 
Internal Conflict -0.070 -1.299 .195 .509 1.963 
Efficiency of legal framework  0.063 0.585 .559 .125 8.008 
Cooperation in labor-employer relations 0.013 0.237 .813 .483 2.071 
Exchange Rate Stability 0.008 0.211 .833 .949 1.054 
 
 
 
 197 
 
 
Ranking of political risk in terms of impact on offshore outsourcing flows – KPO 
 
Indicator Description Beta T-value Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intellectual property protection 0.935 4.936 .000 .100 9.988 
Burden of customs procedures -0.505 -4.017 .000 .228 4.390 
Staff Security -0.265 -2.823 .005 .409 2.447 
Quality of Bureaucracy 0.206 1.816 .071 .279 3.581 
Efficiency of legal framework  -0.196 -1.157 .249 .125 8.008 
Corruption 0.195 1.559 .120 .229 4.361 
Judicial independence -0.180 -1.112 .267 .137 7.280 
Government Stability 0.105 1.528 .128 .758 1.318 
Cooperation in labor-employer relations 0.078 0.909 .364 .483 2.071 
External Conflict -0.052 -0.717 .474 .691 1.447 
Exchange Rate Stability 0.048 0.782 .435 .949 1.054 
Internal Conflict -0.014 -0.164 .870 .509 1.963 
 
As captured in the model the beta coefficient indicates a significant positive 
relationship between locations with strong Intellectual Property Protection 
regulations and high Quality of Bureaucracy across all the offshore outsourcing 
typologies. Similarly, there is a negative relationship between the Burden of 
Customs Procedures and internal conflict and the offshore outsourcing flows 
across the board.  
There are also some obvious inconsistencies as with Corruption, which appears 
as a positive relationship for KPO and BPO, while for ITO has a negative 
relationship to the offshore outsourcing flows. Similarly, the significance of 
Judicial Independence indicated in ITO flows, is not comparable to the negative 
relations indicated in the KPO and BPO segments.  
The following section will seek to rank and compare the external business 
variables that may further influence the flow of offshore outsourcing across the 
three typologies and seek to integrate the key drivers into the final model. 
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4.4.3.5 Model 1B: Cross-industry offshore outsourcing with external 
business risk variables  
Following the same methodology as for Model 1A the external business variables 
were inserted into the regression analysis in random order using a forced entry 
approach. The methodology was applied each of the offshore outsourcing 
typology specific datasets i.e. ITO, KPO and BPO. As captured in the descriptive 
overview below the N-sample size varies across the offshore outsourcing 
typologies due to availability of data ranging from N=333 for KPO up to N=722 
for BPO.  
The lowest N-value for the independent variables were for Pillar 2 - Electricity and 
telephony infrastructure at 458 and GDP per Capita at 552, however using pair-
wise exclusion the model seeks to maximize sample size across the variables. 
Table 80: Model 1B - Descriptive statistics for business variables (cross industry) 
Variable Description Mean Std. Deviation N 
KPO 1374136198.19 4062126854.24 333 
ITO 2476603803.55 7988717458.36 484 
BPO 5479340785.34 11901448748.88 722 
External Conflict .00 1.00 828 
Corruption .00 1.00 819 
Government Stability .00 1.00 828 
Internal Conflict .00 1.00 828 
Staff Security .00 1.00 814 
Quality of Bureaucracy .00 1.00 828 
Labor-employer relations .00 1.00 814 
Intellectual property protection .00 1.00 723 
Efficiency of legal framework  .00 1.00 549 
Burden of customs procedures .00 1.00 729 
Judicial independence .00 1.00 814 
Exchange Rate Stability .00 1.00 827 
As captured in the model summary matrix, the analysis yielded an R values 
between .556 up to .774 indicating the values of the multiple correlation 
coefficient between the 9 external business variables and the offshore 
outsourcing flows for ITO/KPO/BPO (dependent variables). The value of the R2, 
measuring how much of the variability in the offshore outsourcing flows is 
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accounted for by the 9 indicators, is stated as (ITO - .309, KPO - .599 and BPO - 
.513). This indicates that the 9 political risk indicators account for a total of 51.3 
– 59.9% of the variation in offshore outsourcing flows for KPO and BPO 
segments, and 30.9% of the ITO segment only. As experienced in the analysis in 
Model 1A, there appears to be more consistency between the KPO and BPO 
datasets and that of the ITO segment. The adjusted R2 provides an indication of 
the generalizability of the model and should ideally be very close to the R2 value. 
From the summary below it is clear that the difference is small for BPO at .513 - 
.501= 0.012 (or 1.2%), indicating that if the model was derived from the full 
population of BPO engagements rather than the given sample it would account 
for 1.2% less variance in the outcome.  For ITO and KPO, the generalizability is 
slightly less at 2.7% for ITO and 2.2% for KPO, which is likely again linked to the 
reduced N-sample size. 
Table 81: Model 1B - Summary statistics for business variables (cross industry) 
 Model Summary matrixes 
Model 
IB 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Change Statistics Durbin 
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 
ITO .556a .309 .282 .309 11.401 9 .354 
Model 
IB 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Change Statistics Durbin 
Watson R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 
KPO .774a .599 .577 .599 26.737 9 .545 
Model 
IB 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Change Statistics Durbin 
Watson R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 
BPO .717a .513 .501 .513 40.456 9 .632 
 
The F-ratio, measuring the overall significance of the regression model value, is 
indicated at 11.401 for ITO and 26.737 for the KPO segment and considered 
significant (p<.001). However, the F-ratio for the BPO segment is stated higher 
at 40.456, suggesting a stronger explanatory power for the BPO dataset with a 
higher N-sample size.  
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The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates the degree to which the assumption of 
independent errors is tenable, and as mentioned in previous chapters should 
ideally indicate a value between 1 and 3, and preferably as close to 2 as possible 
(Field 2009). The Durbin-Watson value for these models are again below 1, with 
BPO indicating the highest value if .632, ITO at .354 and KPO as low as .545, 
suggesting a level of positive correlation between adjacent residuals in the 
models (Field 2009). 
4.4.3.6 Model 1B: Collinearity levels 
For the given models the VIF values are high for Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony 
infrastructure and above 10 for Pillar 9 - Technological readiness and Pillar 5 - 
Higher education and training. The tolerance indicators for these pillars, plus for 
Pillar 12 - Innovation are below <1 or 2, hence indicating potential problem of 
Collinearity between these variables. As the models will be further refined and 
several variables excluded through stage 2 and 3, this problem will be addressed 
in the final model. 
4.4.3.7 Model 1B: Parameters and coefficients 
As in the previous model the combined standardized beta value, t-test values and 
significance levels have been captured in the matrix below and will form the basis 
for comparison of the relative significance of the individual political risk indicators. 
The larger the value of the t-value the greater the contribution of the political risk 
as a predictor of offshore outsourcing flows, while a significance value of 0.00 
indicates highest level of significance of the model. As noted below the beta 
coefficient can indicate a negative or positive relationship. The standardized beta 
values are measured in standard deviation units and are directly comparable, and 
provides an insight into the importance of the individual predictor in the context 
of each offshore outsourcing activity. 
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Table 82: Model 1B - Ranking of business variables (cross industry) 
Ranking of external business variables in terms of impact on Offshore Outsourcing 
Flows – ITO  
Indicator Description Beta T-value Tolerance VIF 
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony 
infrastructure 
-0.891 -5.416 .111 8.972 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness 0.410 1.966 .069 14.431 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size 0.292 4.3 .654 1.528 
Pillar 12 - Innovation 0.253 1.916 .173 5.775 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training 0.199 1.12 .096 10.466 
Pillar 4 - Primary Education 0.153 1.503 .289 3.457 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency -0.049 -0.64 .511 1.957 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment -0.032 -0.481 .688 1.453 
GDP per Capita 0.029 0.261 .246 4.069 
 
Ranking of external business variables in terms of impact on Offshore Outsourcing 
Flows – KPO  
Indicator Description Beta T-value Tolerance VIF 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness -0.801 -4.225 .069 14.431 
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony infrastructure 0.750 5.019 .111 8.972 
Pillar 12 - Innovation 0.744 6.202 .173 5.775 
Pillar 4 - Primary Education -0.391 -4.216 .289 3.457 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment -0.389 -6.461 .688 1.453 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size 0.381 6.183 .654 1.528 
GDP per Capita 0.246 2.442 .246 4.069 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency 0.211 3.03 .511 1.957 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training -0.196 -1.215 .096 10.466 
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Ranking of external business variables in terms of impact on Offshore Outsourcing 
Flows – BPO  
Indicator Description Beta T-value Tolerance VIF 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size 0.474 10.202 .654 1.528 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training -0.452 -3.721 .096 10.466 
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony 
infrastructure 
0.394 3.506 .111 8.972 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment -0.220 -4.855 .111 8.972 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency 0.206 3.919 .511 1.957 
Pillar 12 - Innovation 0.189 2.094 .173 5.775 
GDP per Capita 0.139 1.829 .246 4.069 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness 0.120 0.838 .069 14.431 
Pillar 4 - Primary Education -0.008 -0.108 .289 3.457 
 
As captured in the model the beta coefficient indicates a significant positive 
relationship between locations with strong capacity for Innovation, especially for 
the KPO segment, plus Domestic Market Size and GDP per Capita. Similarly, 
there is a consistent negative relationship between Pillar 3 - Macro Environment 
and the offshore outsourcing flows across the board. There are also some 
obvious inconsistencies as with Pillar 9 - Technological readiness, which appears 
as a positive relationship for ITO and BPO, while for KPO has a negative 
relationship to the offshore outsourcing flows. Similarly, the negative relationship 
for Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony infrastructure in ITO flows is not intuitive.  
4.4.3.8 Model 2: Cross-industry offshore outsourcing with external 
business risk variables backward  
Following the methodology of previous sections, the ranked political risk variables 
and external business variables will be inserted into the regression model in order 
of highest Beta value accordingly. The objective is to identify the key political risk 
variables most predictive for each offshore outsourcing activity, and the 
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corresponding external business variable, to be inserted together into the final 
model for each typology for overall comparison. 
4.4.3.9 Model 2A: Key political risk variables - ITO 
As per the methodology in previous sections, the ranked political risk variables 
Model 1A were inserted into the backward step-wise regression. 
Table 83: Model 2A - Statistics summary (ITO) 
Mode
l 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Change Statistics  
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1  
1 .506a .256 .217 .256 6.493 12  
2 .506b .256 .220 .000 .043 1  
3 .504c .254 .221 -.002 .684 1  
4 .501d .251 .221 -.003 1.059 1  
5 .498e .248 .222 -.003 .873 1  
6 .489f .239 .216 -.008 2.587 1  
7 .482g .232 .212 -.007 2.120 1  
8 .476h .227 .210 -.005 1.583 1  
9 .469i .220 .206 -.007 2.206 1  
10 .459j .211 .201 -.009 2.663 1 .267 
 
As per below the backward step-wise regression yielded 3 key political risk 
variables for ITO including a negative relationship with Internal Conflict (Beta: -
.336, high T-value and significant <.001); Judicial Independence (Beta: .226, high 
T-value and significant <.002); and Quality of Bureaucracy (Beta: .212, high T-
value and non-significant >.001). The findings confirm that much of the ITO 
offshore outsourcing takes place to locations with significant internal conflict 
issues, likely due to cost considerations. The identification of judicial 
independence and bureaucracy levels further confirm the importance of 
institutional capacity at offshore outsourcing locations. 
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Table 84: Model 2A - Coefficients and collinearity statistics  
ITO - Coefficients 
Model 
Std. 
Co. 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Beta 
Zero-
order 
Partial Part Tol. VIF 
 
(Constant)  5.947 .000      
Internal Conflict -.336 -5.436 .000 -.185 -.334 -.315 .881 1.135 
Judicial independence .268 3.118 .002 .307 .199 .181 .454 2.203 
Quality of Bureaucracy .212 2.521 .012 .313 .162 .146 .474 2.111 
As per the methodology in previous sections, the ranked external business 
variables Model 1B were inserted into the backward step-wise regression with 
offshore outsourcing flows for ITO as dependent variable.  
Table 85: Model 2A - Change statistics (ITO) 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Change Statistics  
R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 Durbin-Watson 
1 .537a .288 .260 .288 10.271 9  
2 .537b .288 .263 .000 .061 1  
3 .536c .288 .266 -.001 .194 1  
4 .536d .287 .268 -.001 .274 1  
5 .533e .285 .269 -.002 .738 1  
6 .526f .277 .265 -.007 2.395 1 .363 
7 .519g .269 .260 -.008 2.603 1  
As per below the backward step-wise regression yielded 3 key external business 
variables with a combined R2 of 26.9%, highlighting Domestic Market size and 
capacity for Innovation as key driving forces, while indicating a negative 
relationship with Electricity and telephony infrastructure confirming that much 
offshore outsourcing takes place to developing economies. 
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Table 86: Model 2A - Coefficients and collinearity statistics  
Model 
Std. 
Coef. 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Beta 
Zero-
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant)  6.105 .000      
Pillar 2 - Electricity and 
telephony infrastructure 
-.333 -4.416 .000 .029 -.277 -.247 .549 1.822 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size .372 5.873 .000 .439 .358 .328 .779 1.284 
Pillar 12 - Innovation .365 4.502 .000 .317 .282 .252 .475 2.107 
 
4.4.3.10 Model 2B: Key political risk variables - KPO 
As per the methodology in previous sections, the ranked political risk variables 
Model 1A were inserted into the backward step-wise regression with offshore 
outsourcing flows for KPO as dependent variable.  
Table 87: Model 2B - Summary statistics (KPO) 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Change Statistics  
R Square 
Change F Change df1 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .527a .277 .234 .277 6.429 12  
2 .527b .277 .238 .000 .027 1  
3 .524c .275 .239 -.002 .642 1  
4 .522d .272 .240 -.003 .808 1  
5 .519e .269 .240 -.003 .905 1  
6 .516f .267 .242 -.002 .638 1  
7 .510g .261 .239 -.006 1.684 1  
8 .504h .254 .236 -.007 1.848 1 .245 
 
As per below the backward step-wise regression yielded 5 key political risk 
variables for KPO including a significant positive relationship with higher capacity 
for Intellectual property protection (Beta: .921, high T-value and significant <.001) 
and Quality of Bureaucracy (Beta: .260, high T-value but non- significant >.001). 
In addition there is a significant negative relationship with Burden of customs 
procedures (Beta: -.477, high T-value but non- significant >.001), and non-
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significant relationship with Judicial independence (Beta: 1.235, high T-value but 
non- significant >.001) and Staff Security (Beta: -.228, high T-value but non- 
significant >.001). The findings further highlighting the importance of institutional 
capacity at offshore outsourcing locations. 
Table 88: Model 2B - Coefficients and collinearity statistics  
Model 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant)  5.662 .000   
Intellectual property protection .921 5.544 .000 .130 7.690 
Burden of customs procedures -.477 -4.078 .000 .262 3.814 
Staff Security -.228 -2.621 .009 .473 2.116 
Quality of Bureaucracy .260 2.761 .006 .406 2.464 
Judicial independence -.235 -1.761 .080 .201 4.969 
 
As per the methodology in previous sections, the ranked external business 
variables Model 1B were inserted into the backward step-wise regression with 
offshore outsourcing flows for KPO as dependent variable.  
Table 89: Model 2B - Summary statistics for business variables (KPO) 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Change Statistics 
 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .774a .599 .577 .599 26.737 9  
2 .772b .595 .575 -.004 1.476 1 .563 
As per below the backward step-wise regression yielded 8 key external business 
variables with a combined R2 of .595 (or 59.5%), highlighting Capacity for 
Innovation, Market Size, and Electricity and telephony infrastructure on as 
significant and key driving forces, while GDP levels and Labour Market efficiency 
featured with moderate Beta values but non-significant. The model also indicated 
a negative relationship with Technological readiness, Primary Education and 
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Macro Environment confirming that even large elements of KPO offshore 
outsourcing takes place to developing economies. 
Table 90: Model 2B - Coefficients and collinearity  
Model 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
 
(Constant)  6.789 .000   
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness -.889 -5.069 .000 .081 12.316 
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony 
infrastructure 
.700 4.866 .000 .121 8.284 
Pillar 12 - Innovation .714 6.073 .000 .181 5.530 
Pillar 4 - Primary Education -.441 -5.281 .000 .359 2.789 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment -.394 -6.549 .000 .692 1.446 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size .364 6.059 .000 .693 1.444 
GDP per Capita .278 2.860 .005 .264 3.786 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency .206 2.957 .004 .513 1.950 
 
4.4.3.11 Model 2C: Key political risk variables – BPO 
As per the methodology in previous sections, the ranked political risk variables 
Model 1A were inserted into the backward step-wise regression with offshore 
outsourcing flows for BPO as dependent variable.  
Table 91: Model 2C - Summary statistics for political risk (BPO) 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .606a .368 .350 .368 20.980 12 433 .000  
2 .606b .368 .352 .000 .045 1 433 .833  
3 .606c .368 .353 .000 .060 1 434 .806  
4 .606d .367 .354 -.001 .598 1 435 .440  
5 .603e .364 .352 -.003 2.009 1 436 .157 .457 
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As per below the backward step-wise regression yielded 9 key political risk 
variables for BPO including a positive and significant relationship with Intellectual 
property protection (Beta: .752, high T-value and significant <.001) and Quality of 
Bureaucracy (Beta: .216, high T-value and significant <.001). In addition, the 
model yields a significant negative relationship with External Conflict (Beta: -.182, 
high T-value and significant <.001) and Burden of Customs (Beta: -.316, high T-
value and significant <.001). The remaining variables include Judicial 
Independence, Corruption, Staff Security and Government Stability, however all 
are non-significant at >.001).  
Table 92: Model 2C - Coefficients and collinearity statistics  
Model 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant)  12.079 .000   
Intellectual property protection .752 6.873 .000 .122 8.225 
Burden of customs 
procedures 
-.316 -4.179 .000 .255 3.924 
Judicial independence -.183 -2.133 .033 .197 5.065 
Quality of Bureaucracy .216 3.213 .001 .321 3.113 
Corruption .203 2.618 .009 .242 4.124 
External Conflict -.182 -4.474 .000 .876 1.142 
Staff Security -.146 -2.567 .011 .451 2.217 
Government Stability -.081 -2.010 .045 .902 1.108 
As per the methodology in previous sections, the ranked external business 
variables Model 1B were inserted into the backward step-wise regression with 
offshore outsourcing flows for BPO as dependent variable.  
Table 93: Model 2C - Summary statistics for business variables (BPO) 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .717a .513 .501 .513 40.456 9 345 .000  
2 .717b .513 .502 .000 .012 1 345 .914  
3 .716c .512 .502 -.001 .873 1 346 .351 .641 
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The back-ward step-wise regression yielded 9 key external business variables 
with a combined R2 of .512 (or 51.2%), highlighting a positive relationship with 
Domestic Market Size,  Electricity and telephony infrastructure,  Labour market 
efficiency, Innovation and GDP per Capita. In addition, the model yielded a 
negative relationship with the Macro Environment and Higher education and 
training again confirming the developing economy context of a majority of 
offshore outsourcing activities.  
Table 94: Model 2C - Coefficients and collinearity statistics  
Model 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant)  12.297 .000   
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size .469 10.325 .000 .681 1.468 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training -.430 -4.104 .000 .128 7.810 
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony  .439 4.773 .000 .166 6.027 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment -.227 -5.150 .000 .724 1.381 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency .211 4.048 .000 .517 1.934 
Pillar 12 - Innovation .214 2.513 .012 .193 5.181 
GDP per Capita .167 2.539 .012 .324 3.082 
 
4.4.3.12 Model 2ABC: Summary across offshore outsourcing typologies 
Through the process of linear regression analysis the research has firstly ranked 
the 12 key political risk variables identified in the exploratory research in 
accordance with their ability to predict activity specific offshore outsourcing flows 
to various country locations. Secondly, the research applied backward step-wise 
linear regression to identify the key most predictive political risk variables, limiting 
the variable sets to the key variables for each activity.   
For the political risk variables the positive relationship between Quality of 
Bureaucracy and flows across all offshore outsourcing activities is a consistent 
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trend with Beta values around .216-.268, however significant at <.001 for KPO 
and BPO only, while non-significant for ITO at >.001. For ITO the primary, and 
only significant variable at <.001 was Internal Conflict suggesting that ITO is more 
often outsourced to more unstable locations. For BPO the primary risk variable 
was Intellectual Property Right protection with the by-far highest Beta and T-value 
and significant at < .001. For BPO there are similar, less high Beta values, 
indicating negative relationships with BPO outsourcing and external conflict  and 
Burden of customs procedures both significant at < .001. For KPO the two primary 
variables were intellectual property protection with the highest Beta value (across 
all activities) and Burden of Customs procedures both significant at .001.  
For the external business variables the model the primary external variables for 
ITO was a positive relationship with Domestic Market size and Innovation both 
significant at .001, and a negative relationship with Electricity and telephony 
infrastructure. For KPO Innovation and Electricity and telephony infrastructure 
were both the primary and significant positive drivers, followed by Domestic 
Market size and Macroeconomic environment. Ironically Technical readiness 
featured as the highest negative variable followed by primary education, both 
significant at .001. Finally for BPO the main positive drivers were Electricity and 
telephony infrastructure and Domestic market, followed by Labour Market 
Efficiency. Contrary to ITO and KPO, Innovation was non-significant at > .001.  
4.4.4 Political Risk and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows 
Following the same methodology as with the aggregated Offshore Outsourcing 
data in the previous chapter, the political and external business variables were 
inserted into the regression analysis in random order with the Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) data using a forced entry approach. The method allows for a 
classification of the individual risk indicators impact on FDI flows and the 
predicative strength of the external business variables in the context of FDI.  
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4.4.4.1 Model 1A: (FDI) with political risk variables  
Table 95:  Model 1A - Descriptive statistics (FDI) 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Inward foreign direct investment flows  179996.36 434677.38 734 
External Conflict .00 1.00 828 
Corruption .00 1.00 819 
Government Stability .00 1.00 828 
Internal Conflict .00 1.00 828 
Staff Security .00 1.00 814 
Quality of Bureaucracy .00 1.00 828 
Cooperation in labor-employer relations .00 1.00 814 
Intellectual property protection .00 1.00 723 
Efficiency of legal framework .00 1.00 549 
Burden of customs procedures .00 1.00 729 
Judicial independence .00 1.00 814 
Exchange Rate Stability .00 1.00 827 
 
As captured in the model summary matrix the analysis yielded an R value of .539 
indicating the values of the multiple correlation coefficient between the 12 Political 
Risk Indicators and the Inward foreign direct investment flows (dependent 
variable). The value of the R2, measuring how much of the variability in the Inward 
foreign direct investment flows is accounted for by the 12 indicators, is stated as 
.291. This indicates that the 12 political risk indicators account for a total of 29.1% 
of the variation in offshore outsourcing flows. The adjusted the R2 provides an 
indication of the generalizability of the model and should ideally be very close to 
the R2 value. In this model the difference is small at .291-.272-= 0.018 (or 1.8%), 
indicating that if the model was derived from the full population rather than the 
given sample it would account for 1.8% less variance in the outcome.  
Table 96: Model 1A - Summary statistics for political risk in FDI 
 
Model Summary matrix 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 
1 .539a .291 .272 370924.63 .291 15.185 12 
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Table 97: Model 1A - Change statistics for political risk in FDI 
Model Summary 
Model 
Change Statistics 
df2 Sig. F Change Durbin-Watson 
1 444 .000 .532 
The F-ratio, measuring the overall significance of the regression model value of 
the model, is indicated at 15.185, which is considered significant (p<.001). The 
significance level suggests that the regression equation does have validity in 
fitting the FDI data i.e. the independent variables are not purely random with 
respect the Inward foreign direct investment flows. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates the degree to which the assumption of 
independent errors is tenable, or that there should be no autocorrelation between 
observations in the model (Field, 2009, p. 220), meaning relationships between 
values separated from each other by a given time lag in the residuals (prediction 
errors). The statistic indicator ranges in value from 0 to 4.  
A value near 2 indicates non-autocorrelation; a value toward 0 indicates positive 
autocorrelation; a value toward 4 indicates negative autocorrelation. A 
conservative rule indicates that the value should be between 1 and 3, and 
preferably as close to 2 as possible (Field, 2009). The Durbin-Watson value for 
model 1 is indicated at .532, suggesting a level of positive correlation between 
adjacent residuals in the model (Field, 2009). 
The ANOVA provides an overview of the significance of Model 1A containing the 
12 pre-identified political risk predictors of Inward foreign direct investment flows. 
Table 98: Model 1A - ANOVA for political risk in FDI 
ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 
25070880043254.42 12 
2089240003604
.53 
15.185 .000b 
Residual 
61087776777530.81 444 
137585082832.
28 
  
Total 
86158656820785.23 456    
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4.4.4.2 Model 1A: Model parameters and coefficients 
The Standardized Coefficients Beta values for FDI flows and the pre-identified 
political risk indicators suggest a positive correlation on Corruption, Quality of 
Bureaucracy and Intellectual Protection. 
Table 99: Model 1A - Coefficients for political risk in FDI 
Model 1 – FDI Political Risk Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Beta 
1 (Constant)  10.374 .000 
External Conflict -.154 -3.201 .001 
Corruption .215 2.576 .010 
Government Stability .003 .075 .940 
Internal Conflict .001 .025 .980 
Staff Security -.184 -2.943 .003 
Quality of Bureaucracy .269 3.554 .000 
Labor-employer relations -.013 -.219 .827 
Intellectual property protection .733 5.806 .000 
Efficiency of legal frameworks .059 .522 .602 
Burden of customs procedures -.312 -3.727 .000 
Judicial independence -.353 -3.272 .001 
Exchange Rate Stability .015 .358 .721 
The political risk indicators are further ranked in accordance with the positive or 
negative impact on offshore outsourcing flows as captured in below matrix. 
Table 100: Model 1A - Ranking of political risk in FDI 
Indicator Description Beta T-value Sig. 
Intellectual property protection 0.733 5.806 0 
Judicial independence -0.353 -3.272 0.001 
Burden of customs procedures -0.312 -3.727 0 
Quality of Bureaucracy 0.269 3.554 0 
Corruption 0.215 2.576 0.01 
Staff Security -0.184 -2.943 0.003 
External Conflict -0.154 -3.201 0.001 
Efficiency of legal framework  0.059 0.522 0.602 
Exchange Rate Stability 0.015 0.358 0.721 
Labor-employer relations -0.013 -0.219 0.827 
Government Stability 0.003 0.075 0.94 
Internal Conflict 0.001 0.025 0.98 
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4.4.4.3 Model 1A: Collinearity levels 
For the given model the VIF values are below 10 and all tolerance indicators are 
above 1, and most above 2, except Intellectual property protection, Efficiency of 
legal frameworks, Judicial Independence all ranging from 1-2 and hence 
indicating potential problem. 
Table 101: Model 1A - Collinearity statistics  
Model 1 – FDI Coefficients 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
External Conflict .691 1.447 
Corruption .229 4.361 
Government Stability .758 1.318 
Internal Conflict .509 1.963 
Staff Security .409 2.447 
Quality of Bureaucracy .279 3.581 
Labor-employer relations .483 2.071 
Intellectual property protection .100 9.988 
Efficiency of legal framework  .125 8.008 
Burden of customs procedures .228 4.390 
Judicial independence .137 7.280 
Exchange Rate Stability .949 1.054 
4.4.4.4 Model 2A: Key political risk indicators for FDI 
 
Similar to the methodology applied for the aggregate Offshore Outsourcing data 
a backward stepwise methodology was applied to the set of Political Risk 
Indicators in the connect of FDI flows. The approach included inserting the non-
political risk indicators with the highest scoring Beta indicator inserted first, with 
the objective of isolating the key sets of non-political risks relevant for the FDI 
volumes.  
As captured in the Model 2A summary matrix, the analysis yielded an R value of 
.539 indicating that values of the multiple correlation coefficient between the 12 
political location indicators and the FDI inward flows (dependent variable). The 
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value of the R2, measuring how much of the variability in the FDI inward flows is 
accounted for by the 12 indicators, is stated as .290, which is only 0.001 less than 
for Model 1 with all the indicators. This indicates that the 7 key political location 
indicators account for a total of 29.0 % of the variation in offshore outsourcing 
flows. The difference between the R2 and adjusted R2 is small at .290-.279 = 
0.011 (or 1.1%), indicating that if the model was derived from the full population 
rather than the given sample it would account for less than 1, 1% variance in the 
outcome.  
Table 102: Model 2A - Summary statistics for political risk in FDI 
Model 2A summary matrix – FDI Key Political Risk Indicators 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 
.539a .291 .272 .291 15.185 12 444 .000  
2 .539b .291 .273 .000 .001 1 444 .980  
3 .539c .291 .275 .000 .007 1 445 .935  
4 .539d .291 .277 .000 .047 1 446 .829  
5 .539e .291 .278 .000 .125 1 447 .724  
6 .539f .290 .279 -.001 .320 1 448 .572 .491 
The key political risk for inward FDI flows is captured as follows: 
Table 103: Coefficients and collinearity statistics  
Model 2A – FDI Key Political Risk Indicator Coefficients 
Model 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant)  10.426 .000   
Intellectual property protection .761 6.708 .000 .123 8.148 
Judicial independence -.323 -3.623 .000 .199 5.018 
Burden of customs procedures -.310 -3.939 .000 .256 3.906 
Quality of Bureaucracy .250 3.708 .000 .348 2.876 
Corruption .222 2.749 .006 .243 4.124 
Staff Security -.190 -3.208 .001 .452 2.212 
External Conflict -.153 -3.599 .000 .880 1.136 
 216 
 
4.4.4.5 Model 2B: (FDI) with external business risk variables 
As captured in the Model 2B summary matrix, the analysis yielded an R value 
of.718 indicating that values of the multiple correlation coefficient between the 9 
external business variables and the FDI inward flows (dependent variable). The 
value of the R2, measuring how much of the variability in the FDI inward flows is 
accounted for by the 9 indicators, is stated as .515, which is only 0.005 less than for 
Model 1 with all the indicators. This indicates that the 4 key external business variables 
account for a total of 51.5 % of the variation in offshore outsourcing flows. The difference 
between the R2 and adjusted R2 is small at .515-.512-= 0.003 (or 0.3%), indicating that 
if the model was derived from the full population rather than the given sample it would 
account for less than 0.3% variance in the outcome.  
Table 104: Model 2B - Descriptive statistics for business variables in FDI 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Inward foreign direct investment flows  179996.36 434677.38 734 
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony  .00 1.00 458 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment .00 1.00 814 
Pillar 4 - Primary Education .00 1.00 814 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training .00 1.00 814 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency .00 1.00 814 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness .00 1.00 819 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size .00 1.00 814 
Pillar 12 - Innovation .00 1.00 814 
GDP per Capita .00 1.00 552 
 
Table 105: Model 2B - Summary statistics for business variables in FDI 
Model 2B summary matrix – FDI Key external business variables 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Chang
e 
1 .721a .520 .513 303320.56 .520 73.045 8 539 .000  
2 .721b .520 .514 303078.32 .000 .138 1 539 .711  
3 .721c .520 .515 302838.92 .000 .146 1 540 .703  
4 .720d .518 .513 303248.45 -.002 2.467 1 541 .117  
5 .718e .515 .512 303700.34 -.002 2.620 1 542 .106 .422 
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The key external business variables for inward FDI flows is captured as follows: 
Table 106: Model 2B - Coefficients and collinearity statistics  
Model 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
5 (Constant)  13.874 .000   
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment -.251 -7.300 .000 .756 1.322 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency .348 9.640 .000 .685 1.461 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size .534 17.100 .000 .914 1.094 
GDP per Capita .200 5.372 .000 .643 1.555 
 
4.4.4.6 Model 3: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) complete model 
As captured in the Model 3 Summary matrix, the analysis yielded an R value of 
738 indicating that values of the multiple correlation coefficient between the 
combined 7 Political Risk Indicators and 4 external business variables, and the 
inward FDI flows (dependent variable). The value of the R2, measuring how much 
of the variability in the inward FDI flows is accounted for by the 13 indicators, is 
stated as .544. 
This indicates that the combined 7 Political Risk Indicators and 4 external 
business variables account for a total of 53.3% of the variation in offshore 
outsourcing flows. The adjusted the R2 provides an indication of the 
generalizability of the model and should ideally be very close to the R2 value. In 
this model the difference is small at .544-.533 = 0.01 (or 1%), indicating that if the 
model was derived from the full population rather than the given sample it would 
account for 1% less variance in the outcome.  
The model further indicates that the identified key political risk account 
independently for 27.9% of the variation of inward FDI flows, however with the 
added external business variables the model account for an additional 25.4% of 
the variation, totally at a predicative power of 54.4%.  
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Table 107: Model 3 - Summary statistics for complete model for FDI 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Chang
e 
1 
.539a .290 .279 369034.25 .290 26.458 7 453 .000  
2 
.738b .544 .533 297000.86 .254 62.596 4 449 .000 .527 
Table 108: Model 3 - ANOVA for complete model for FDI 
ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 25222050032256.74 7 3603150004608.11 26.458 .000b 
Residual 61692384479938.88 453 136186279205.16   
Total 86914434512195.62 460    
2 
Regression 47308365227524.87 11 4300760475229.53 48.756 .000c 
Residual 39606069284670.76 449 88209508429.11   
Total 86914434512195.62 460    
The ANOVA provides an overview of the significance of Model 3 containing the 
predictors of inward FDI flows. For the initial model the value of F is 26.458which 
indicates that the correlation is unlikely to have happened by chance and also 
highly significant (p<0.01). For the second model the value of F is higher at 
48.756, which can be interpreted as while the initial model significantly improved 
the ability to predict offshore outsourcing flows, the second model added some 
value as the F-ratio is more significant.  
4.4.4.7 Model 3: Parameters and coefficients 
A review of the Model 3 Beta-values indicates to what degree each of the political 
risk and external business variables affects the inward FDI flows, if the effects of 
all other predictors are held constant.  
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Table 109: Model 3 - Coefficients for complete model for FDI 
Model Std. Coef. Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant)  10.472 .000 
External Conflict -.153 -3.615 .000 
Corruption .222 2.761 .006 
Staff Security -.190 -3.222 .001 
Quality of Bureaucracy .250 3.725 .000 
Intellectual property protection .761 6.737 .000 
Burden of customs procedures -.310 -3.957 .000 
Judicial independence -.323 -3.639 .000 
2 (Constant)  13.012 .000 
External Conflict .018 .509 .611 
Corruption .122 1.757 .080 
Staff Security -.100 -2.039 .042 
Quality of Bureaucracy .023 .391 .696 
Intellectual property protection .357 3.641 .000 
Burden of customs procedures -.177 -2.712 .007 
Judicial independence -.293 -3.978 .000 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment -.241 -6.404 .000 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency .399 9.356 .000 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size .489 12.993 .000 
GDP per Capita .166 2.649 .008 
Table 110: Model 3 - Collinearity statistics  
Model Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
External Conflict .880 1.136 
Corruption .243 4.124 
Staff Security .452 2.212 
Quality of Bureaucracy .348 2.876 
Intellectual property protection .123 8.148 
Burden of customs procedures .256 3.906 
Judicial independence .199 5.018 
2 (Constant)   
External Conflict .784 1.275 
Corruption .212 4.714 
Staff Security .425 2.350 
Quality of Bureaucracy .292 3.426 
Intellectual property protection .106 9.466 
Burden of customs procedures .237 4.214 
Judicial independence .187 5.355 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment .715 1.399 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency .558 1.791 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size .716 1.397 
GDP per Capita .260 3.851 
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4.4.4.8 Model 3: Summary of FDI specific political risk and external 
business variables 
Through the process of linear regression analysis the research has firstly ranked 
the 12 key political risk variables identified in the P2 exploratory research in 
accordance with their ability to predict FDI inward flows to various country 
locations. Secondly, the research applied backward step-wise linear regression 
to identify the key most predictive political risk variables, limiting the variable set 
to 7 variables including External Conflict; Corruption; Staff Security; Quality of 
Bureaucracy; Intellectual property protection; Burden of customs procedures; 
Judicial independence with a combined R2 value of .279, meaning with a 
predicative ability of 27.9%, which is slightly less than the 33.1% for the R2 for 
offshore outsourcing  
As indicated in the matrix and in isolation from the external business variables 
(Model 1 only), the model indicates a positive correlation between FDI flows and 
Intellectual property protection (Beta: .761, high T-value and significant at <.001); 
Quality of Bureaucracy (Beta: .250, second highest T-value and significant at 
<.001); and Corruption (Beta: .222, third lowest T-value but less significant at .006 
and hence >.001). Similarly the model indicate a negative relationship between 
External Conflict; Staff security; Burden of customs and judicial independence all 
significant at <.001. 
For the external business variables the model beta coefficients indicates a 
significant positive relationship between locations with high levels of Labour 
market efficiency and larger Domestic Market Size (all with high t-values and 
significant at <.001). There also appears to be a negative correlation between 
FDI flows and higher levels of macro environment stability (both with high t-values 
and significant at <.001).  
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4.5 Interpreting the Regression Analysis Results  
4.5.1 Testing hypothesis #1  
Hypothesis 1: Offshore outsourcing activities, as a non-equity and contract-based 
modality, are less sensitive to political risk considerations than general inward 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the choice of offshore locations. 
A comprehensive review of the literature suggested that previous research have 
generally limited political risk research to ownership-based entry modes, or 
captive offshoring, on the notion that these entry modes represent a more 
complex investment form than contract-based entry modes like offshore 
outsourcing. The perception has been that since non-equity offshoring modalities 
have less capital at stake and no physical facilities at risk on the ground, political 
risk consideration should be a less significant concern. On this basis the research 
explored and mapped the extent to which offshore outsourcing and regular FDI 
differ in sensitivity to political risk in their offshore engagements.  
Firstly, in order to conduct a comparative analysis, the research applied the 
similar linear regression methodology for FDI inward flows as applied for the 
Offshore Outsourcing flow data. The analysis ranked the 12 key political risk 
variables identified in the exploratory research in accordance with their ability to 
predict offshoring flows to various country locations. Secondly, the research 
applied backward step-wise linear regression to identify the most predictive 
political risk variables, limiting the variable set to 7 variables, including External 
Conflict; Corruption; Staff Security; Quality of Bureaucracy; Intellectual property 
protection; Burden of customs procedures; Judicial independence with a 
combined R2 value of .279, meaning with a predicative ability of 27.9%, which is 
slightly less than the 33.1% for the R2 for offshore outsourcing. The same 
methodology was applied for external business variables and combined with the 
political risk findings yielding a model for predicting FDI flows with an R2 of .544 
meaning with a combined predicative ability of 54.4%. 
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In isolation from the external business variables (Model 1 only), the model 
indicates a positive correlation between FDI flows and Intellectual property 
protection (Beta: .761, high T-value and significant at <.001); Quality of 
Bureaucracy (Beta: .250, second highest T-value and significant at <.001); and 
Corruption (Beta: .222,   third lowest T-value but less significant at .006 and hence 
>.001). Similarly the model indicate a negative relationship between External 
Conflict; Staff security; Burden of customs and judicial independence all 
significant at <.001. For the external business variables the model beta 
coefficients indicates a significant positive relationship between locations with 
high levels of Labour market efficiency and larger Domestic Market Size (all with 
high t-values and significant at <.001). There also appears to be a negative 
correlation between FDI flows and higher levels of macro environment stability 
(both with high t-values and significant at <.001).  
Compared with the findings from the offshore outsourcing activities, the findings 
suggest a consistent overlap of key substantial variables, including Intellectual 
Property Protection; Quality of Bureaucracy and Burden of Customs all significant 
at <0.001 for both offshore outsourcing and FDI activities.  
This is a significant finding as it highlights that for both FDI and outsourcing 
activities, institutional and regulatory factors in the host country are essential. 
Furthermore, the notion that Domestic Market size is a key external variable for 
both modalities suggest that an interlinkage between entry mode strategies  and 
that offshore outsourcing should not be seen in isolation from companies longer-
term market entry considerations. 
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Figure 12: Variables across offshore outsourcing versus FDI 
  
The findings further suggest that both FDI and outsourcing activities operate in 
external environments characterized by high levels of custom burdens and 
macro-economic instability. This negative correlation suggests that much of the 
offshoring activities, whether FDI or outsourcing, take place in developing 
economies to leverage cost arbitrage, and that companies are identifying 
strategies to deal with these challenges. It should be noted that both offshoring 
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vulnerable to both internal and external instability. However, for outsourcing 
activities Internal Conflict was non-significant at >.001 (.002) and External 
Conflict non-significant at >.001 (.025) For FDI External Conflict was significant 
at <.001. 
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regulatory variables relating to Intellectual Property Protection and Quality of 
Bureaucracy. The results can be considered as statistically significant and partly 
supporting the hypothesis that Offshore outsourcing activities, as a non-equity 
and contract-based modality, is less sensitive to political risk considerations than 
general inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the choice of offshore 
locations. The important distinction identified from the research is what kind of 
political risks is being considered. The findings confirms logically that political 
risks like security and conflict related risks will have a higher impact on 
investments with a physical presence including captive manufacturing plants or 
service centres. On the other hand, both contract-based outsourcing and FDI 
activities will equally be impacted by IP loss.  
A final interesting finding is that the capacity for Innovation in a location appears 
to be a stronger predicative feature for contract-based offshoring than that of FDI. 
This findings suggest that while FDI is often designed as a means to access 
foreign markets or leverage labour arbitrage for manufacturing, offshore 
outsourcing is often more than a cost consideration and also a means to attract 
foreign talent and knowledge for competitive advantage. As these talent pools 
are often not available on the home market, offshore outsourcing becomes a tool 
for tapping into innovation centres around the world.  
4.5.2 Testing hypothesis #2 
Hypothesis 2: When the institutional and regulatory factors in the host country are 
strengthened, the volume of overall (ITO/BPO/KPO) contract-based offshore 
outsourcing will increase.  
As summarized in the opening section, the findings of the explorative research 
on identifying and mapping political risk manifestations in offshore outsourcing 
suggests that the nature of offshore political risk exposure revolves increasingly 
around policy and legal predictability, including institutional capacity, confirming 
the relevance of incorporating institutional differentiations in the determination of 
external uncertainty. The below matrix summarizes the findings of 25 interviews 
and review of 91 offshore engagement cases, indicating that political risks with 
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the highest level of concern refers to policy, institutional capacity (bureaucracy) 
and legal unpredictability (contract enforcement).  
Table 111: Overview of political risk distribution   
Political Risk Description Freq. of Mention (%) 
Policy predictability 25 21.6 
Institutional capacity limitations 22 19.0 
Legal unpredictability 19 16.4 
Political instability 16 13.8 
Instability of socio-economic environment 15 13.0 
Macro-economic instability 7 6.0 
Total 116 100% 
This research project set out to determine if concerns with institutional and 
regulatory factors would translate into offshore outsourcing flows across a large 
sample of potential locations through the use of linear regression analysis. The 
methodology allowed for determining the measure of variability in the offshoring 
outsourcing flows accounted for by the 12 pre-identified political risk indicators. 
The findings suggest that the combined political risk variables account for a total 
of 38.0% of the variation in offshore outsourcing flows, confirming that political 
risk, in the choice of outsourcing supplier locations is a relevant and important 
factor in determining supplier choice and in post award of contract monitoring. 
With a small difference between R2 and adjusted R2 value at 1.7% the research 
findings further have a confirmed high generalizability level suggesting that the 
regression equation has significant validity.  
Through the use of stepwise back ward regression, the methodology further 
allowed for a measure of the individual impact of each Political Risk variable as 
a predictor of offshore outsourcing flows, as a means for classification of relative 
importance. As captured in the findings matrix below, the beta coefficients 
indicates a significant and positive coefficient for Intellectual property protection 
regulations and the quality of bureaucracy. Similarly, there is a significant and 
negative relationship with the Burden of customs procedures. A less significant 
negative relationship also exists with Internal and external conflict, plus 
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government stability indicating a lesser impact on the predictive ability of the 
indicator in the model. 
Table 112: Overview of coefficients and collinearity statistics  
Model 
Std. 
Coef. 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Beta 
Zero-
order 
Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)  12.733 .000      
Intellectual property protection .618 7.352 .000 .477 .331 .278 .202 4.942 
Burden of customs procedures -.352 -4.841 .000 .297 -.225 -.183 .270 3.700 
Quality of Bureaucracy .353 5.885 .000 .503 .270 .223 .397 2.519 
Internal Conflict -.153 -3.145 .002 .051 -.148 -.119 .604 1.654 
External Conflict -.100 -2.246 .025 -.012 -.106 -.085 .716 1.397 
Government Stability -.078 -1.950 .052 -.111 -.093 -.074 .892 1.121 
The results of the regression analysis are clearly in line with the exploratory 
research findings, confirming a positive and significant relationship between 
offshore outsourcing flows and intellectual property protection and quality of 
bureaucracy. Similarly, the negative and significant relationship between burden 
of customs procedures and offshore outsourcing flows further confirms, together 
with the non-significant > .001 internal and external conflict and government 
stability variables, that offshore outsourcing engagements extend into often 
unstable and unpredictable environments. The degree of acceptable risk 
exposure is likely a consideration driven by cost-pressures, compelling 
companies to engage in low-cost countries at various political development 
stages. Overall the results can be considered as statistically significant and 
validating hypothesis #1 stating that “When the institutional and regulatory factors 
in the host country are strengthened, the volume of overall (ITO/BPO/KPO) 
contract-based offshore outsourcing will increase”.  
For the set of external business variables the model beta coefficients indicates a 
significant positive relationship between locations with high levels of labour 
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market efficiency, capacity for innovation and presenting a larger domestic 
market size (all with high t-values and significant at <.001). In addition 
technological readiness scores a high Beta and t-value, however the significance 
level is slightly lower at <.005.  There also appears to be a negative correlation 
between offshore outsourcing flows and improved levels of higher education and 
more stable macro environment variables (both with high t-values and significant 
at <.001). 
Overall the research produced a model with an R2 value of .553 indicating that 
the final model account for a total of 55.3% of the variation in offshore outsourcing 
flows. The adjusted R2, providing an indication of the generalizability of the model, 
suggests that if the model was derived from the full population rather than the 
given sample it would account for 0.8% less variance in the outcome suggesting 
a high level of generalizability.  
There is a potential problem with autocorrelation of the disturbances within the 
data, which is often the case with time-series regression analysis. The standard 
Durbin–Watson d statistic provides an indication of autocorrelations and is 
computed at a value of .398 (Model 3), indicating a positive first-order serial 
correlation for the data sample. One consequence of autocorrelation might be 
that some or all estimated coefficients are biased, which could affect the 
interpretation of the relative impact of the indicators for political risk and 
institutions on foreign investment. 
As further to the analysis provided on the overall sample of countries with 
outsourcing activities, the research also explored the particular political risk 
dynamics surrounding offshore outsourcing to low-cost countries, to test for any 
significant difference in outcome. The findings for the non-high income countries 
confirms the importance of institutional capacity through the positive relationship 
with the variable on quality of bureaucracy in the host location for both high and 
non-high income countries, and reconfirms that the bulk of offshore outsourcing 
takes place in locations with a potential instability reflected in the negative 
relationship with internal conflict variables. However, while the capacity for 
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Innovation as a predictor for offshore outsourcing flows is predominant in the all-
inclusive sample, it is non-significant in the context of non-high income countries. 
This suggests that while companies use offshore outsourcing as a means to 
access talent and innovation, this outreach is mainly targeting high-income 
locations. This similarly, explains the non-significant relationship with Intellectual 
Property Rights legislation in the context of non-high-income countries, as less 
high-end KPO activities will be directed to these locations. 
4.5.3 Testing hypothesis #3 
Hypothesis 3: When the institutional and regulatory factors in the host country are 
strengthened, the offshore outsourcing volumes of business activities with a 
higher knowledge content (KPO) is likely to increase.  
As per the exploratory research, the further association of knowledge-based 
outsourcing (KPO) with loss of IP, policy change on foreign ownership and 
contract enforcement risks, suggests that institutional capacity i.e. legal 
enforcement of IP rights and contracts becomes increasingly important as the 
knowledge content and value of services are enhanced. The exploratory findings 
suggested that the company specific risk profile changes subject to the level of 
service value involved in the offshoring engagement and that risk should be 
considered in the context of low versus high value service delivery as a key 
distinction for the nature and level of exposure.  
On this background the research explored the potential impact of the pre-
identified political risk variables and external business environment variables in 
the offshore flows for the three identified types of offshore outsourcing i.e. 
ITO/KPO/BPO in order to present a comparative analysis. Through the process 
of linear regression analysis the research firstly ranked the 12 key political risk 
variables identified in the exploratory research in accordance with their ability to 
predict activity specific offshore outsourcing flows to various country locations. 
Secondly, the research applied backward step-wise linear regression to identify 
the key most predictive political risk variables, limiting the variable sets to the key 
variables for each outsourcing activity. The analysis yielded R values between 
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.517 up to .606 indicating the values of the multiple correlation coefficient 
between the 12 Political Risk Indicators and the offshore outsourcing flows for 
ITO/KPO/BPO (dependent variables). The value of the R2, measuring how much 
of the variability in the offshore outsourcing flows is accounted for by the 12 
indicators, is stated as (ITO - .267, KPO - .277 and BPO - .368). This indicates 
that the 12 political risk indicators account for a total of 26.7 to 27.7% of the 
variation in offshore outsourcing flows for ITO and KPO segments, and 36.8% of 
the BPO segment.  
Figure 13: Variables across offshore outsourcing activities 
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The adjusted R2 provides an indication of the generalizability of the model and 
should ideally be very close to the R2 value. From the summary below it is clear 
that the difference is small for BPO at .368-.350-= 0.018 (or 1.8%), indicating that 
if the model was derived from the full population of BPO engagements rather than 
the given sample it would account for 1.8% less variance in the outcome. 
However, for ITO and KPO, the generalizability seems less at 3.0% for ITO and 
4.3% for KPO, which is likely linked to the reduced N-sample size. 
For the political risk variables the positive relationship between Quality of 
Bureaucracy and flows across all offshore outsourcing activities is a consistent 
trend with Beta values around .216-.268, however significant at <.001 for BPO 
only, while non-significant for KPO and ITO at >.001. For ITO the primary, and 
only significant variable at <.001 was Internal Conflict suggesting that ITO is more 
often outsourced to unstable locations. For BPO the primary risk variable was 
Intellectual Property Right protection with the highest Beta and T-value and 
significant at < .001. For BPO there are similar, less high Beta values, indicating 
negative relationships between BPO outsourcing and external conflict and 
Burden of Customs procedures both significant at < .001. For KPO the two 
primary variables were a positive and significant relationship with intellectual 
property protection with the by far highest Beta value (across all activities) and a 
negative relationship with Burden of Customs procedures also significant at .001.  
In terms of external variables the ITO flows have a positive relationship with 
Domestic Market size and Innovation, both significant at .001, and a negative 
relationship with Electricity and telephony infrastructure. For KPO Innovation and 
Electricity and telephony infrastructure were both the primary and significant 
positive drivers, followed by Domestic Market size and Macroeconomic 
environment. Ironically Technical readiness featured as the highest negative 
variable followed by primary education, both significant at .001. Finally for BPO 
the main positive drivers were Electricity and telephony infrastructure and 
Domestic market, followed by Labour Market Efficiency. Contrary to ITO and 
KPO, Innovation was non-significant at > .001.  
 231 
 
A review of the relationship with key political risk variables and cross-offshore 
outsourcing confirm that the offshore outsourcing industry cannot be assessed 
as one holistic group in terms of detailed risk assessment but should be reviewed 
through the lens of their activities i.e. ITO, KPO or BPO.  
The indication of a negative relationship between ITO and offshore outsourcing 
flows suggest that ITO activities are more often outsourced to locations more 
exposed to internal conflict. One reason for this could be that the nature of the 
ITO activities are easier to divert in case of unrest and/or be completed through 
home-based arrangements a part of a business continuity plan. On a more 
detailed review of the dependent variable data in (Annex C.6), it is also clear that 
ITO outsourcing remains dominated by the India market. This may distort the 
findings as India, while being assessed through a one-country ratings in the 
independent variables, is a sub-continent with several outsourcing locations with 
varying exposure to country level or regional political risk events.  
The finding that BPO activities have a positive relationship with mainly Quality of 
Bureaucracy and Labour Market efficiency suggests that typical BPO activities 
like management of call centres and back-office support activities is more labour 
intensive and requires more regulatory engagement with governments for the 
local suppliers of services. As BPO outsourcing contracts often become more 
integrated and require more long term and in-depth relationships it would make 
sense that HR and regulatory related issues experienced by the local contractors 
are more of a collective concern and hence a shared problem with the service 
buyer. Similarly, in order to leverage cost arbitrage for labour intensive back-office 
work the offshore outsourcing would often take place in a weak Macroeconomic 
environment, which explains the negative relationship, and in regions 
characterized by geo-political tension, but less so of internal conflict that could 
cause service distribution for the BPO activity.  
As suspected the KPO segment came out with a strong and significant (at <.001) 
positive relationship with the strength of Intellectual Property Rights frameworks 
to protect any R&D activities conducted by the outsourcing companies. A more 
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detailed review of KPO flows in Annex C. 7, highlights that most of KPO activities 
are directed to locations like the United States, Germany, Canada and other EU 
locations. Overall the results can be considered as statistically significant 
indicating a strong statistical relationship between KPO flows and institutional 
capacity to protect against IP loss. While the findings are statistically significant 
the research cannot establish direct causality between the parameters and 
therefore only partly validating hypothesis #3: When the institutional and 
regulatory factors in the host country are strengthened, the in-coming offshore 
outsourcing volumes of business activities with a higher knowledge content 
(KPO) is likely to increase. The findings suggest that to attract KPO activities the 
location needs to ensure specifically the appropriate Intellectual Property Rights 
framework to safe guard the outputs of the R&D activities.   
In terms of external business variables, domestic market size and basic electricity 
and telephony are the most important factors across all offshore outsourcing 
activities. While the need for a functioning basic electric and telephone 
infrastructure is intuitive it is also surprising in the sense that much of the 
outsourcing activities are assumed to take place in developing economies, and 
hence the infrastructure requirements will despite any cost incentives, bring a 
natural limit to outsourcing flows to many economies without the necessary 
infrastructure in place. More surprising is perhaps the pull-effect of a large 
domestic market, as contract-based offshoring is generally assumed to serve 
external entities i.e. through call centre activities, IT application management etc. 
The pull-effect of larger markets, and positioning of contract-based offshore 
outsourcing activities in potential domestic markets, suggests that offshore 
outsourcing could be considered part of a larger market entry strategy in line with 
the stages Model of Internationalization thinking (Valne and Johansson, 1977). 
4.6 Concluding Comments 
Since the 1990s offshoring has been a common feature in manufacturing 
strategies, and with technological advances within telecommunication and IT the 
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offshoring of services, like back-office operations and call centres, has joined the 
portfolio of business activities that are being consistently outsourced abroad.  
The focus of this research has been to analyse and map political risk in the 
context of the offshore outsourcing industry to enhance the understanding of 
political risk as a determinant of offshore outsourcing location decisions. The 
systematic literature review suggested that previous political risk research have 
generally been limited to ownership-based activities, or captive offshoring, on the 
notion that these operations represent a more complex investment form than a 
contract-based operation. The perception has been that since non-equity 
offshoring modalities have less capital at stake and no physical facilities at risk 
on the ground, political risk consideration should be a less significant concern. 
On this notion there has been an absence of an analytical framework that goes 
beyond captive offshoring and that can adequately contribute, either in a 
taxonomic or an operational sense, to improve political risk management within 
the offshore outsourcing industry.  
To overcome this gap this research applied an evidence-based approach, 
soliciting data from 25 interviewees and reviewing a total of 91 offshore 
engagements. The political risks experienced in offshoring engagements was 
mapped against the political risk indicators identified in the systematic literature 
and suggested that the offshore outsourcing industry was largely concerned with 
institutional and regulatory stability like contract enforcement, bureaucracy and 
corruption considerations, including political risk emanating from the home 
country government. Furthermore, the findings suggested a differentiation of 
political risk concerns across various types of outsourcing typologies, including 
Information Technology Outsourcing (ITO), Business Process Outsourcing 
(BPO) and Knowledge-based Outsourcing (KPO). Based on the literature review 
and findings of the exploratory study on political risk exposure among offshoring 
practitioners, a series of suggested correlations between offshoring firm’s 
location decisions and political risk related predictors in the external location 
environment was hypothesized.    
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To analyse the significance of the hypotheses the research applied a linear 
multiple regression methodology based on aggregate and activity specific (ITO, 
KPO and BPO) datasets generated from the IMF Balance of Payment (BoP) 
database to function as the dependent variables. For the purpose of identifying 
appropriate data sources to compile the independent variable datasets a 
comprehensive review of existing governance and country indicators was 
conducted and a dataset compiled from various sources including the ICRG Index 
and the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI from the World Economic Forum). 
As research on offshore outsourcing has been hampered by the absence of 
available data, one of the major contributions of this research is the design and 
compilation of a dataset capturing location specific offshore outsourcing flows 
and the corresponding break-down into ITO, KPO and BPO specific categories.  
Firstly, the research results validated the findings of the exploratory research, 
confirming a positive relationship between offshore outsourcing flows and 
institutional and regulatory factors. The research findings highlighted a positive 
and significant relationship between Intellectual Property Rights protection and 
the Quality of Bureaucracy and increased inflows of contract-based offshore 
outsourcing activities. The validated the hypothesis that “When the institutional 
and regulatory factors in the host country are strengthened, the volume of overall 
(ITO/BPO/KPO) contract-based offshore outsourcing will increase”.  
The research further analysed activity specific offshore outsourcing activities and 
mapped the political risk accounting for the highest variability in the offshoring 
outsourcing flows. The findings showed a dispersed distribution of political risk 
variables across ITO/KPO and BPO engagements, confirming the relevance of 
also analysing offshore outsourcing according to the nature of the outsourcing 
activity, rather than solely as a consolidated industry. Despite the contradictory 
results from the cross-industry analysis, the research obtained a significant (and 
positive) coefficient for Intellectual Property Rights protection with a very high 
Beta value for KPO activities, a significant but lower positive value for BPO and 
no indicated importance for ITO activities. These results are broadly in line other 
research suggesting that IP considerations and enforcement is a key feature in 
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companies R&D offshore location or entry mode decisions (Martinz-Noya and 
Garcia-Canal, 2011; Colovic, 2011). Overall the results partly validate that the 
hypotheses that “When the institutional and regulatory factors in the host country 
are strengthened, and the business activity is of a higher knowledge content 
(KPO), the offshore outsourcing volumes will increase more than that of ITO and 
BPO engagements”. The findings suggest that to attract KPO activities the 
location needs to ensure specifically the appropriate Intellectual Property Rights 
framework to safe guard the outputs of the R&D activities. 
Finally, the research addressed the perception that offshore outsourcing, as an 
offshoring modality is less susceptible to political risk and since non-equity 
offshoring modalities have less capital at stake and no physical facilities at risk 
on the ground, political risk consideration should be a less significant concern.  
The results of the research validated that political risk is a genuine issue of 
concern in offshore outsourcing, despite being contract-based and therefore 
technically “outsourcing” risks to the suppliers. The research indicated that the 12 
identified political risks accounted for 38.0% of the variability in the offshoring 
outsourcing flows suggesting that concerns about service disruptions and/or 
suppliers forwarding cost implications of external uncertainties to the service 
buyer features as a factor in considering supplier and location choice. The 
important distinction between offshore outsourcing and FDI activities identified 
from the research is what kind of political risks is being considered. The research 
yielded a significant and positive relationships with Intellectual Property Right 
protection and Bureaucracy, for both Offshore Outsourcing and FDI activities, 
while FDI locations was also related to security and conflict related variables. The 
findings confirms logically that political risks like security and conflict related risks 
will have a higher impact on investments with a physical presence including 
captive manufacturing plants or service centres, while contract-based 
outsourcing and FDI activities will be equally concerned with risks concerning IP 
loss and quality of bureaucracy.  
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As potential host countries compete to attract offshore outsourcing activities as a 
basis to enhance employment and project knowledge transfer opportunities into 
their economies, it would be prudent to take note of the perceived importance of 
strengthening institutional and regulatory factors. If the host country is seeking to 
attract outsourcing contracts within the areas of R&D, it would be especially 
important to ensure that the appropriate IP regulatory frameworks are in place, 
while for the more labour intensive BPO activities, a well-functioning labour 
market and minimal bureaucracy would have a high impact. While beyond the 
immediate scope of this research, it is also noteworthy to acknowledge that a 
well-functioning supporting ITC infrastructure in potential host countries is 
fundamental in order to attract offshore outsourcing activities.   
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A.1 Offshore literature map and historical developments
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Dunning, J.H, 1980
Companies engage in 
global production due 
advantages in:
- Ownership factors
- Location factors
- Internalization factors
Vernon, R. 
1966
Production 
Cycle 
Theory
Dunning, J.H, 2000
- including asset augmenting 
FDI and alliance related cross 
border ventures. 
- The determination of an 
optimum locational portfolio
of assets is a competitive 
advantage. (O advantage).
Transactional
“Turning activities to outside  vendors in 
areas in which using the market mechanisms 
results in lower transaction costs 
(Williamson 1975)
Resource  seeking
“Reliance on external sources for 
manufacturing components and other value-
adding activities”. 
(Lei & Hitt 1995)
Transformational
“Turning over all or part of an organizational 
activity to an outside vendor” 
(Barthelemy 2003)
Developmental
Turning over the management, 
development and continuous 
improvement of internal activities and 
processes to an outside vendor.
Graf & Mudambi 2005
- Adds a human capital dimension 
to the  framework of 
infrastructure, country risk and 
government policy. 
- Incorporates firm specific 
moderators including the nature 
of business processes and 
customer expectations.
 Adds firm specific and situation 
specific factors – the nature of the 
business process and customer 
expectations
McIvor, Ronan (2009)
-Developed paths for 
outsourcing decisions based 
on three measures of 
contribution to competitive 
advantage, relative 
capability position and the 
opportunism associated with 
outsourcing are integrated 
into a prescriptive 
framework for outsourcing 
strategic decision-making. 
Coase, R. 
1937
Transaction 
Cost Theory
Teece, D.J (1986)
Identifies when and where 
contractual alternatives to 
the multinational firm is 
viable:
- Nature of Technology
- The regime of 
appropriability
- Market characteristics
Barney, J.D. (1991)
Sustained competitive 
advantage through 
resources -  valuable, 
imperfectly imitable, no 
substitutes
Williamson (1979)
Characteristics of 
transactions i.e. asset 
specificity, frequency, 
measurement. 
Internalization vs 
market contracts
Penrose 
(1959)
Barney, J.D. (1999)
Firm capabilities and those 
of its potential partners can 
influence boundary 
decisions – capabilities 
important determinant of 
boundary decisions
Wernerfelt (1984)
Exploring firm from 
resource side
- Resource 
perspective
-Resource position 
barriers
Madhok (1998)
Comparison of TCE 
and RBV variables in 
outsourcing decisions
– finding RBV prevalent.
Large companies 
concerned with 
positioning, more than 
opportunistic behavior.
Ellram et al (2008)
Empirical support to 
basic principles of TCE 
in off-shore outsourcing in 
global market – HR asset 
specificity non-awareness. 
Focus on risk management 
(uncertainty) in external 
environment.
Buckley & 
Carson 
1976
Aubert et al (1996)
Empirical support to 
basic principles of TCE 
in IS outsourcing in 
domestic market – asset 
specificity, measurement 
uncertainty and transaction 
frequency.
Pralad & Hamel (1990)
- Core competence should 
not be outsourced but 
internalised.
Arnold (2000)
Linking TCE product 
specificity with RBV core 
competency – adding a 
long-term strategic 
element to TCE. 
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A.2 Overview of key articles 
No. Article Reference Journal Journal 
rating* 
1 (Agarwal and Feils, 2007) Journal of Administrative Sciences n/a 
2 (Alon and Herbert, 2009) Business horizons 1* 
3 (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994) Academy of Management Review 4* 
4 (Brewer 1993) International Executive n/a 
5 (Busse and Hefeker, 2007) European Journal of Political Economy 3* 
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8 (Delios and Henisz, 2003) Strategic Management Journal 4* 
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10 (Desbordes, 2010) Economics & Politics n/a 
11 (Di Gregorio, 2005) International Business Review 3* 
12 (Feinberg and Gupta, 2009) Academy of Management Journal 4* 
13 (Gao, 2009) Singapore Management Review n/a 
14 (Green, 1974) Columbia Journal of World Business n/a 
15 (Hahn, Doh, and Bunyaratave, 2009) MIS Quarterly 4* 
16 (Herath and Kishore, 2009) Information Systems Management 1* 
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22 (Leavy, 1984) Long range planning 3* 
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24 (Nakatsu and Iacovou, 2009) Information & Management 3* 
25 (Oetzel, 2005) International Business Review 3* 
26 ((Pedersen and Ørberg Jensen, 2011)) Journal of Management Studies 4* 
27 (Rice and Mahmoud, 1990) International Journal of Forecasting 3* 
28 (Rios-Morales, Gamberger, Smuc and Azuaje, 2009) Research in International Business and Finance n/a 
29 (Robock, 1971) Columbia Journal of World Business n/a 
30 (Schoenherr, 2010) International Journal of Production Research 3* 
31 (Simon, 1984) Journal of International Business Studies 4* 
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32 (Sodhi and Lee, 2007) Journal of the Operational Research Society 2* 
33 (Van Wyk, 2010) Journal of International Business Research n/a 
34 (Vitharana and Dharwadkar, 2007)  Communications of AI n/a 
35 (Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004) Journal of International Business Studies 4* 
* The core articles were extracted from a range of journals, with the ranking indicated in accordance 
the Cranfield University, Journal recommendations for Academic Publication, Eighth edition, April 2011. 
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 : 
 
B.1 Repertory Grid Interview Script 
Explanation to the Interviewee:  
Introduction and personal statement 
Interview administration instructions 
Biographical data 
Position and title in the company, plus ears of experience 
Description of the company offshoring structure and activities 
Role in the design and management of offshoring activities 
Elements - Identification of Constraints (or Risk): 
Based on the wide political risk definition (shared with the interviewee by email and 
reiterated at interview) the interviewee names six offshoring engagements that was 
affected by some level of political impact. 
Write the constraints (or risks) on random pre-numbered cards (I.e. 5; 1; 4; 3; 2; 6) 
Constructs and pole constructs - Present triad and collect constructs: 
The interviewee is asked: “Please think about how two of these engagements are 
similar and different from the 3rd in terms of political risk exposure. 
The political risk construct is defined – Noting that the meanings of the constructs need 
to be probed  
Rating of Constraints (or Risks): 
Rate the triad elements on pre-decided scale against construct, and then rate all other 
elements (constraints) and enter on pre-prepared grid against a 1-5 scale.
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B.2 Repertory Grid Analysis Data Extraction Matrix 
Date: 
 
Interviewee: Interviewer: Start: Finish: 
No.  Engagement 
1 
Engagement 
2 
Engagement 
3 
Engagement 
4 
Engagement 
5 
Engagement 
6 
 
 
Political risk 
      
Impact 
1  
 
* * *     
2  
 
   * * *  
3  
 
* *  *    
4  
 
*  *  *   
5  
 
*   *  *  
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6  
 
 * *  *   
7  
 
  * *  *  
8  
 
*    * *  
9  
 
 *  *  *  
10         
Note: Stars indicate the three elements included in each of the triads 
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B.3 Distribution of samples across Industry and offshored service 
type 
No. Industry Description of offshored business component 
1 Academia IT Support 
2 Accounting Back-office Support 
3 Accounting AP/AR/GL Accounting 
4 Banking Application management 
5 Banking Application management 
6 Banking Application Outsourcing Processing 
7 Banking Check processing 
8 Banking IT Helpdesk 
9 Banking Programme Development 
10 Banking Internal Financial Services 
11 Banking Application Management 
12 Engineering Services Delivery of Engineering & architectural services for global clients 
13 Entertainment Messaging Systems development 
14 Financial Services Processing of financial services  
15 Financial Services Shared Service Center 
16 Financial Services Processing of financial services  
17 Financial Services Processing of financial services  
18 Financial Services Processing of financial services  
19 Gaming Industry Programme Development 
20 Gaming Industry Programme Development 
21 Gaming Industry Programme Development 
22 Healthcare Claims Processing 
23 Healthcare Health Insurance Processing 
24 Healthcare Health Insurance Processing 
25 Healthcare Health Insurance Processing 
26 Healthcare Health Insurance Processing 
27 Healthcare Health Insurance Processing 
28 Healthcare Health Insurance Processing 
29 Healthcare Processing of Insurance Claims 
30 Insurance Processing of insurance claims 
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31 Insurance Processing of insurance claims 
32 Insurance Data entry and Insurance Business Cycle 
33 Insurance/Re-insurance Outsourcing investment management 
34 IT - Electronic Games Electronic Games Development 
35 IT Industry Call Center - Specific Support Channel 
36 IT Industry Call Center - English Support 
37 IT Industry Call Center - English/Japanese 
38 IT Industry Call Center Support - English/Spanish/Portuguese 
39 IT Industry Written Support 
40 Manufacturing - Heavy equipment Developing software embedded in crane manufacturing 
41 Marketing Consumer Product Marketing 
42 Medical Equipment Manufacturing of medical equipment 
43 Medical Equipment Remote Database Support 
44 Pharma Multiple Frame Agreements for research and development  
45 Pharma Pharmaceutical product manufacturing and development 
46 Pharma Clinical testing 
47 Pharma Clinical testing 
48 Pharma Clinical testing 
49 Pharma Clinical testing 
50 Pharma Clinical testing 
51 Pharma Clinical testing 
52 Pharma Clinical testing 
53 Pharma Programme Development 
54 Pharma Programme Development 
55 Pharma Programme Development 
56 Pharma Clinical Testing 
57 Pharma Clinical Testing 
58 Pharma Clinical Testing 
59 Pharma Clinical Testing 
60 Pharma Clinical Testing 
61 Pharma Clinical Testing 
62 Production Back-office Support 
63 Production IT Application support 
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64 Production Back-office Support 
65 Production IT Application support 
66 Production Back-office Support 
67 Public Utility Remote Database Support 
68 Public Utility Remote Database Support 
69 Retail Call centre/Helpdesk 
70 Software Application development and testing 
71 Software Industry Software and product development 
72 Software Industry Software and product development 
73 Software Industry IT  Application support 
74 Software Industry Software and product development 
75 Software product development Software and product development 
76 Software product development Remote Database Support 
77 Telecom Operations Center with Helpline and proactive management 
78 Telecom Call Center services 
79 Telecom Business Customer Interfacing 
80 Telecom Technical Support 
81 Telecom Engineering Support 
82 US Exchange Outsourcing of commodities and securities exchange 
83 Utilities Infrastructure Application & Procurement processing 
84 Utilities Application management 
85 Utilities Application management 
86 Web based consumer industry Data entry and indexing of historical documents 
87 Web based consumer industry Data entry and indexing of historical documents 
88 Web based consumer industry Data entry and indexing of historical documents 
89 Web based consumer industry Data entry and indexing of historical documents 
90 Web based consumer industry Data entry and indexing of historical documents 
91 Web based consumer industry Data entry and indexing of historical documents 
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 : 
C.1 Governance Indexes considered for the political risk indicators (Independent Variables) 
 
) 
Index Name Producer Stated purpose Format Scales Coverage (Years) Coverage 
(countries) 
Web address 
Global 
Competitive 
Index (GCI) 
World 
Economic 
Forum with 
Columbia 
University 
The Global Competitiveness 
Index (GCI) attempts to 
quantify the impact of a  
number of key factors which 
contribute to create the 
conditions for 
competitiveness, with 
particular focus on the 
macroeconomic 
environment, the quality of 
the  
country’s institutions, and the 
state of the country’s 
technology and supporting  
infrastructure. 
The index is composed of nine pillars:  
1. Institutions 
2. Infrastructure  
3. Macro economy 
4. Health and primary education 
5. Higher education and training 
6. Market efficiency (goods, labour, 
financial) 
7. Technological readiness 
8. Business sophistication  
9. Innovation 
Uses a 1-7 scale  
Higher average 
score means 
higher degree of 
competitiveness 
First data: 
Collected in 1979 
Latest data: 
Collected in 2005 
Stated frequency: 
Annual 
Global 125 
countries 
http://www.wefor
um.org/issues/gl
obal-
competitiveness 
 
http://reports.wef
orum.org/global-
competitiveness-
report-2014-
2015/downloads/ 
 
 
      
 
275 
 
Country Policy 
and  
Institutional 
Assessment 
World Bank The Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) aims to assess the 
quality of a country’s present 
policy and institutional 
framework. 
The CPIA rates countries against a 
set of 16 criteria grouped in four 
clusters: (a) economic management; 
(b) structural policies; (c) policies for 
social inclusion and equity; and (d) 
public sector management and 
institutions. 
 First data: 
collected in the 
1970s (but not 
publicly available) 
Latest data: 
collected in 2006 
(first made publicly 
available) 
Stated frequency: 
Annual 
78 
countries 
http://web.worldb
ank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/TOP
ICS/ENVIRONM
ENT/EXTDATAS
TA/0,,contentMD
K:21115900~me
nuPK:2935553~p
agePK:64168445
~piPK:64168309
~theSitePK:2875
751,00.html 
 
 
The Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI)  
 
 
World Bank 
Institute 
To provide periodic cross-
country estimates of six 
dimensions of governance, 
as well as access to a large 
dataset of underlying 
individual sources of 
governance data 
Aggregate and individual governance 
indicators for six dimensions of 
governance: 
 Voice and Accountability 
 Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence 
 Government Effectiveness 
 Regulatory Quality 
 Rule of Law 
 Control of Corruption 
The 
‘Governance 
Matters’ 
indicators use a 
scale from -2.5 to 
2.5 (higher 
values indicate 
higher quality of 
governance). 
Period 1996–2013 Global 213 
countries. 
http://info.worldb
ank.org/governan
ce/wgi/index.asp
x#home 
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Heritage 
Foundation’s 
Economic 
Freedom Index 
(EFI) 
Heritage 
Foundation 
and Wall Street 
Journal 
To develop systematic, 
empirical measurement of 
economic freedom in 
countries throughout the 
world. 
The 2004 Index on Economic 
Freedom measures how well 
countries score on a  
list of 50 independent variables 
divided into 10 broad factors of 
economic freedom: trade policy, fiscal 
burden of government, government 
intervention in the  
economy, monetary policy, capital 
flows and foreign investment, banking 
and finance, wages and prices, 
property rights, regulation 
Countries are 
ranked on a 1-5 
scale 
First data: 
Collected in 1994. 
 
161 
countries 
http://www.herita
ge. 
org/research/feat
ures/index/countr
yFiles/English/20
04Index.pdf 
 
 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index (CPI) 
Transparency 
International 
To provide data on 
‘corruption in international 
business transactions’ 
A composite index drawing on 9 
independent institutions including: 
Freedom House, PWC, WEF, Gallup, 
World Bank and Economist 
Intelligence Unit. 
 First data: Earliest 
data used dates 
from 1980. 
Latest data: 
Collected in 2006. 
163 
countries 
globally 
Available from 
the Transparency 
International 
internet site:  
www.transparenc
y.org/policy_rese
arch/surveys_indi
ces/cpi 
Bertelsmann’s 
Transformation 
Bertelsmann 
Foundation 
and the Centre 
The Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index (BTI) is 
intended to evaluate the 
For the Management Index, all the 
countries in the study are ranked 
according to progress in which 
 First data 
collected: 2003 
119 
developing 
and 
http://www.bti-
project.de/bti-
home/ 
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Status Index 
(TSI) 
for Applied 
Research 
(C.A.P) at 
Munich  
University 
progress, development and 
transformation of countries in 
transition 
transformation has resulted from 
judicious management of the 
economy, with the best country 
receiving the highest rank. 
Latest data 
collected: 2005 
Frequency: Every 
two years 
transition 
countries 
worldwide. 
 
Opacity Index Kurtzman 
Group 
To discourage opacity, due 
to the cost it imposes on 
countries in terms of reduced 
foreign direct investment. 
The methodology measures opacity 
based on five distinct components: 
business and government corruption 
(costs from corruption, based on 
Transparency International and other 
sources); ineffective legal system 
(overall function of legal system, 
effectiveness in resolving disputes 
and protecting businesses); costs of 
doing business (including losses from 
bureaucratic red tape, non-trans 
parent taxation, and costs from 
organized crime and terrorism); 
inadequate accounting and 
governance practices. 
 
 
The final score is 
derived by 
rescaling all of 
the above 
categories and 
taking the simple 
average of the 
five sub-indices; 
separately, the 
scores for each 
individual sub-
index can show 
companies here 
the threats lie in 
each country. 
First data: 
Collected in 2001. 
Latest data: 2004. 
Stated frequency: 
Not stated. 
The 2004 
index 
covers 48 
countries 
worldwide. 
http://www.kurtz
mangroup.com/o
pacity_index.htm 
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Political 
Constraint 
Index 
 
 
 
 
 
Henisz, 
University of 
Pennsylvania 
Measure the feasibility of 
change in policy given the 
structure of a nation’s 
political institutions and the 
preference of the actors that 
inhabit them. The Political 
Constraint Index is used for 
political risk analysis for 
investment purposes and for 
predicting policy variability 
more generally. 
The index uses quantitative data on 
the number of independent branches 
of administrative government with 
veto power, over policy change, and 
the distribution of preferences within 
those veto players. These data are 
analyzed in a simple spatial model of 
political interaction to assess the 
feasibility with which any one actor 
can secure a change in the status 
quo. 
Scale 0 (most 
hazardous - no 
checks and 
balances) to 1 
(most 
constrained) 
First data: Some 
data collected as 
early as 1815 
Latest data: 
Collected in 2004 
Stated Frequency: 
Annual 
Global: 234 
countries 
http://www.mana
gement.wh 
arton.upenn.edu/
henisz/ 
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C.2 Review of methodology and data sources applied in comparable political risk research 
 
Author Year Citation  Journal 
Name 
Contribution  Research approach  Sample 
types 
Mumpower 
& 
Livingston  
1987  Experts Judgments of 
Political Riskiness. 
Journal of 
Forecasting 
Highlights the relative limited difference in political risk 
expert judgments and that of "naïve" experts, highlighting 
the limited predictive ability of experts. Also notes the 
predictive importance of infant mortality rate and other 
development variables. 
Applied factor analysis, 
linear regression and 
cluster analysis in data 
analysis 
83 developing 
countries 
covering 
1984-2003 
Fatehi & 
Safizadeh 
1989 The Association Between 
Political Instability and 
Flow of Foreign Direct 
Investment. 
Management 
International 
Review (MIR) 
Explores the association between US MNCs investment 
(FDI) and political instability, identifying positive correlation 
between protest demonstrations, successful assassinations, 
political strikes and political execution and FDI inflow, 
suggesting that symptoms of socio-political instability by and 
large have had lasting effects on US FDI decisions.  
Applied multiple regression 
analysis with FDI serving as 
dependent variable and 
frequencies of socio-
political served as 
independent variable. 
3857 
international 
expansions of 
665 Japanese 
manufacturin
g firms 
Rice & 
Mahmoud  
1990 Political Risk Forecasting 
by Canadian Firms. 
International 
Journal of 
Forecasting 
The research explores political risk forecasting among 
Canadian firms linking forecasting and management 
decision making. Results showed that personal judgments 
was by far the most used political risk forecasting method, 
second was scenario planning and last was the Delphi 
method. The biggest problem were that the assessments 
tend to be reactive and unreliable data 
Applied Fischer’s Least 
Significant Difference (LSD) 
technique to identify 
"groups" within the 
respondent pool 
Looked at 
years 1950-
82 and 15 
countries with 
global spread 
Oetzel & 
Zenner 
2001 Country Risk Measures: 
How Risky Are They? 
Journal of 
World 
Business 
Investigates the extent to which country risk measures can 
predict periods of intense instability. Findings indicate that 
commercial risk measures are very poor at predicting actual 
realized risks. 
Applied a punctuated 
equilibrium framework 
 
Delios & 
Henisz  
2003 Political hazards, 
experience and sequential 
entry strategies: The 
Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
The study found support for the role of experience in the 
firm’s international expansion and sensitivity to political 
uncertainty. The study adds political hazard to the stages 
Applied Co variation Data 
mining on Japanese 
overseas investment 
5-8000 
German 
parent 
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international expansion of 
Japanese firms. 
model, including measuring political hazards, cultural block 
distance, and investment experience. 
companies 
and about 
13,500 
affiliates 
located in 
more than 
140 countries 
Zhao 2003 Country factor differentials 
as determinants of FDI 
flow to China. 
Thunderbird 
International 
Business 
Review 
The study focused on empirically examining the importance 
of source country factors in explaining the level of FDI in 
China. Findings revealed that high level of growth when the 
Chinese market exhibited a high growth rate than source 
countries; when the source countries had a relative stronger 
currency. However FDI flow was low when China had a 
relatively less stable political environment and higher 
operational risk. 
Applied Multiple Regression  Data 
extracted 
from the 
Almanac of 
China's 
Foreign 
Economic 
Relations and 
Trade  
Mudambi & 
Navarra 
2003 Political tradition, political 
risk and foreign direct 
investment in Italy. 
Management 
International 
Review 
The research finds that the major influence on the location 
of investment emanates from location and infrastructural 
factors, while local political tradition is influential at the 
margin.   
Applied a two-step 
econometric  model  
See source 
list 
Keillor & 
Wilkinson 
2005 Threats to international 
operations: Dealing with 
political risk at the firm 
level.  
Journal of 
Business 
Research 
Explores relationships between specific forms of political 
risk i.e. transfer restrictions and ownership/control 
restrictions and the political activities used by firms to 
manage these risks finding that political activities of firms is 
related to the threats that they face.  
Survey 0 
Busse & 
Hefeker 
2007 "Political risk, institutions 
and foreign direct 
investment" 
European 
Journal of 
Political 
Economy 
The paper examines a wide range of indicators for political 
risk and to identify the relative importance of these indicators 
for FDI inflows. The result indicate that government stability, 
internal and external conflicts, corruption, law & order, ethnic 
tensions, democratic accountability and bureaucratic quality 
of government matter for the investment decision of MNCs. 
Applied factor analysis, 
linear regression and 
cluster analysis in data 
analysis 
0 
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Strongest are GOV, Internal Conflict, Law & order and Econ, 
while corruption matters over time but only marginally. 
 
Agarwal & 
Feils 
2007 Political risk and the 
internationalization of 
firms: An empirical study of 
Canadian-based export 
and FDI firms.   
Journal of 
Administrative 
Sciences  
Explores the critical political risk concerns among exporters 
finding increasing concern with red tape from bureaucratic 
inefficiency to corruption.  
Repeated Measures within 
Subjects - MANOVA 
Currency 
crisis used as 
surrogate for 
economic or 
political 
events 
Sanders, 
Locke,  
Moore & 
Autry 
2007  A multidimensional 
framework for 
understanding outsourcing 
arrangements.   
Journal of 
Supply Chain 
Management 
The study established a framework clarifying the broad 
spectrum of outsourcing modalities in terms of scope and 
criticality, outlining their respective risks and advantages. 
The study does not inform on inherent political risks.  
In-depth interviews  19 Senior 
Managers 
Sodhi & Lee 2007 An analysis of sources of 
risk in the consumer 
electronics industry.  
The Journal of 
the 
Operational 
Research 
Society 
Describes many of the risks associated with any global 
supply chain in the electronics industry. Develops an 
understanding of supply chain risks in the consumer 
electronics industry, identifying both strategic and 
operational level risks. 
Case study IMF FDI flows 
from 108 
countries 
Straub 2008 Opportunism, corruption 
and the multinational firm's 
mode of entry. 
Journal of 
International 
Economics 
Explores institutional constraints in host countries with focus 
on corruption constraints. Distinguishes between 
bureaucratic and political corruption, finding that in the 
absence of corruption MNE would prefer FDI, however both 
kind of corruption shifts the trade-off marginally toward debt. 
The debt contracts are defined as projects where MNE 
engage in a licensing agreement with the host country.   
Correlation  FDI capital 
flows 
measured in 
the IMFs 
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
Database 
covering 106 
countries 
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Feinberg & 
Gupta 
2009 MNC subsidiaries and 
Country Risk: 
Internalization as a 
Safeguard Against Weak 
External Institutions. 
Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
The study focuses on MNC risk management in high risk 
locations post-entry and confirms that trade internalization is 
increased under uncertainty. 
Correlation 21 Source 
Countries 
investment 
1983-1999 
yielding 357 
observations 
Nakatsu & 
Lacovou 
2
009 
A comparative study 
of important risk factors 
involved in offshore and 
domestic outsourcing of 
software development 
projects.  
Informati
on & 
Management 
The study generates a list of risk factors for domestic 
and outsourced software development projects and 
compares the two contexts.  
A two-panel Delphi 
Study 
24 Exporters 
and 21 FDIs 
(10% respond 
rate) 
Rios-
Morales, 
Gamberger, 
Smuc and 
Azuaje, 
2009 
2009 Innovative methods in 
assessing political risk for 
business 
internationalization 
Research in 
International 
Business and 
Finance 
The paper assesses the relevance and action ability of 
"Good Governance" indicators in political risk assessment. 
The findings suggest that quantitative indicators of good 
governance may provide the basis for accurate and 
meaningful model's for assessment and prediction of 
political risk.  
Integrative Data mining - 1. 
Uses the Political Instability 
task Force (PITF) dataset 
as the source of information 
about political instability. 2. 
Uses the GG indicators of 
the World Bank. 
1722 R&D 
projects by 
MNEs located 
in developed 
and emerging 
economies 
Hahn, Doh, 
and 
Bunyaratav
e 
2009 The evolution of risk in 
Information Systems 
Offshoring 
MIS Quarterly The study find that firm-specific experience and the core 
"risk-gab" between home and host country are predictive of 
companies pursuing progressively riskier locations, but that 
their effects dissipate as environment-wide experience is 
incorporated.  
Merging datasets from 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) and 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) - and the 
LOCO monitor database 
developed by OCO 
consulting  
IS projects 
(881) 
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Kesternich 
& Schnitzer 
2010 "Who is afraid of political 
risk? Multinational firms 
and their choice of capital 
structure"  
Journal of 
International 
Economics 
Explores how MNC chose the capital structure of their 
foreign affiliates in response to political risk i.e. ownership or 
leverage. Findings suggest that as political risk increases, 
ownership tends to decrease, while leverage will 
increase/decrease based on type of political risk. Focus on 
expropriation, intellectual property rights and confiscatory 
taxes.  
OLS regression - using data 
from the Deutche 
Bundesbank and ICRG as a 
measure of political risk. 
170 
López-
Duarte & 
Vidal-
Suárez 
2010 "External uncertainty and 
entry mode choice: 
Cultural distance, political 
risk and language 
diversity" 
International 
Business 
Review 
Aims at analyzing the effect of external uncertainty on entry 
mode choice i.e. between WOS and JV. Findings suggest 
that managers interested in expanding through FDI should 
consider language diversity as a main factor influencing the 
entry mode choice.  
Logistic regression models 15 
outsourcing 
offshore 
experts and 
17 Domestic 
outsourcing 
experts 
Wan & 
Zhang  
2010 Business Risk 
Management for Software 
Outsourcing Service 
Provider  
Scientific 
Research 
Publishing 
The study constructs a risk structure based on established 
correlations between risk factors for a Software Outsourcing 
service between Hong Kong and Guangdong. The model 
identifies political & legal risks as one of the five most 
important considerations. 
Applies an Interpretive 
Structural Model using a re-
order reachable matrix. 
19 Executives 
Demirbag & 
Glaister  
2010 Factors determining 
offshore location choice for 
R&D projects. 
Journal of 
Management 
Studies 
Focuses on R&D outsourcing and the location choice. At the 
regional level, findings show that the R&D wage difference 
and knowledge infrastructure difference between home and 
host countries, the science and engineering talent pool size, 
and the political risk level of host countries are important 
determining factors. At the firm level, experience of overseas 
R&D projects and prior experience with research in the host 
country are found to be important location determinants. 
Multi logistic regression 
model - used LOCO 
database maintained by 
OCO consulting.  
Samsung 
electronics 
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Pedersen 
and Ørberg 
Jensen 
2011 The economic geography 
of off shoring: The fit 
between activities and 
local context.  
Journal of 
Management 
Studies 
Analyzes the fit between destination attributes and attributes 
of offshored business activities and reveals a multi-facet 
location pattern in which firm strategies, to some degree 
follow, a logic where manufacturing is relocated to low-cost 
destinations and R&D is relocated to high-cost destinations.  
Survey 881 IS 
projects 
Gholami 2012 Critical risk factors in 
outsourced support 
projects of IT.  
Journal of 
Management 
Research 
Determines the critical risk factors in the Information 
Technology (IT) projects outsourcing. Identifies legal and 
political risk as being a main concern for ITO and identifies 
sub-categories i.e.  (Privacy rule, Law and order, 
accountability, Quality of Bureaucracy). 
Semi structured interview 1504 Danish 
firms 
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C.3 Overview of Data Sources and Scope for Independent Variables 
No. 
Overall Risk 
Family 
Risk Description Data Heading Data Source 
Data 
Type 
Data Description 
1. 
Policy 
predictability 
Home-Country Risk    Data unavailable 
Change of data management 
regulatory framework 
   Data unavailable 
Predictability & 
transparency of tax regime 
   Data unavailable 
Predictability of labor 
regulations 
   Data unavailable 
2. 
Political 
Instability 
Geo-political Risk External Conflict 
PRS Group - the 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide 
1-12 
(best) 
A measure of both the risk to the incumbent government from 
foreign action, ranging from non-violent external pressure 
(diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions, 
territorial disputes, sanctions, etc.) to violent external 
pressure (cross-border conflicts to all-out war). The risk 
rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: War, 
Cross-Border Conflict, and Foreign Pressures 
Internal unrest Internal Conflict 
PRS Group - the 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide  
1-12 
(best) 
A measure of political violence in the country and its actual or 
potential impact on governance. The risk rating assigned is 
the sum of three subcomponents: Civil War/Coup Threat, 
Terrorism/Political Violence, and Civil Disorder. 
Terrorism 
Business costs of 
terrorism 
 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index, 1.13 
1-7 (best) 
In your country, to what extent does the threat of terrorism 
impose costs on businesses? [1 = to a great extent; 7 = not at 
all] 
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Host Government Stability 
Government 
Stability 
PRS Group - the 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide 
1-12 
(best) 
 
A measure of both of the government’s ability to carry out its 
declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office. The risk 
rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: 
Government Unity, Legislative Strength, and Popular Support. 
3. 
Instability of 
socio-economic 
environment 
Social unrest 
Socio-economic 
conditions 
 
PRS Group - the 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide 
1-12 
(best) 
A measure of the socioeconomic pressures at work in society 
that could constrain government action or fuel social 
dissatisfaction. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three 
subcomponents: Unemployment, Consumer Confidence, and 
Poverty.( 
Organized Crime 
Business costs of 
crime and violence 
 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index, 1.14 
1-7 (best) 
In your country, to what extent does the incidence of crime 
and violence impose costs on businesses? [1 = to a great 
extent; 7 = not at all] 
Organized Crime 
Organized crime 
 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index, 1.15 
1-7 (best) 
In your country, to what extent does organized crime (mafia-
oriented racketeering, extortion) impose costs on 
businesses? [1 = to a great extent; 7 = not at all] 
Organized Labor Strike 
Cooperation in 
labor-employer 
relations 
 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index 7.01 
1-7 (best) 
In your country, how would you characterize labor-employer 
relations? [1 = generally confrontational; 7 = generally 
cooperative] 
 
Wage Flexibility 
 
Flexibility of wage 
determination 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index 7.02 
1-7 (best) 
In your country, how are wages generally set? [1 = by a 
centralized bargaining process; 7 = by each individual 
company] 
4. 
Macro-economic 
instability 
Currency Fluctuations Exchange Rate 
Stability 
PRS Group - the 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide 
Annual % 
Change 
Annual percentage change in the exchange rate of the 
national currency against the USD (against the EUR in the 
case of the USD; prior to 2000, to the DM). 
Wage Inflation 
Inflation, annual % 
change* 
 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index, 3.03 
Annual % 
Change 
Annual percent change in consumer price index (year 
average) 
      
 
287 
 
5. 
Institutional 
capacity 
limitations 
Host country bureaucracy 
Burden of customs 
procedures 
 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index, 6.13 
1-7 (best) 
In your country, how efficient are the customs procedures 
(related to the entry and exit of merchandise)? [1 = not efficient 
at all; 7 = extremely efficient] 
Host country bureaucracy 
Quality of 
Bureaucracy 
PRS Group - the 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide 
1-4 (Best) 
Institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is a shock 
absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when 
governments change. 
Institutional Corruption 
Irregular payments 
and bribes 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index, 1.05 
1-7 (best) 
Average score across the five components of the following 
Executive Opinion Survey question: In your country, how 
common is it for firms to make undocumented extra payments or 
bribes connected with (a) imports and exports; (b) public 
utilities; (c) annual tax payments; (d) awarding of public 
contracts and licenses; (e) obtaining favorable judicial decisions? 
In each case, the answer ranges from 1 [very common] to 7 
[never occurs]. 
6. 
Legal 
unpredictability 
Contract enforcement 
Judicial 
independence 
 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index, 1.06 
1-7 (best) 
In your country, to what extent is the judiciary independent from 
influences of members of government, citizens, or firms? [1 = 
heavily influenced; 7 = entirely independent] 
Contract enforcement 
Efficiency of legal 
framework in 
settling disputes 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index, 1.10 
1-7 (best) 
In your country, how efficient is the legal framework for private 
businesses in settling disputes? [1 = extremely inefficient; 7 = 
extremely efficient] 
Contract enforcement 
Efficiency of legal 
framework  
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index, 1.11 
1-7 (best) 
In your country, how easy is it for private businesses to challenge 
government actions and/or regulations through the legal 
system? [1 = extremely difficult; 7 = extremely easy] 
 
Loss of IP 
Intellectual property 
protection 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index, 1.02 
1-7 (best) 
In your country, how strong is the protection of intellectual 
property, including anti-counterfeiting measures? [1 = extremely 
weak; 7 = extremely strong] 
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C.4 Aggregate BOP Services Credit - Computer and Information Services (CIS), Research & Development 
Services and Other Business Services (2010) 
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Global: Aggregate BOP Services Credit (TOP 25); Computer and Information Services (CIS), Research 
& Development Services and Other Business Services (2010)
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C.5 Sample Distribution (BPO TOP 25) - Services, Other Business Services, Technical, trade-related, and 
other business services (2010) 
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C.6 Sample Distribution (ITO Top 25): Services, Telecommunications, computer, and information 
services, Computer services (2010) 
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Global: Sample Distribution (Top 25): Services,  Telecommunications,  computer,  and info. services,  Computer 
services (2010)
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C.7 Sample Distribution – KPO Top 25 (Global), Research and Development Services, (2010) 
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C.8 Top 25 A.T. Kearny Index of Best Offshore Outsourcing locations 
 
TOP 25 A.T. Kearny Index of Best Offshore Outsourcing locations Country Rank 
India 1 
China 2 
Malaysia No data 
Mexico No data 
Indonesia No data 
Thailand 6 
Philippines 4 
Brazil 3 
Bulgaria 15 
Egypt 17 
Vietnam No data 
Chile No data 
Sri Lanka 20 
Romania 10 
Jordan 19 
Russia 5 
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Costa Rica 12 
Pakistan 16 
Bangladesh 18 
Tunisia 34 
Ghana 27 
Panama No data 
Hungary 7 
Morocco 11 
Argentina 8 
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C.9 Comparison of Standardized Coefficients Outcomes (List-wise versus pair-wise exclusion) 
 
  Standardized Coefficients (Beta) Standardized Coefficients (Beta) 
  List-wise exclusion Pair-wise exclusion 
1 Political risk variables   
External Conflict -.094 -.010 
Corruption .148 .232 
Government Stability -.068 -.051 
Internal Conflict -.167 -.239 
Staff Security -.065 -.121 
Quality of Bureaucracy .305 .294 
Cooperation in labor-employer relations .076 .085 
Intellectual property protection .692 .695 
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes -.096 -.120 
Burden of customs procedures -.379 -.424 
Judicial independence -.053 -.026 
Exchange Rate Stability .003 -.001 
1 External business variables   
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony infrastructure .054 .073 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment -.232 -.221 
Pillar 4 - Primary Education .052 .009 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training -.372 -.244 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency .165 .156 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness .290 .131 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size .526 .491 
Pillar 12 - Innovation .349 .312 
GDP per Capita -.019 .099 
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C.10 Comparison of variable ranking - List-wise versus pair-wise exclusion 
 
Political Risk Variables   
  List-wise exclusion 
Intellectual property protection 0.692 
Quality of Bureaucracy 0.305 
Corruption 0.148 
Cooperation in labor-employer relations 0.076 
Exchange Rate Stability 0.003 
Judicial independence -0.053 
Staff Security -0.065 
Government Stability -0.068 
External Conflict -0.094 
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes -0.096 
Internal Conflict -0.167 
Burden of customs procedures -0.379 
 
 Political Risk Variables Pair-wise exclusion 
Intellectual property protection 0.695 
Quality of Bureaucracy 0.294 
Corruption 0.232 
Cooperation in labor-employer relations 0.085 
Exchange Rate Stability -0.001 
External Conflict -0.010 
Judicial independence -0.026 
Government Stability -0.051 
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes -0.120 
Staff Security -0.121 
Internal Conflict -0.239 
Burden of customs procedures -0.424 
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External Business Variables  
 List-wise exclusion 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size 0.526 
Pillar 12 - Innovation 0.349 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness 0.290 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency 0.165 
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony infrastructure 0.054 
Pillar 4 - Primary Education 0.052 
GDP per Capita -0.019 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment -0.232 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training -0.372 
 
External Business Variables Pair-wise exclusion 
Pillar 10 - Domestic Market Size 0.491 
Pillar 12 - Innovation 0.312 
Pillar 7 - Labor market efficiency 0.156 
Pillar 9 - Technological readiness 0.131 
GDP per Capita 0.099 
Pillar 2 - Electricity and telephony infrastructure 0.073 
Pillar 4 - Primary Education 0.009 
Pillar 3 - Macro Environment -0.221 
Pillar 5 - Higher education and training -0.244 
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